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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Problems	of	the	utmost	concern	that	are	often	faced	by	both	developing	and	developed	
countries	are	those	of	inflation,	the	budget	deficit	and	the	accumulated	public	debt.	It	is	be-
lieved	that	the	main	reason	for	high	inflation	in	most	developing	countries	and	countries	with	
transition	economies	is	the	financing	of	the	budget	deficit	by	seigniorage.	This	means	that	
in	most	such	cases	it	is	the	budget	deficit	that	is	responsible	for	high	inflation.	From	time	to	
time	tensions	that	had	accumulated	in	the	fiscal	sphere	and	mistakes	that	had	been	made	in	
monetary	policy	have	serious	consequences,	such	as	hyperinflation	or	a	debt	crisis.	
The	government	and	the	central	bank	are	interconnected	by	a	consolidated	public	sector	
budget	constraint:	the	operational	deficit	of	the	budget	is	financed	by	new	borrowings	and	by	
seigniorage.	On	one	hand,	the	central	bank,	which	controls	money	emission,	has	an	impor-
tant	goal	to	achieve,	namely	a	low	and	stable	level	of	inflation.	On	the	other	hand,	the	central	
bank	must	also	be	concerned	about	 the	 stability	of	 the	 financial	 system,	and	 in	particular	
about	the	sustainability	of	the	public	debt.	This	means	that,	even	given	the	central	bank’s	for-
mal	independence	of	the	government,	the	former	must	nevertheless	take	into	account	prob-
lems	in	the	fiscal	sphere	and	cover	a	certain	part	of	the	budget	deficit	by	seigniorage.	In	other	
words,	the	policies	of	the	government	and	of	the	central	bank	interact	with	each	other.	
This	work	covers	a	series	of	questions	which	are	of	principle	concern	in	the	analysis	of	the	
interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies:
Is	inflation	a	completely	monetary	phenomenon?
Is	there	a	simple	cause-and-effect	relationship	between	inflation	and	the	budget	defi-
cit?
Can	chronic	inflation	be	overcome	only	by	a	tight	monetary	policy	that	is	formally	
independent	of	fiscal	requirements?
What	importance	do	expectations	of	future	stability	have?
Can	monetary	policy	be	permanently	or	only	temporarily	tightened	given	(exogenous)	
fiscal	policy?
Should	an	increase	in	the	government’s	budget	deficit	be	accompanied	by	an	increase	
or	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money?	What	short-term	and	long-term	re-
sults	will	this	have	for	inflation?
What	 situations	 are	 there	 in	which	neither	 fiscal	nor	monetary	policies	 are	 able	 to	
avoid	a	financial	crisis,	and	how	can	they	be	avoided?
The	 goal	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 elucidate	 the	 general	 principles	 for	 the	 formulation	of	
the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	that	would	make	hyperinflation	and/or	
a	debt	crisis	impossible.	
•
•
•
•
•
•
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2We	solve	the	following	problems	in	achieving	this	goal:
determination	of	the	constraints	that	exist	for	the	common	policies	of	the	government	
and	the	central	bank;
description	of	the	general	ways	in	which	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	can	interact;
elucidation	of	potential	difficulties	that	may	arise	in	the	formulation	of	uncoordinated	
macroeconomic	policies.	
In	reality,	the	interaction	of	the	government	and	the	central	bank	is	an	important	prob-
lem	not	just	for	developing	countries	or	for	transition	economies.	This	important	question	
about	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	was	first	posed	in	the	1980s,	when	the	
USA	and	many	European	countries	faced	acute	problems	that	had	to	do	with	the	budget	
deficit	 and	public	debt.	At	present	 this	 range	of	 questions	 is	 being	 actively	discussed	by	
academics	and	policymakers	with	regard	to	the	problem	of	the	interaction	of	a	common	
monetary	policy	and	often	uncoordinated	fiscal	policies	in	the	countries	of	the	European	
Union.
The	questions	posed	above	are	of	special	relevance	for	the	Russian	economy,	which	has	
experienced	the	1998	crisis.	Russia’s	currently	under-developed	financial	system	and	con-
cern	about	the	ability	of	the	government	to	retain	a	high	budget	income	in	the	case	of	unfa-
vorable	exogenous	factors	make	the	problem	of	cooperation	in	the	formulation	of	fiscal	and	
monetary	policies	no	less	important	than	a	few	years	ago.
Several	historical	episodes	of	macroeconomic	policies	in	quite	different	countries	(such	
as	Argentina,	Chile,	Indonesia,	Israel,	Korea,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	Philippines,	Russia,	Thai-
land,	and	the	United	States)	are	considered	in	this	paper.	In	considering	all	these	case	stu-
dies,	our	main	goal	was	to	illustrate	the	different	ways	in	which	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	
can	interact	and	to	underline	the	potential	problems	of	interaction.	Some	of	these	case	stu-
dies	are	examples	of	successful	stabilization	programs,	while	others	are	examples	of	policy	
coordination	failure.	We	did	not	intend	to	conduct	rigorous	empirical	studies.	Almost	all	of	
the	episodes	considered	in	this	paper	have	been	extensively	studied	in	the	literature	on	stabi-
lization	policy.	For	this	reason,	we	have	simply	based	our	exposition	on	the	descriptive	parts	
of	these	works,	interpreting	macroeconomic	policy	in	terms	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	in-
teraction.	At	the	same	time,	it	would	be	difficult,	and	perhaps	even	impossible,	to	successfully	
apply	econometric	analysis	in	this	area	of	inquiry.	This	is	simply	due	to	the	nonlinear	nature	
of	the	dynamics,	and	to	the	possibility	that	certain	important	factors	that	are	not	in	line	with	
our	narrow	fiscal-monetary	framework	may	be	omitted.	
1.2. Literature on fiscal and monetary policy interaction
The	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	has	become	especially	relevant	during	the	
last	20—25	years.	The	paper	“Some	Unpleasant	Monetarist	Arithmetic”	by	Sargent	and	Wal-
lace	(1981)	was	groundbreaking;	the	authors	showed	that	restricted	monetary	policy,	given	
realistic	assumptions,	is	not	able	to	decrease	inflation	either	in	the	long	or	short	run	without	
•
•
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3certain	changes	in	fiscal	policy.	This	paper	is	one	of	the	most	cited	in	articles	dealing	with	this	
problem	area.
Two	lines	of	research	have	appeared	in	the	economic	literature.	The	fist	of	these	(Livia-
tan,	1984,	1986,	1988;	Drazen,	1985;	Aiyagari	and	Gertler,	1985;	Bruno	and	Fischer,	1990)	
studied	the	effect	of	interaction	of	common	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	on	public	debt	with-
out	using	a	formal	game-theoretic	approach.	The	so-called	“fiscal	theory	of	inflation”	ap-
peared	in	the	1980s.1	We	base	our	research	on	this	approach.	
A	new	approach	appeared	in	the	1990s:	the	fiscal	theory	of	the	price	level	(Sims,	1994;	
Woodford,	1995),	which	applied	a	non-traditional	interpretation	of	the	budget	constraint	of	
the	government.	
A	second	approach,	which	was	formed	by	Blinder	(1982),	Tabellini	(1985,	1986,	1987a,b),	
Alesina	and	Tabellini	(1987),	Petit	(1989),	Tabellini	and	La	Via	(1989),	Nordhaus,	Schultze	
and	Fischer	(1994),	is	based	on	the	formal	description	of	an	optimal	strategic	interaction	of	
the	two	policies.	
Blinder	(1982)	studied	various	means	by	which	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	may	inter-
act,	casting	doubt	on	the	assumption	that	their	coordination	can	always	be	effective.	He	be-
lieves	that	one	of	the	reasons	that	their	coordination	may	not	be	effective	is	the	wide	range	of	
instruments	available	by	which	fiscal	and	monetary	authorities	may	achieve	the	major	goals	
of	stabilization	policies:	“When	no	one	can	be	sure	what	is	the	right	thing	to	do,	no	one	can	
ensure	us	that	a	unified	fiscal-monetary	policy	authority	will	do	better	than	the	two-headed	
horse	we	now	ride”2.
Literature modeling the strategic interaction of the authorities 
Two	main	groups	of	problems	concerning	 the	 strategic	 interaction	of	 the	government	
and	the	central	bank	can	be	found	in	the	modern	literature.	The	first	concerns	the	study	of	
how	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	influence	the	stability	of	public	debt	and	the	regulation	of	
inflation.	Following	the	groundbreaking	work	by	Tabellini	(1986),	van	Arle,	Bovenberg	and	
Raith	(1995,	1997)	enhanced	the	former’s	model	so	that	fiscal	policies	were	concerned	not	
only	with	attaining	their	own	goals,	but	also	with	attaining	goals	traditionally	considered	to	
be	monetary.	
Beetsma	and	Bovenberg	(1995,	1997a,	2003)	also	considered	the	conflict	of	interest	be-
tween	fiscal	and	monetary	policies,	namely	the	regulation	of	the	size	of	public	debt	and	of	the	
rate	of	inflation.	The	authors	assume	that	it	is	possible	to	achieve	effective	interaction	of	the	
two	authorities	irrespective	of	whether	the	central	bank	is	independent	or	not.	The	authors	
note	that,	assuming	cooperation	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies,	the	government	does	not	
1	 More	recent	contributions	to	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation	are	Weil	(1987),	Drazen	and	Helpman	(1988,	
1990),	Bental	and	Eckstein	(1990),	Kawai	and	Maccini	(1990),	Miller,	Skidelsky	and	Weller	(1990),	Dorn-
busch	(1996),	Miller	and	Zhang	(1997),	Bhattacharya,	Guzman	and	Smith	(1998),	Bhattacharya	and	Haslag	
(1999),	Ruge-Murcia	(1999)	among	others.	
2	 See	Blinder	(1982),	pp.	25—26.
4have	to	use	the	debt	for	optimizing	the	economy	if	the	central	bank	stabilizes	the	price	level.	
At	the	same	time,	if	the	monetary	authorities	are	independent,	efficient	interaction	is	pos-
sible	if	the	government	is	more	intolerant	of	inflation	than	both	the	central	bank	and	soci-
ety.	The	authors	also	note	that,	in	order	to	avoid	the	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	of	
Sargent	and	Wallace	it	is	necessary	to	determine	the	optimal	level	of	public	debt	in	order	to	
efficiently	manage	the	economy.	
The	second	area	of	research	concerns	the	following	fact:	both	fiscal	and	monetary	poli-
cies	can	use	instruments	to	influence	aggregate	demand,	and	in	doing	so	find	a	compromise	
between	output	and	inflation.	Andersen	and	Schneider	(1986)	were	some	of	the	first	to	con-
sider	 this	problem,	and	 they	noted	 that	 two	 independent	authorities	do	not	automatically	
guarantee	optimal	output.	
Dixit	and	Lambertini	(2001,	2003)	showed	that	coordination	entails	a	smaller	output	and	
higher	inflation	than	either	authority	would	like,	if	monetary	policies	are	more	conservative	
than	fiscal	policies.	They	also	pointed	out	that	in	this	case	it	would	be	preferable	for	the	fiscal	
authorities,	i.e.	the	government,	to	lead.	In	their	opinion,	efficient	interaction	between	the	
government	and	the	central	bank	is	possible	if	both	have	identical	goals	(output	approaches	
social	optimum	and	prices	are	stable)	or	if	their	goals	are	strictly	separate	(the	central	bank	
is	concerned	only	with	the	price	level,	and	the	government	is	concerned	only	with	optimal	
output).	Lambertini	(2004)	comes	to	similar	conclusions.
	
Practical applications of the research 
The	creation	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	influenced	researchers	to	con-
sider	 the	 interaction	of	 fiscal	and	monetary	authorities	 in	more	detail	and	to	provide	sug-
gestions	for	solving	real-life	problems.	Beetsma	and	Bovenberg	(1997b,	1999)	did	this;	they	
generally	approved	of	the	EMU	policies	and	determined	that	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	which	
gave	priority	to	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	in	stabilizing	prices,	was	reasonable.	Van	
Aarle,	Bovenberg	 and	Raith	 (1997)	noted	 that	 the	monetary	 authorities	 in	 the	EMU	had	
significantly	greater	freedom	of	action	than	the	separate	fiscal	authorities,	and	therefore	they	
should	carefully	watch	not	only	for	the	deviation	of	inflation	rates	from	optimal	levels,	but	for	
the	deviation	of	public	debt	as	well.	In	addition,	van	Aarle,	Engwerda	and	Plasmans	(2001)	
noted	that	either	partial	or	complete	integration	of	fiscal	authorities	would	be	advisable	for	
more	efficient	interaction	with	the	ECB.	Engwerda,	van	Aarle	and	Plasmans	(2002)	consi-
dered	the	possibility	of	an	integration	of	fiscal	authorities	in	the	EU	countries.
Dixit	and	Lambertini	(2003)	note	that	the	efficient	functioning	of	the	EMU	is	needed	
not	so	much	for	the	coordination	of	fiscal	and	monetary	authorities	or	for	the	integration	of	
fiscal	authorities	in	different	countries,	but	rather	for	the	consistency	of	goals	with	respect	to	
the	optimal	levels	of	output	and	inflation.	Staudinger	(2003)	suggested	a	rather	different	solu-
tion	to	the	problem	of	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	authorities	in	the	EMU.	In	
her	opinion,	the	most	efficient	interaction	of	the	two	authorities	is	determined	by	the	weight	
that	these	two	agents	assign	to	output,	inflation	and	other	indices	in	their	loss	functions.	She	
5comes	to	the	conclusion	that	under	current	conditions	the	EMU	should	prefer	an	indepen-
dent,	dominate	ECB.	
Herzog	(2006)	considers	the	problem	of	coordinating	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	in	the	
Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	(CIS).	It	is	shown	in	this	article	that	countries	with	
more	bargaining	power	(such	as	Russia)	tend	to	coordinate	less	and	more	slowly.	This	is	be-
cause	of	various	factors,	such	as	the	risk	premium	in	the	interest	rate,	the	free-rider	problem	
and	asymmetry	of	information.	
There	are	two	more	features	of	modern	research.	Firstly,	many	articles	in	this	field	are	
partly	oriented	to	the	institutional	side	of	the	interaction	between	the	government	and	the	
central	bank.	For	instance,	Di	Bartolomeo	and	Di	Gioacchino	(2003,	2004)	considered	two	
stages	in	a	game-theoretic	interaction.	The	two	sides	first	determine	their	bargaining	power	
and	only	afterwards	does	a	differential	game	ensue.	Unlike	Nash	equilibrium,	this	 type	of	
correlated	equilibrium	can	be	used	to	determine	the	interconnected	behavior	of	the	agents.	
Secondly,	an	ever-increasing	number	of	studies	have	a	microeconomic	basis	in	the	tradition	
of	new	Keynesian	models	with	real	and	nominal	rigidities	(Linnemann	and	Schabert,	2002;	
Muscatelli,	Tirelli	and	Trecroci,	2004;	Beetsma	and	Jensen,	2005).
1.3. Outline of the thesis
Overview
We	analyze	the	fiscal	policy	of	the	government	and	the	monetary	policy	of	the	central	
bank	under	assumption	that	the	central	bank	is	formally	independent	of	the	government.	The	
logic	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	is	determined	by	the	existence	
of	a	consolidated	budget	constraint	for	both	the	government	and	the	central	bank,	as	well	as	
their	common	goal	of	stabilizing	the	public	debt	and	inflation.	Monetary	authorities	deter-
mine	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	The	government	determines	the	expenditures	and	the	
revenues	of	the	budget,	and	thus	determines	the	trajectory	of	the	budget	deficit	(or	surplus).
We	 provide	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 interaction	 of	 fiscal	 and	monetary	
policies	and	give	the	main	concepts	in	fiscal	and	monetary	theory	in	Chapter	2.	The	bud-
get	constraint	of	the	government	determines	the	dynamics	of	the	public	debt.	The	principle	
of	sustainable	fiscal	policy	demands	that	at	every	point	in	time	the	accumulated	volume	of	
public	debt	is	backed	by	the	real	value	of	future	budget	surpluses	and	of	seigniorage.	In	turn,	
the	dynamics	of	 inflation	and	seigniorage	are	described	by	the	framework	of	 the	generally	
accepted	monetarist	approach.	Using	this	apparatus,	we	give	an	overview	of	the	two	modern	
approaches	to	the	analysis	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies,	namely	
the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation	and	the	fiscal	theory	of	the	price	level.	
Chapter	3	is	devoted	to	the	analysis	of	the	influence	of	inflation	on	the	primary	budget	
deficit.3	By	considering	the	financing	of	the	budget	deficit	by	seigniorage,	we	give	a	compara-
3	 Chapter	3	draws	on	Pekarski	(2000).
6tive	analysis	of	situations	in	which	inflation	does	not	influence	the	primary	budget	deficit	and	
of	situations	in	which	the	effect	of	inflation	is	positive	or	negative.	We	analyze	bifurcations	in	
the	system	describing	dynamics	of	the	public	debt	and	real	money	balances.	We	suggest	a	de-
scription	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	that	bring	the	economy	to	a	catastrophe	in	the	form	
of	hyperinflation	and	a	debt	crisis	(based	on	the	Russian	economy	experience).	
In	Chapter	4	we	consider	various	 scenarios	 for	 the	 interaction	of	 fiscal	and	monetary	
policies,	assuming	the	simplest	form	of	stabilizing	the	debt	and	inflation	at	a	constant	level.4	
We	analyze	admissible	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	Situations	in	which	uncoordinated	poli-
cies	are	impossible	are	determined.	Given	the	feasibility	constraint	for	fiscal	policy,	we	deter-
mine	situations	in	which	neither	fiscal	nor	monetary	policies	are	able	to	avert	hyperinflation	
and	a	debt	crisis.
In	Chapter	5	we	suggest	a	wider	view	of	the	interaction	between	the	government	and	the	
central	bank.5	Their	common	policy	should	not	violate	the	principle	of	sustainability	of	the	
public	debt.	This	approach	accounts	not	only	for	the	current	state	of	the	fiscal	sphere	and	of	
the	money	market,	but	for	expected	future	policies	as	well.	Assuming	rational	forward-look-
ing	expectations	formed	by	the	private	sector,	we	demonstrate	the	increased	possibilities	of	
fiscal	and	monetary	policies	if	the	expectations	of	society	are	actively	influenced	by	policy-
makers.	
Chapter	6	provides	overview	of	the	main	results.
Methodology 
The	basis	of	this	research	is	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation,	which	was	formulated	in	the	be-
ginning	of	the	1980s	as	part	of	the	new	classical	economics.	The	fiscal	theory	of	inflation	al-
lows	for	a	wider	understanding	of	monetary	policy	in	comparison	with	the	original	monetarist	
approach	and	assumes	that	fiscal	policy	plays	an	important	role	in	determining	the	rate	of	
inflation.	In	the	last	decade	a	new	direction	of	inquiry	has	been	actively	discussed	—	that	of	
the	fiscal	theory	of	the	price	level.	We	provide	an	overview	of	this	(still	controversial)	theory	
in	the	second	chapter.	After	comparing	it	to	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation,	we	find	the	latter	to	
be	more	acceptable.
An	important	assumption	in	the	analysis	of	the	fifth	chapter	is	the	hypothesis	of	ratio-
nal	forward-looking	expectations	that	belongs	to	the	same	new	classical	school	of	economic	
thought.	This	hypothesis	is	the	basis	for	the	most	interesting	results.	
This	research	makes	significant	use	of	mathematical	modeling.	We	analyze	the	system	
of	dynamic	equations	 that	was	derived	 for	 the	optimal	behavior	of	 a	 representative	agent.	
The	properties	of	the	linearized	system	are	considered,	and	we	investigate	the	stability	of	the	
steady	states	of	the	economy	and	analyze	the	transition	dynamics.	In	addition,	as	our	model	
is	characterized	by	nonlinear	dynamics,	it	is	of	interest	to	analyze	the	bifurcation	of	the	sys-
4	 Chapter	4	draws	on	Pekarski	(2001).
5	 Chapter	5	draws	on	Pekarski	(2003,	2004).
7tem	if	various	parameters	of	the	model	are	changed.	Finally,	assuming	rational	expectations,	
we	 construct	 a	 forward-looking	 solution	 that	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 required	 transversality	
conditions.	Some	of	the	results	were	arrived	at	by	using	numerical	methods.
Main results of the research
We	suggest	a	modification	of	the	basic	model	for	the	dynamics	of	inflation	and	public	
debt	to	account	for	the	influence	of	inflation	on	the	primary	budget	deficit	in	the	third	chap-
ter.	This	new	dynamic	system	has	 interesting	nonlinear	properties,	which	have	not,	 to	the	
best	of	 the	author’s	knowledge,	been	considered	in	the	economic	 literature	before.	A	new	
economic	interpretation	of	the	bifurcation	exhibited	in	the	nonlinear	dynamics	of	inflation	
and	public	debt	is	presented,	and	can	be	applied	as	a	possible	explanation	for	the	Russian	
crisis	of	1998.
The	analysis	in	the	fourth	chapter	is	conducted	using	the	same	basic	system	for	the	dy-
namics	of	inflation	and	public	debt.	Several	new	results	were	arrived	at	in	the	course	of	this	
research,	which	expand	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation.	In	particular,	the	well-known	principle	
of	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	has	been	amplified	with	consequences	of	«unpleasant	
monetarist	arithmetic»	for	fiscal	policy.	In	addition,	the	results	allowed	us	to	systemize	the	
possible	ways	in	which	the	government	and	the	central	bank	interact.	Moreover,	the	goals	of	
fiscal	and	monetary	policies	that	are	in	principle	unattainable	in	the	absence	of	coordination	
have	been	identified.	An	analysis	of	the	constraints	of	sustainability	and	feasibility	of	mac-
roeconomic	policies	in	the	framework	of	the	model	for	the	dynamics	of	inflation	and	public	
debt	has	allowed	us	to	determine	the	region	on	the	phase	diagram	in	which	even	a	coordi-
nated	macroeconomic	policy	is	unable	to	avert	a	debt	crisis	and	hyperinflation.
Unilateral	and	collaborative	actions	by	the	government	and	the	central	bank	are	investi-
gated	in	the	fifth	chapter.	Assuming	that	expectations	are	rational	and	allowing	for	the	pos-
sibility	of	announcing	changes	in	macroeconomic	policy	before	they	are	actually	implement-
ed,	new	important	results	have	been	arrived	at	in	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation.	Firstly,	we	were	
able	to	find	a	way	to	solve	the	problem	of	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”.	In	particular,	
we	show	that	under	certain	conditions	monetary	policy	can	be	permanently	tightened	given	
(exogenous)	fiscal	policy.	Secondly,	our	research	finds	out	that	it	is	not	so	much	the	current	
volume	of	seigniorage	that	is	important	for	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	but	
rather	the	ability	of	the	central	bank	to	influence	the	expected	present	value	of	future	seig-
niorage.	Thirdly,	we	were	able	to	identify	the	three	main	factors	that	jointly	determine	the	
feasibility	of	various	ways	in	which	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	may	interact.	These	factors	
are:	(i)	the	expectations	of	economic	agents	with	respect	to	forthcoming	changes	in	monetary	
policy,	(ii)	the	level	of	inflation	in	the	economy	(inflationary	regime),	and	(iii)	the	interest	
rate	for	the	servicing	of	the	public	debt.	This	last	factor	not	only	determines	the	dynamics	of	
the	fiscal	sphere,	but	also	determines	how	monetary	policy	should	be	conducted.
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Fiscal and monetary policy: 
The basic concepts and models
2.1. Introduction
The	current	range	of	questions	posed	by	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	is	
presented	in	this	chapter.	The	first	goal	of	this	introductory	overview	is	to	formulate	the	main	
concepts	in	the	analysis	of	macroeconomic	policy	(e.g.,	the	sustainability	of	fiscal	policy	or	
the	concept	of	rational	expectations)	and	to	consider	the	two	main	models	which	serve	as	a	
basis	for	the	analysis	in	the	following	chapters;	these	are	the	general	model	for	the	financing	
of	the	budget	deficit	and	the	Cagan	model	for	the	dynamics	of	inflation.	The	first	two	sections	
of	this	chapter	are	devoted	to	this	purpose.	
The	second	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	describe	the	general	logic	of	the	interaction	between	
fiscal	and	monetary	policy.1	This	interaction	has	many	aspects,	and	we	can	discern	two	main	
avenues	of	 research	 in	 this	area	 in	 the	economic	 literature.	The	 first	 is	 the	analysis	of	 the	
interaction	between	the	government	and	the	central	bank	in	the	context	of	the	influence	of	
macroeconomic	policies	on	 the	 real	economy	(production	or	unemployment).2	As	a	 rule,	
the	possibility	of	a	compromise	between	inflation	and	unemployment	in	the	short	run	(for	
example,	the	Phillips	curve)	is	the	basis	for	the	analysis.	The	goal	functions	of	society,	the	
government	and	the	central	bank,	which	are	generally	all	different,	are	optimized	in	either	
static	or	dynamic	frameworks.	In	the	last	few	years,	in	the	vein	of	the	new	political	economy,	
it	has	become	popular	to	consider	the	interaction	between	the	central	bank	and	the	govern-
ment	in	a	game-theoretic	manner.3	
Our	analysis	in	the	following	chapters	belongs	to	the	second	avenue	of	research,	in	which	
the	main	goal	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	is	that	of	stabilizing	inflation	
and	the	public	debt.	We	discuss	the	two	major	approaches	to	this	problem	in	the	third	and	fourth	
sections,	namely	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation	and	the	fiscal	theory	of	the	price	level.	There	are	
two	main	ideas	in	considering	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy.	Firstly,	the	govern-
ment	and	central	bank	have	a	consolidated	public	sector	budget	constraint.	Namely,	the	two	
most	common	sources	for	the	financing	the	government’s	budget	deficit	are	new	borrowings	
1	 The	most	complete	overview	of	this	area	of	research	can	be	found	in	the	papers	by	Dodge	(2002)	and	
Chadha	and	Nolan	(2003).
2	 Among	the	first	important	studies	in	this	field	were	those	by	Blinder	(1982),	Tabellini	(1985,	1987a,	b),	
and	Petit	(1989).	See	also	the	overview	by	Nordhaus,	Schultze	and	Fischer	(1994).	Over	the	last	decade	this	
approach	has	become	especially	popular	in	discussing	the	policies	of	the	European	Central	Bank	and	its	in-
teractions	with	the	governments	of	European	countries,	and	in	discussing	the	Stability	Pact	(the	Maastricht	
Treaty).	See,	for	example,	Beetsma	and	Bovenberg	(1995,	1997,	2003),	Aarle,	Engwerda	and	Plasmans	(2001),	
Dixit	(2001),	Dixit	and	Lambertini	(2001,	2003).
3	 This	applies	also	to	the	second	avenue	of	research	into	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy.	The	
corresponding	game-theoretic	models	are	given	in	the	papers	by	Tabellini	(1986),	Tabellini	and	LaVia	(1989),	
Aarle,	Bovenberg	and	Raith	(1995),	DiBartolomeo	and	DiGioacchino	(2003,	2004).
9and	seigniorage	(real	income	from	money	base	emission).	The	volume	of	base	money	emission	
is	determined	by	the	operations	of	the	central	bank	on	the	open	market.	A	possible	interpreta-
tion	of	this	fact	could	be	that	while	it	is	the	government	that	determines	the	total	volume	of	pub-
lic	sector	obligations,	it	is	the	central	bank	that	determines	the	composition	of	these	obligations	
by	exchanging	government	bonds	for	base	money	(creating	seigniorage).4	Therefore,	the	central	
bank	shoulders	part	of	the	burden	in	financing	the	government’s	budget	deficit.5	Secondly,	the	
government	and	the	central	bank	are	concerned	with	inflation	and	the	stability	of	the	financial	
market	(in	particular,	with	the	sustainability	of	the	public	debt).	This	means	that	whether	or	not	
their	policies	were	coordinated,	the	government	and	the	central	bank	have	common	goals	(even	
though	it	is	possible	that	they	assign	different	weights	to	them).	As	a	result,	fiscal	and	monetary	
policy	are	forced to	interact	in	some	fashion.	This	is	the	key	idea	in	our	study.	
2.2. Fiscal policy, the budget deficit and the public debt 
An	analysis	of	fiscal	policy	in	practically	any	aspect	of	macroeconomic	dynamics	should	
include	the	government’s	budget	constraint.	Since	this	constraint	 is	central	 in	the	analysis	
given	in	the	following	chapters,	we	will	begin	by	considering	all	of	its	possible	interpretations.	
Let	us	introduce	the	main	variables.	Let	d	be	the	real	primary	deficit	of	the	public	sector,	de-
fined	as	the	difference	between	government	expenditures	and	net	taxes:	d	=	G	–	T.	In	most	of	
the	situations	considered	below	it	is	quite	enough	to	consider	only	the	primary	budget	deficit	
as	a	“final”	characteristic	of	fiscal	policy.6	
We	will	assume	that	at	every	point	in	time	the	government	must	meet	expenses	rb	in	order	
to	service	the	public	debt,	where	b	is	the	volume	of	real	public	debt.	Consideration	of	the	real	
(or	indexed)	public	debt	as	opposed	to	nominal	public	debt	is	meant	to	narrow	the	range	of	
problems	that	we	consider.7	The	real	interest	rate	r	(the	rate	of	servicing	of	the	public	debt)	
is	taken	to	be	constant	for	simplicity.8	In	total,	the	primary	budget	deficit	and	payments	for	
4	 See	Wallace	(1981)	and	Sargent	(1985).
5	 At	the	present	time	the	central	bank	in	most	countries	is	an	institution	that	is	formally	independent	of	
the	government.	In	practice,	the	direct	crediting	of	the	government	by	the	central	bank	is	prohibited	by	law.
6	 In	some	situations	it	will	be	more	convenient	to	use	the	term	budget	surplus,	which	is	naturally	deter-
mined	as	–d	=	T	–	G.	
7	 In	reality,	 the	practice	of	 indexing	the	public	debt	 is	not	widespread.	However,	 in	Sargent’s	opinion	
(1985),	an	analysis	of	 the	dynamics	of	 the	real	public	debt	 is	quite	 justified.	Formally,	a	 state	which	 issues	
a	nominal	debt	can	back	it	 if	actual	inflation	is	higher	than	expected;	this	fact	was	noted	earlier	by	Keynes	
(1923).	However,	it	is	probably	not	wise	to	consider	this	possibility	as	a	conscious	choice	of	the	state.	If	the	ex-
pectations	of	economic	agents	are	rational,	then	this	policy	is	dynamically	inconsistent	(Calvo,	1978).	Dorn-
busch	(1986)	note	that	“…	inflationary	escape	from	debt	is	simply	no	longer	an	issue.	Keynes	preferred	way	is	
gone”.	By	contrast,	introduction	of	indexed	state	obligations	has	been	practiced	in	some	countries	with	high	
and	unpredictable	inflation	in	order	to	have	an	instrument	that	is	insured	against	“inflation	surprises”	(see	an	
overview	of	the	practice	of	using	various	debt	instruments	in	the	monograph	by	Missale	(1999)).	The	problems	
associated	with	the	advisability	of	issued	indexed	debt	obligations	by	the	government	have	been	studied,	for	
example,	in	papers	by	Dornbusch	and	Fischer	(1986),	Calvo	and	Guidotti	(1990),	Bohn	(1988,	1990,	1991),	
and	Dornbusch	(1996).
8	 The	 assumption	 that	 the	 interest	 rate	 is	 constant	 is	 quite	widespread	 in	 investigations	 in	 fiscal	 and	
monetary	policies;	it	allows	the	investigator	to	simplify	his	analysis	without	significantly	influencing	the	main	
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the	servicing	of	the	debt	comprise	the	operational	deficit	of	the	budget	d	+	rb,	which	must	be	
financed	by	either	new	borrowings	 &b,	and	(or)	by	seigniorage,	S.9	The	latter	is	defined	as	the	
real	profit	from	base	money	emission	and	we	will	consider	it	in	detail	in	the	next	section.	The	
following	simple	dynamic	equation	for	the	budget	constraint	is	in	essence	the	equation	for	
the	financing	of	the	operational	deficit	of	the	budget:	 d + rb = &b+ S ,	or
	 &b = rb + d − S .	 (2.1)
Formally,	equation	(2.1)	describes	 the	dynamics	of	 the	public	debt.	The	 increment	 in	
the	debt	is	defined	as	the	difference	between	the	operational	budget	deficit	and	seigniorage.	
At	every	point	in	time	the	volume	of	public	debt	is	predetermined	by	previous	fiscal	policies.	
In	other	words,	at	every	point	in	time	the	government	has	an	accumulated volume	of	debt.	In	
this	sense,	the	most	appropriate	way	to	determine	the	trajectory	of	the	debt	seems	to	us	to	be	
the	backward-looking	approach.10	Taking	the	point	of	time	t	=	0	to	be	the	initial	point	and	
putting	b0	=	b(0)	to	be	the	initial	volume	of	the	debt,	the	solution	of	(2.1)	can	be	written	in	
the	following	form:
	 b(t) = b
0
ert + d(τ)− S(τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e
− r (τ−t )dτ
0
t
∫ .	 (2.2)
Obviously,	for	a	positive	root	of	equation	(2.1),	which	is	equal	to	the	interest	rate	r,	and	
for	given	acceptable	trajectories	of	the	primary	budget	deficit	and	seigniorage,	equation	(2.2)	
describes	in	the	general	case	the	unstable	dynamics	of	public	debt.	In	the	simplest	case	with	
constant	primary	budget	deficit	and	seigniorage	equation	(2.2)	can	be	written	as	
	 b(t) =
S − d
r
+ b
0
− S − d
r
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
ert .	 (2.3)
results.	We	give	a	simple	model	of	dynamical	optimization	in	the	Appendix	at	the	end	of	Chapter	2,	which	
provides	the	microeconomic	foundation	of	our	analysis.	In	the	framework	of	the	suggested	model,	first	order	
condition	equates	real	interest	rate	to	(constant)	subjective	discount	factor	of	consumer’s	intertemporal	pre-
ferences.	Sometimes	it	is	useful	to	consider	the	dependence	of	the	interest	rate	of	the	debt	on	the	size	of	the	
debt,	i.e.	include	the	risk	premium	(see,	for	example,	Drazen	and	Helpman	(1990)).	However,	we	are	analyz-
ing	the	conduction	of	a	macroeconomic	policy	that	does	not	allow	for	a	default,	and	so	we	should	not	consider	
the	public	debt	as	a	risk	asset.	
9	 All	variables	in	the	general	case	are	functions	of	time,	but	this,	however,	is	not	shown	in	the	text	in	order	
to	simplify	understanding.	A	dot	above	a	variable	indicates	a	derivative	with	respect	to	time.	For	example,	 &b	is	
the	increase	in	time	of	the	volume	of	real	public	debt.	
10	 Equation	 (2.1),	obviously,	defines	many	possible	 trajectories	of	 the	public	debt.	 In	a	dynamic	eco-
nomics	there	are	two	methods	to	choose	a	concrete	trajectory	(particular	solutions	of	the	dynamic	equation):	
backward-looking	solutions	and	 forward-looking	solutions.	 In	 this	and	 following	chapters	we	will	use	both	
approaches	and	explain	the	reason	for	choosing	one	or	the	other	in	each	situation.	A	general	overview	of	these	
methods	can	be	found	in	Leslie	(1993)	and	Turnovsky	(2000).	A	revolutionary	paper,	which	changed	the	views	
of	macroeconomists	on	the	modeling	of	economic	dynamics,	is	the	paper	by	Sargent	and	Wallace	(1973).
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In	this	case,	if	the	government	is	initially	unable	to	finance	the	operational	deficit	by	seignior-
age,	i.e.	d	+	rb0	>	S,	then	the	public	debt	will	exponentially	increase	to	infinity.	
Clearly,	this	type	of	description	of	the	dynamics	in	the	fiscal	sphere	cannot	be	used	as	
a	 basis	 for	 formulating	macroeconomic	 policy	 without	 additional	 comments.	We	 suggest	
three	approaches	to	the	solution	of	this	problem.	
Dynamics of the public debt to output ratio
One	of	the	first	possible	explanations	for	why	the	description	of	the	dynamics	of	public	
debt	(2.2)	is	problematic	is	this:	The	assumption	that	the	interest	rate	is	constant	does	not	at	
all	mean	that	the	private	sector	is	ready	to	hold	an	arbitrarily	large	public	debt;	at	each	point	
in	time	the	increment	of	public	debt	should	not	be	greater	than	(at	least)	the	volume	of	private	
saving.	The	exponential	increase	in	the	public	debt	(with	rate	r)	can	sooner	or	later	bring	the	
situation	to	this	dangerous	point.	In	order	to	understand	whether	or	not	the	increase	in	public	
debt	is	a	problem	that	should	be	dealt	with,	we	can	simply	consider	the	dynamics	of	the	ratio	
of	public	debt	to	output	in	the	economy.	Suppose	for	simplicity	that	the	aggregate	output	y 
is	increasing	with	a	constant	rate	equal	to	gY	(beginning	from	some	initial	level	y0).	Consider	
not	the	public	debt,	the	primary	budget	deficit	and	seigniorage,	but	rather	their	share	in	the	
aggregate	output,	by	=	b/y,	dy	=	d/y	and	Sy	=	S/y.	Equation	(2.1)	and	its	solution	(2.2)	can	
then	be	rewritten	in	terms	of	the	new	variables	as	
	 &b
y
= r − g
y( )by + dy − Sy.	 (2.4)
	 by (t) = by (0)e
(r− gy )t
+ d
y
(τ)−S
y
(τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e
−(r− gy )(τ−t )dτ
0
t
∫ , by (0) = b0y
0
.	 (2.5)
In	this	case,	the	root	of	the	characteristic	equation	is	equal	to	r	–	gy.	If	the	interest	rate	is	less	
than	the	growth	rate	of	aggregate	output,	then	the	dynamics	of	the	debt	to	output	ratio	will	be	
stable.	By	analogy	with	(2.3),	in	the	simplest	case	of	constant	ratios	of	the	deficit	and	of	seig-
niorage	to	the	aggregate	demand,	the	debt	to	output	ratio	will	asymptotically	approach	a	sta-
tionary	level	 b
y
*
= r − g
y( )
−1
S
y
− d
y( ) .	In	reality,	this	removes	many	possible	problems	and	in
a	certain	sense	changes	the	logic	of	building	models	of	macroeconomic	dynamics.	First	of	all,	it	
is	not	necessary	to	introduce	additional	constraints	for	macroeconomic	policies,	since	(2.5)	de-
scribes	stable	dynamics	for	almost	any	“reasonable”	trajectories	dy(t)	and	Sy(t).	This	also	means	
that	we	do	not	come	to	the	inevitability	of	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	via	
the	budget	constraint	(2.1)	—	a	problem	which	lies	at	the	core	of	this	entire	work.11
11	 In	this	respect,	the	condition	r	>	gy	is	undoubtedly	the	key	assumption	of	the	entire	investigation	pre-
sented	here.	This	also	applies	to	the	paper	by	Sargent	and	Wallace	(1981),	which	is	foundational	in	this	area,	
and	one	 to	which	we	will	often	return.	We	should	not,	however,	 take	 this	assumption	as	making	 the	entire	
analysis	sensitive	(fragile).	If	it	were	so,	then	this	would	apply	to	practically	everything	in	dynamic	macroeco-
nomics.	This	obvious	fact	was	noted	in	the	classical	model	of	overlapping	generations	(Diamond,	1965).	It	is	
well	known	that	the	assumption	r	>	gy	in	the	basic	version	of	the	overlapping	generations	model	is	a	necessary	
12
In	reality,	however,	a	more	realistic	assumption	is	r	–	gy >	0.
12	If	the	interest	rate	is	greater	
than	the	growth	rate	of	aggregate	output,	then	(2.5)	as	well	as	(2.2)	describes	unstable	dyna-
mics.	If	so,	 then	model	(2.1)	 is	qualitatively	the	same	(from	the	point	of	view	of	stability)	
as	 the	model	(2.4).	Below,	 in	simplifying	the	analysis,	we	will	consider	equation	(2.1)	and	
remember	that	the	principle	results	of	this	work	will	not	change	if	we	switch	from	(2.1)	to	
(2.4)13,	14.
Macroeconomic policy that keeps the public debt at a stationary level
The	simplest	way	to	solve	the	problem	of	the	instability	of	(2.1)	is	the	following.	We	can	
introduce	an	additional	constraint	on	macroeconomic	policy	by	demanding	fiscal	and	mone-
tary	policy	to	be	trajectories	d(t)	and	S(t)	such	that	the	public	debt	remains	at	a	stationary	
level.	In	a	more	general	case,	we	can	consider	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	that	shift	the	public	
debt	(as	well	as	other	variables)	from	one	steady	state	to	another.	This	is	considered	in	the	
third	chapter.	
We	suggest	the	following	simple	example.	Macroeconomic	policies	will	keep	the	public	
debt	at	a	stationary	level	if
	 rb
0
+ d(t)− S(t) = 0.	 (2.6)
In	essence,	this	is	a	further	constraint	on	macroeconomic	policies.	But	what	is	important	is	
that	this	is	a	joint constraint on	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	since	the	former	determines	the	
trajectory	d(t),	while	the	latter	determines	the	trajectory	S(t).	We	see	that	macroeconomic	
policy	has	only	one	degree	of	freedom15:	either	the	central	bank	must	“produce”	the	seignior-
condition	for	the	so-called	dynamic efficiency	of	the	economy.	If	the	economy	is	dynamically	efficient,	then	
the	government	cannot	accumulate	debt	by	Ponzi	scheme.	And	vice	versa,	the	public	debt	cannot	move	along	
an	unstable	trajectory,	if	the	economy	displays	the	property	of	dynamic	inefficiency	r	>	gy.	See	also	modern	
investigations	of	this	problem	in	the	papers	by	Abel	et	al.	(1991),	Blanchard	and	Weil	(1992),	and	Buiter	and	
Kletzer	(1994).	
12	 This	fact,	beyond	doubt,	holds	for	the	vast	majority	of	developing	countries	and	economies	in	crisis.	
Most	industrially	developed	countries,	which	used	the	advantages	of	low	(or	even	negative)	interest	rates	in	
the	1960s	and	70s,	have	also	faced	the	problem	of	an	increase	of	the	ratio	of	public	debt	to	GDP	in	the	last	few	
decades.	This	was	to	a	significant	extent	determined	by	the	fact	that	the	interest	rates	on	average	became	larger	
than	the	rate	of	growth	of	the	economy.	
13	 Moreover,	we	may	easily	change	the	notation	of	the	variables	and	understand	relative	indexes	(interest	
rate,	growth	rate	of	base	money,	etc.)	to	simply	be	variables	that	are	corrected	for	the	growth	rate	of	output,	and	
consider	all	real	indexes	as	ratios	of	output.
14	 We	will	return	once	more	to	the	case	r	>	gy	in	the	next	chapter,	in	order	to	characterize	the	stability	of	
the	common	dynamics	of	public	debt	and	real	money	balances.	
15	 One	of	the	first	to	introduce	this	idea	was	Christ	(1979,	p.	526):	“…the	effects	of	their	[central	bank	and	
government]	separate	and	joint	policies	depend	on	the	actions	of	their	consolidated	sector	vis-à-vis	the	rest	of	
the	economy,	independent	of	any	additional	transactions	that	they	may	undertake	between	themselves	alone”,	
and	later	“The	most	fundamental	implication	of	the	GBR	[government	budget	restraint]	is	that	the	authorities	
cannot	fix	arbitrary	paths	for	all	of	the	macro-economic	policy	variables	at	once.	At	least	one	policy	variable	
must	have	its	path	endogenously	determined	by	the	joint	actions	of	the	GBR	and	the	economy’s	structure”.	
These	ideas	have	been	used	as	a	foundation	for	the	analysis	given	in	later	chapters	in	this	work.	
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age	necessary	to	keep	the	public	debt	at	a	stationary	level	given	exogenous	fiscal	policies,	or	
the	government	must	control	the	trajectory	of	the	primary	budget	deficit	for	given	monetary	
policy	(for	whatever	volume	of	seigniorage	is	given).	In	other	words,	we	face	the	necessity	
of	the	two	policies	interacting	in	various	forms.	We	will	return	to	this	problem	in	the	second	
chapter.	Also,	in	the	third	chapter,	we	will	show	that	analogous	ideas	arise	in	a	more	general	
case,	when	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	working	together,	shift	the	economy	from	one	steady	
state	to	another.	
Sustainable macroeconomic policies 
The	constraint	(2.6)	does	imply	that	the	volume	of	public	debt	remains	stable,	but	“re-
moves	 its	dynamics”,	and	this	considerably	decreases	 its	use	for	applications.	Indeed,	 it	 is	
possible	to	formulate	a	more	general	constraint	on	macroeconomic	policy,	one	that	would	
guarantee	the	sustainability	of	public	debt:
	 lim
t→∞
b(t)e−rt = 0.	 (2.7)
This	condition	is	nothing	but	a	condition	for	the	absence	of	Ponzi	games16.	The	growth	of	the	
public	debt	should	not	be	“too	fast”;	the	rate	of	growth	of	b(t)	should	not	systematically	be	
greater	than	the	interest	rate.	The	solution	of	(2.1),	given	(2.7),	can	be	written	as
	 b(t) = S(τ)− d(τ)( )e−r (τ−t )dτ
t
∞
∫ ,	 (2.8)
Equation	(2.8)	is	a	forward-looking	solution	of	the	differential	equation	(2.1).	As	in	(2.1),	
equation	(2.8)	is	a	budget	constraint	for	the	government,	or,	in	the	context	of	this	discussion,	
a	joint	budget	constraint	on	the	policies	of	the	government	and	of	the	central	bank17.	From	
a	 formal	point	of	view,	budget	constraints	written	as	 (2.1)	or	 (2.8)	are	 identical,	 if	 condi-
tion	(2.7)	is	satisfied.	However,	unlike	the	dynamic	budget	constraint	given	in	(2.1),	which	
determines	the	dynamics	of	the	debt	at	each	point	in	time,	constraint	(2.8)	is	given	in	terms	
of	present	value.	It	requires	that	the	public	debt	at	each	point	in	time	be	not	greater	than	the	
present	value	of	future	budget	surpluses	and	seigniorage.	Fiscal	policies	that	satisfy	(2.8)	are	
called	sustainable.	As	in	the	previous	section,	here	we	need	to	deal	with	the	inevitability	of	
the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policy.	Regardless	of	the	fact	that	we	are	now	
considering	the	sustainability	of	public	debt	(of	the	government’s	debt),	the	integrand	in	the	
16	 In	a	wide	class	of	dynamic	optimization	models	of	 general	 economic	equilibrium	 this	 condition	 is	
a	necessary	condition	of	transversality	(see,	e.g.,	the	model	of	dynamic	optimization	in	the	Appendix	to	Chap-
ter	3).	In	the	context	of	general	equilibrium,	equations	(2.1)	and	(2.7)	are	joint	constraints	for	the	private	sector	
and	the	government.	
17	 The	term	“consolidated	budget	constraint	for	the	government	and	the	central	bank”	can	also	be	found	
in	the	literature.	Below	we	will	for	brevity	continue	to	use	the	term	“budget	constraint	of	the	government”,	
understanding	that	this	constraint	involves	both	the	government	and	the	central	bank.	
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right	side	of	(2.8)	is	determined	not	only	by	fiscal	policy,	but	by	monetary	policy	as	well.	An	
analysis	of	the	possible	interactions	in	the	context	of	sustainable	macroeconomic	policies	is	
given	in	the	fourth	chapter.18
The	concept	of	a	forward-looking	solution,	suggested	in	1973	by	T.	Sargent	and	N.	Wal-
lace,	 is	 based	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 economic	 agents	 are	 rational.	Their	 actions,	which	
determine	 the	current	state	and	 the	dynamics	of	 the	economic	system,	are	based	on	 their	
expectations	concerning	future	states	of	the	system.	Formally,	one	assumes	that	(i)	the	expec-
tations	of	economic	agents	are	rational;	(ii)	it	is	necessary	to	use	conditions	about	the	future	
states	 of	 the	 system	 rather	 than	 initial	 conditions	 in	 order	 to	 choose	 a	 certain	 trajectory;	
(iii)	the	possibility	of	changing	the	expectations	(the	availability	of	information)	of	economic	
agents	about	the	future	presupposes	the	possibility	of	a	discrete	(jump)	change	in	the	values	
of	the	variables	in	the	system.	
Several	important	comments	on	the	applications	of	this	concept	to	the	analysis	of	mac-
roeconomic	policy	and	to	the	dynamics	of	public	debt	are	necessary.	The	future	trajectories	
d(t)	and	S(t)	may	be	unknown.	Thus,	the	form	of	(2.8)	implicitly	means	that	economic	agents	
holding	government	bonds	have	perfect	foresight	with	respect	to	the	future	macroeconomic	
policies	of	the	government	and	of	the	central	bank.	In	practice,	this	assumption	is	a	conve-
nient	starting	point	for	analysis	and	it	can	often	be	found	in	the	literature.	In	the	general	case,	
there	should	be	an	operator	of	rational	expectations	in	front	of	the	integral	in	the	right	side	
of	(2.8).
The	use	of	the	terminal	condition	(2.7)	instead	of	an	initial	condition	to	arrive	at	a	for-
ward-looking	specification	of	 the	dynamics	of	public	debt	 should	not	be	considered	 to	be	
a	 simple	“technical”	assumption	 in	 the	analysis.	The	problem	is	 that	 the	 initial	condition	
b(0)	=	b0	remains.	The	public	debt	is	what	is	known	as	a	“sluggish”	variable,	rather	than	a	
“jump”	variable,	in	other	words,	its	value	at	each	point	in	time	is	determined	by	its	previous	
dynamics	(by	the	accumulation	process	of	the	government).	From	a	technical	point	of	view,	
the	superposition	of	two	conditions,	the	initial	condition	and	the	terminal	condition,	is	sim-
ply	impossible,	as	each	is	able	to	determine	a	unique	trajectory	on	the	vector	field,	and	we	
have	an	over-defined	problem	(a	lack	of	one	degree	of	freedom).	The	only	“lucky”	exclusion	
is	when	the	initial	and	terminal	conditions	determine	the	same	trajectory.	This	case	charac-
terizes	the	principle	of	sustainable	fiscal	policy.	This	assumed	coincidence	of	two	trajectories	
is	not	an	“improbable”	assumption,	but	in	fact	an	additional	constraint	on	macroeconomic	
policy.	The	initial	and	terminal	conditions	are	principally	different	from	each	other.	The	ini-
tial	condition	is	determined	by	the	previous	history	of	the	process,	and	it	cannot	be	changed	
18	 Below,	in	the	fourth	chapter,	we	will	pay	due	attention	to	the	following	important	idea:	an	analysis	of	
the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	in	the	context	of	the	budget	constraint	(2.8)	must	be	focused	
on	the	present	value	of	future	budget	deficits	and	seigniorage.	The	analysis	of	their	trajectories	may	then	be	of	
intermediate	use.	In	this	respect	we	go	against	the	postulate	by	C.	Christ:	“It	is	not	possible	to	change	just	one	
policy	variable	from	its	previous	path,	leaving	all	others	on	their	previous	paths”	(Christ,	1979,	p.	527).	This	
is	quite	possible,	if	the	changes	in	the	trajectory	of	the	variable	do	not	change	the	present	price	of	its	future	
values.	
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post factum	by	any	means,	while	(2.7)	can	be	rewritten	 in	terms	of	 future	macroeconomic	
policy;	the	determination	of	this	policy	is	what	we	wish	to	achieve.	Indeed,	the	general	solu-
tion	of	(2.1)	can	be	written	as
	 b(t) = Cbe
rt
+ d(τ)− S(τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e
−r (τ−t )dτ
0
t
∫ ,	 (2.9)
where	Cb	is	an	arbitrary	constant.	Applying	(2.7)	determines	the	value	of	Cb:
	 C
b
= S(τ)− d(τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e
−rτdτ
0
∞
∫ .	 (2.10)
Therefore,	the	choice	of	Cb	and,	therefore,	the	no-Ponzi	game	condition	(2.7),	is	determined	
by	a	macroeconomic	policy	that	determines	the	trajectory	S(τ)	–	d(τ).	
The	initial	and	terminal	conditions	determine	one	and	the	same	trajectory,	on	which	the	
government	and	the	central	bank	choose	policies	such	that	for	a	given	accumulated	level	of	
debt	 b
0
= C
b
= S(τ)− d(τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e
−rτdτ
0
∞
∫ .	We	can	now	formulate	more	accurately	the	principle	of
sustainable	fiscal	policy:	a	fiscal	policy	will	be	sustainable,	if	at	each	point	in	time	t	and	ac-
cumulated	volume	of	public	debt	b(t)	future	policies	are	characterized	by	the	choice	of	tra-
jectories	d(t)	and	S(t)	that	satisfy	(2.8).
The	concept	of	a	sustainable	fiscal	policy	is	connected	to	another	important	concept	in	
government	finance.	Equation	(2.8)	 implicitly	defines	the	backing of government bonds.	As	
T.	Sargent	put	it19:	“To	attract	funds,	the	government	must	offer	lenders	a	prospective	stream	
of	net	revenues	sufficient	to	support	the	value	that	it	presently	proposes	to	borrow...	The	pre-
sent	value	of	[the	stream	of	net	revenues]	forms	the	"backing"	for	the	government	borrowings,	
just	as	the	present	value	of	a	stream	of	prospective	net	revenues	from	a	new	machine	might	
form	the	backing	for	a	private	loan.	Furthermore,	like	any	private	borrower,	the	government	
can	borrow	 in	 interest-bearing	 form	only	 a	 limited	 amount	determined	by	 the	maximum	
present	value	of	the	prospective	government	surpluses	that	the	economy	can	support”.	Again,	
given	the	general	direction	of	our	research,	it	is	important	how	the	public	debt	is	backed,	as	
above:	this	could	be	either	the	future	budget	surplus	or	future	seigniorage,	or	a	mixture	of	
the	two.	The	choice	of	backing	for	public	debt	is	determined	by	the	necessity	of	interaction	
(coordination)	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	and	beyond	doubt	this	plays	a	crucial	role	
in	determining	the	effect	of	the	budget	deficit	on	economic	activity.20	
19	 Sargent	 (1985,	 reprinted	 in	 1993,	 p.	 31).	 This	 approach	 has	 a	 long	 tradition	 in	macroeconomics.	
Keynes	noted	the	role	of	fiscal	policy	with	regards	to	the	problems	of	the	gold	standard	and	hyperinflation:	“It	
is	not	lack	of	gold	but	the	absence	of	other	internal	adjustments	which	prevents	the	leading	European	countries	
from	returning	to	a	pre-war	gold	standard”	(Keynes,	1925,	p.	132).
20	 As	noted	in	the	classic	paper	by	Aiyagari	and	Gertler	(1985,	p.	20),	the	choice	of	backing	of	the	public	
debt	is	important	“…since	rational	agents	discount	future	direct	tax	levies	differently	than	future	money	crea-
tion”.	Later,	in	the	third	and	fourth	chapters	we	will	also	show	the	role	of	differences	in	the	corresponding	
discount	factors.	
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2.3. Monetary policy and inflation
One	of	the	most	popular	models	of	inflation	dynamics	is	the	Cagan	model.	Originally,	
Cagan	(1956)	considered	 the	dynamics	of	 the	money	market,	assuming	adaptive	 inflation	
expectations.	At	present,	 researches	usually	use	 the	Cagan	model	 for	 forward-looking	 ra-
tional	expectations.	However,	any	modification	of	the	Cagan	model	should	incorporate	two	
elements:	(i)	demand	for	real	money	balances,	which	decreases	with	an	increase	in	expected	
inflation,	and	(ii)	a	hypothesis	for	how	inflation	expectations	are	formed	(the	interconnec-
tion	between	expected	and	actual	inflation).	
The	most	convenient	(at	least,	for	continuous	time),	is	the	log-linear	specification	of	the	
demand	function	for	real	money	balances	suggested	by	Cagan:
	 md = Ae−απ
e
.	 (2.11)
Here	md =
M
P
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
d
	is	the	volume	of	demand	for	real	money	balances.	In	the	following	analysis
we	will	 assume	 that	 the	money	market	 is	 in	equilibrium,	 md =
M s
P
= m.	The	parameter	A	
may	depend	on	the	real	interest	rate	and	output.	The	parameter	α = −
dmd
md
dπe
> 0 	characterizes
the	semi-elasticity	of	demand	for	real	money	balances	with	respect	to	expected	rate	of	infla-
tion	(in	the	general	case,	by	the	nominal	interest	rate)21.	The	specification	(2.11)	is	supposed	
to	emphasize	 the	dependence	of	 the	demand	for	real	money	balances	on	expected	rate	of	
inflation.22	Without	loss	of	generality,	we	can	assume	that	A	=	1.	Let	x	=	ln	md,	and	then	(2.11)	
can	be	rewritten	as
	 x = −απe .	 (2.12)
21	 McCallum	 (1989)	uses	 the	 specification	 lnmd = a
0
+a
1
ln y −a
2
R, a
1
,a
2
> 0,	where	y	 is	 real	 output	
and	R	is	the	nominal	interest	rate.	The	constant	A	then	characterizes	the	dependence	of	the	demand	for	real	
balances	on	the	real	income	and	real	interest	rate.	This	functional	form	seems	to	be	ad hoc.	In	the	Appendix	
to	Chapter	3	we	will	give	the	derivation	of	the	demand	function	(2.11)	for	a	certain	specification	of	the	utility	
function	in	Sidrausky’s	model.	There,	however,	the	characteristic	of	semi-elasticity	α	will	depend	on	the	ag-
gregate	output	(or	consumption).	However,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	general	analysis	presented	this	is	not	
of	principle	importance.	
22	 The	use	of	(2.11)	in	the	analysis	of	monetary	policy	and	the	dynamics	of	inflation	implicitly	assumes	
the	constancy	of	(at	least)	real	output	and	the	real	interest	rate.	Cagan	used	this	assumption	in	the	analysis	of	
hyperinflation,	when	indeed	changes	in	real	variables	are	negligibly	small	with	respect	to	changes	in	the	nomi-
nal	variables.	Using	analogous	assumptions,	we	do	not	at	all	intend	to	confine	ourselves	to	the	discussion	of	
hyperinflation,	or	even	to	high	inflation.	Of	course,	we	inevitably	simplify	the	analysis,	in	order	to	concentrate	
on	certain	specific	questions.	
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The	dynamics	of	real	money	balances	can	be	determined	by	simple	arithmetic:	their	rate	
of	growth	is	equal	to	the	difference	between	the	rate	of	growth	of	the	base	money	µ =
&M s (t)
M s (t)
	
and	inflation	rate:
	 &x(t) =
&m(t)
m(t)
= µ − π(t).	 (2.13)
Let	us	first	consider	the	hypothesis	of	adaptive	expectations,	in	accordance	with	which	
the	dynamics	of	 the	expected	 rate	of	 inflation,	and	 therefore	of	 the	 real	money	balances,	
will	be	backward-looking.	Economic	agents	have	a	systematic	forecast	error	and	adapt	their	
expectations	with	speed	θ:
	 &πe(t) = θ π(t)− πe(t)( ), θ > 0 .	 (2.14)
Taken	together,	(2.12),	(2.13)	and	(2.14)	determine	the	dynamics	of	inflation:
	 &π(t) = θ
1−αθ
µ − π(t)( ).	 (2.15)
For	an	initial	level	of	inflation	that	is	different	from	the	(say,	constant)	growth	rate	of	base	
money,	the	backward-looking	solution	is
	 π(t) = µ + (π
0
−µ)e−
θ
1−αθt .	 (2.16)
The	 dynamics	 of	 inflation	 are	 stable	 and	 the	 level	 of	 inflation	 asymptotically	 approaches	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	if	the	reactions	of	economic	agents	are	not	sensitive:	dθ	<	1	
(a	low	speed	of	expectation	adaptation	and/or	low	demand	sensitivity).	Alternatively,	sen-
sitive	behavior	of	economic	agents	(dθ	>	1)	will	make	the	dynamics	of	 the	money	market	
unstable,	which	may	lead	to	hyperinflation	or	hyperdeflation.	
In	the	same	way,	we	may	analyze	the	dynamics	of	the	money	market	under	assumption	
of	perfect	foresight	in	forming	expected	rate	of	inflation23:
	 πe (t) = π(t).	 (2.17)
23	 From	a	technical	point	of	view,	the	hypothesis	of	perfect	 foresight	can	be	considered	to	be	a	 limit-
ing	case	of	(2.14)	with	an	infinitely	high	speed	of	adaptation,	 θ→∞ .	From	a	conceptual	point	of	view,	the	
hypothesis	of	perfect	foresight	and	the	related	hypothesis	of	perfect	myopic	foresight	is	the	simplest	form	of	
rational	expectations.	See,	for	example,	Turnovsky	(2000).
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Taking	equation	(2.17)	along	with	equations	(2.12)	and	(2.13),	we	can	write	the	equation	for	
the	dynamics	of	inflation	in	the	same	way	as	(2.15):
	 &π(t) = − 1α
µ(t)− π(t)( ).	 (2.18)
The	general	solution	of	this	dynamics	equation	for	a	variable	(in	the	general	case)	growth	rate	
of	base	money	can	be	written	as:
	 π(t) = Cπe
1
α
t − 1α µ(τ)e
− 1
α
(τ−t )
dτ
0
t
∫ .	 (2.19)
Equation	(2.18)	has	a	positive	root	equal	to	a–1.	Therefore,	a	backward-looking	solution	will	
be	unstable.	For	the	particular	case	when	is	π(0)	=	π0	constant	and	the	initial	value	is	µ,	(2.19)	
can	be	written	in	the	form
	 π(t) = µ + (π
0
−µ)e
1
α t .	 (2.20)	
On	the	other	hand,	the	forward-looking	solution	(2.18)	will	be	stable.	Imposing	the	ad-
ditional	condition	for	the	absence	of	a	(hyperinflationary)	bubble,	
	 lim
t→∞
π(t)e−
1
α
t
= 0,	 (2.21)
and	thus	determining	the	arbitrary	constant	Cπ =
1
α µ(τ)e
− 1
α
τ
dτ
0
∞
∫ 	in	equation	(2.19),	we	arrive	
at	the	fundamental	solution	
	 π(t) = 1α µ(τ)e
− 1
α
(τ−t )
dτ
t
∞
∫ .	 (2.22)
In	the	following	analysis	we	will	find	it	convenient	to	refer	to	the	equations	for	the	dy-
namics	of	 the	 logarithm	of	 real	money	balances.	Combining	equations	 (2.12),	 (2.13)	 and	
(2.17),	we	can	write
	 &x =
1
α
x +µ .	 (2.23)
The	backward-looking	solution	of	equation	(2.23)	for	the	initial	condition	 x 0( ) = x0 = −απ0	
and	a	constant	growth	rate	of	base	money	has	a	form	that	is	analogous	to	equation	(2.20):
	 x(t) = x* + (x0 − x * )e
1
α t ,	 (2.24)
where	 x* = −αµ 	is	the	stationary	log-level	of	real	money	balances.	
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The	 forward-looking	 solution	 for	 condition	 (2.25),	 which	 is	 equivalent	 to	 condition	
(2.21):
	 lim
t→∞
x(t)e
− 1
α
t
= 0,	 (2.25)
and	for	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	which	is	variable	in	the	general	case,	can	be	written	as
	 x(t) = − µ(τ)e−
1
α
(τ−t )
dτ
t
∞
∫ .	 (2.26)
The	interpretation	of	the	stability	of	backward	and	forward-looking	inflation	dynamics	
from	a	technical	point	of	view	should	not	interest	us	here.	However,	from	a	qualitative	point	
of	view,	we	should	explain	the	choice	of	this	or	that	method	for	determining	the	dynamics,	as	
we	did	above	when	discussing	the	interpretation	of	the	budget	constraint	for	the	government	
and	the	dynamics	of	the	public	debt.	
In	 the	 case	of	 backward-looking	dynamics	of	 the	money	market,	 in	 accordance	with	
equation	(2.20),	if	π0	≠	µ,	then	the	economy	will	face	either	hyperinflation	or	hyperdeflation.	
What	is	strange	is	not	just	the	result	that	an	economy	with	rational	expectations	is	character-
ized	by	unstable	dynamics.	What	is	even	stranger	is	that	if	the	money	market	is	initially	in	a	
steady	state	and	there	is	a	discrete	permanent	increase	of	µ,	then	in	accordance	with	(2.20)	
the	economy	will	exhibit	hyperdeflation.	And	vice	versa,	a	discrete	decrease	in	µ	will	bring	
about	hyperinflation.	However,	regardless	of	this	seeming	paradox,	this	model	can	neverthe-
less	be	explained	and	should	not	be	written	off.	This	situation	can	be	interpreted	from	the	
point	of	view	of	how	the	prices	of	financial	assets	are	determined.	For	a	given	growth	rate	of	
base	money,	inflation	taken	with	a	negative	sign	–π	=	–µ0	can	be	considered	to	be	some	fun-
damental	characteristic	of	the	rate	of	return	of	an	asset	(in	this	case,	nominal	money24).	If	the	
initial	rate	of	return	of	the	asset	is	less	than	the	fundamental,	i.e.	–π0	<	–µ0,	then	a	“negative”	
speculative	bubble	will	form.	Indeed,	equation	(2.20)	can	be	rewritten	as
	
	 −π(t) = −µ + −π
0
− −µ( )( )e
1
α
t
.	 (2.27)
In	this	interpretation,	the	first	item	in	the	right	side	is	the	fundamental	component,	and	the	
second	is	the	bubble25. 
24	 Considering	the	 inverse	of	 the	price	 level	as	 the	purchasing	power	of	a	nominal	money,	the	 level	of
inflation,	taken	with	a	minus	sign,	determines	the	profitability	of	money:	 −π =
d
dt
P −1( )
P −1
.
25	 An	analogous	decomposition	can	be	arrived	at	for	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	We	should	note	that	
this	bubble,	as	a	particular	solution,	is	one	of	infinitely	many	solutions.	
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In	 the	 economic	 literature	 the	 problem	of	 bubbles	 on	 the	 financial	market	 is	 usually	
linked	to	the	question	about	whether	the	behavior	of	investors	is	rational.	Avoiding	the	dis-
cussion	about	the	“rationality”	of	bubbles	on	the	money	and	finance	markets26,	which	is	not	
of	interest	in	this	research,	we	should	nevertheless	comment	on	the	suggested	interpretation	
of	unstable	dynamics	in	the	model.	While	standard	analysis	of	the	dynamics	of	rational	sys-
tems	requires	the	use	of	the	operator	of	conditional	mathematical	expectancy,	our	analysis	
is	based	on	an	extreme	case	of	rational	expectations:	perfect	myopic	foresight.	Determining	
inflation	exactly	for	an	infinitely	small	time	horizon,	economic	agents	do	not	take	into	con-
sideration	either	the	possible	dynamics	of	the	system	or	the	actions	of	monetary	and	fiscal	
authorities	in	the	future.	Therefore,	this	is	a	kind	of	bounded	rationality27.	Thus,	the	question	
about	the	rationality	of	unstable	dynamics	(bubbles)	on	the	money	market	is	replaced	by	the	
question	of	which	hypothesis	about	the	behavior	of	investors	should	be	applied;	this	question,	
however,	also	lies	outside	our	research.	However,	if	we	disregard	the	hypothesis	of	rationality	
and	we	consider	the	principles	by	which	fiscal	and	monetary	polices	can	interact	and	avoid	
the	possibility	of	any	catastrophes	on	the	money	or	bond	markets	(hyperinflation	or	a	confi-
dence	crisis),	we	also	disregard	the	possibility	that	infinitely	increasing	bubbles	are	possible.	
Instead	of	the	condition	for	the	absence	of	bubbles	in	this	model	there	are	(possibly	implicit)	
conditions	for	the	coordination	and	choice	of	policies.
We	can	also	interpret	the	instability	of	the	solution	of	equation	(2.20)	by	considering	real	
money	balances	instead	of	nominal	money.	The	level	of	inflation,	taken	with	a	negative	sign,	
corresponds	to	the	profitability	of	nominal	money.	At	the	same	time,	using	functions	of	the	
type	given	in	(2.11),	the	level	of	inflation	can	be	considered	to	be	the	price	determinant	of	
demand	for	real	money	balances.	Rewriting	(2.13),	we	can	find	the	following	relationship	for	
the	level	of	inflation:
	
&π
π
+
α−1µ
π
=
1
α .	 (2.28)
The	first	member	of	this	equation	is	the	sum	of	increments	of	the	price	determinant	of	de-
mand	and	 the	“dividend”	 for	a	unit	of	 real	money	balances.	The	 second	member,	α–1,	 is	
the	asymptotic	rate	of	growth	of	the	price	determinant	(i.e.,	inflation)28.	If	the	norm	of	the	
26	 An	overview	of	this	problem	can	be	found	Salge	(1997).	An	analysis	of	bubbles	on	the	money	market	in	
the	context	of	Cagan	model	of	hyperinflation	is	given	in	the	book	by	Turnovsky	(2000,	ch.	3).	See	also	Farmer	
(1984).	Empirical	 tests	 for	 the	 existence	of	 hyperinflationary	 bubbles	 are	 given	 in	Casella	 (1989),	Engsted	
(1993,	1994),	and	Funke,	Hall	and	Sola	(1994).
27	 We	implicitly	assume	that	the	inevitability	of	the	interaction	between	monetary	and	fiscal	authorities	in	
order	to	avert	a	crisis	on	the	money	and	finance	markets	is	a	well-known	fact.	Therefore,	lack	of	information	
in	this	case	is	not	a	case	for	the	backward-looking	behavior	of	economic	agents.	
28	 See	equation	(2.27).	Equation	(2.28)	in	essence	is	not	arbitrage,	as	we	are	considering	only	one	asset.	
Nonetheless,	it	is	possible	to	draw	certain	parallels	with	the	no-arbitrage	condition.	The	left	side	of	the	equa-
tion	corresponds	to	the	rate	of	return	of	the	asset	with	continuously	paid	dividends.	The	no-arbitrage	condition	
dictates	the	equality	of	the	(expected)	rate	of	return	of	the	asset	to	the	riskless	interest	rate,	which	in	its	turn	
is	the	asymptotic	growth	rate	of	the	value	of	the	asset.	In	this	case	the	asymptotic	rate	of	growth	is	the	inverse	
semi-elasticity	of	the	money	demand.	
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dividend	for	a	unit	of	real	money	balances	is	less	than	the	asymptotic	rate	of	growth	of	infla-
tion,	which	holds	if	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	is	less	than	the	level	of	inflation	and	µ < π,	
then	the	demand	for	assets	(real	money	balances)	falls,	while	the	price	of	the	asset	increases:	
π	>	0.
An	argument	for	choosing	the	backward-looking	dynamics	of	the	money	market	(boun-
ded	 rationality	 of	 investors)	 could	 be	 the	 well-known	 fact	 that	 inflationary	 processes	 are	
known	to	be	inertial	in	economies	with	both	high	and	low	rates	of	inflation.	Depending	on	
the	situation,	the	inertia	of	inflation	and	of	expected	rate	of	inflation	could	be	explained	by	
either	the	lack	of	trust	of	the	population	to	the	efficacy	of	anti-inflationary	measures,	or	di-
rectly	by	the	mechanisms	by	which	inflation	spreads	in	the	economy29.	The	latter	is	closely	
connected	with	the	principles	of	the	dynamics	of	the	money	market	that	we	consider	here.	
By	contrast,	the	forward-looking	solutions	(2.22)	and	(2.26)	suppose	that	the	behavior	of	
economic	agents	is	completely	rational.	In	Chapter	4	we	analyze	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	
interaction	under	assumption	of	backward-looking	dynamics	of	inflation.	In	Chapter	5	we	
build	our	model	assuming	forward-looking	rational	behavior	of	economic	agents.
2.4. The fiscal theory of inflation:  
“Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”
In	the	previous	section	we	discussed	the	basic	mechanisms	by	which	monetary	policy	can	
influence	the	rate	of	inflation;	this	is	what	in	essence	is	called	“the	monetarist	theory	of	infla-
tion”.	In	certain	respects	it	is	difficult	to	disagree	with	how	M.	Friedman	put	it:	“Inflation	
is	always	and	everywhere	a	monetary	phenomenon”.	From	the	point	of	view	of	traditional	
monetarism,	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	to	a	significant	extent	determines	inflationary	
processes,	since	inflation	as	a	phenomenon	is	a	decrease	in	the	purchasing	power	of	existing	
money	due	to	the	emission	of	new	money.
However,	 the	Cagan	model	by	 itself	as	used	 for	 the	analysis	of	 inflationary	processes,	
does	not	take	into	consideration	many	important	questions.	In	particular,	we	are	interested	in	
the	following	problem:	can	we	(and	if	so,	under	what	conditions)	consider	only	the	monetary	
policy	of	the	central	bank	as	the	sole	determinant	of	inflation,	without	considering	the	fiscal	
policy	of	the	government?	Can	we	use	only	monetary	instruments	to	achieve	lower	inflation	
in	the	short	or	long	run?
This	problem	arises	quite	naturally,	if	we	remember	that	one	of	the	sources	of	financing	
the	budget	deficit	of	the	government	is	seigniorage,	the	real	income	from	the	emission	of	the	
base	money,	which	is	collected	and	controlled	by	setting	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	by	the	
central	bank.	In	this	regard	monetary	policy	should	not	be	considered	in	isolation,	but	rather	
in	the	context	of	determining	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	in	unison.	One	of	the	first	to	note	
this	were	T.	Sargent	and	N.	Wallace	in	1981	in	their	famous	paper:	“unpleasant	monetarist	
29	 See,	for	example,	Beckerman	(1992),	Bruno	(1993),	Dornbusch	(1993),	and	Heymann	and	Leijon-
hufvud	(1995).
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arithmetic”.	Their	paper	laid	the	foundation	for	the	“fiscal	theory	of	inflation”,	or	FTI.	The	
main	result	can	be	given	as	follows.	For	a	given	fiscal	policy	(for	a	predetermined	trajectory	
of	the	primary	budget	deficit)	a	tightening	of	monetary	policy	(decrease	in	the	growth	rate	
of	base	money)	can	bring	about	a	decrease	in	the	rate	of	inflation	in	the	short	run	only	at	the	
expense	of	higher	growth	rates	of	base	money	and	inflation	in	the	future.	Moreover,	if	the	
behavior	of	economic	agents	is	rational	and	forward-looking,	then	a	tight	monetary	policy	
today	may	bring	about	high	inflation	not	only	in	the	future,	but	also	in	the	present.
The	logic	of	this	conclusion	is	based	on	two	main	assumptions.	First	of	all,	it	is	assumed	
that	the	central	bank	considers	the	fiscal	policy	of	the	government	(the	choice	of	trajectory	of	
the	primary	budget	deficit)	as	a	given.	In	other	words,	monetary	policy	assumes	a	passive	role,	
and	the	central	bank	must	provide	the	government	with	a	volume	of	seigniorage	sufficient	to	
cover	the	budget	deficit	(taking	into	account	the	existence	of	an	alternative	source	of	finan-
cing,	namely	new	borrowings	from	the	government)30.	
Secondly,	it	is	assumed	that	the	interest	rate	on	public	debt	is	greater	than	the	growth	rate	
of	output	in	the	economy.	As	we	showed	above,	it	is	in	this	case	that	the	trajectory	both	of	the	
public	debt	and	of	the	ratio	of	government	debt	to	output	is	unstable,	which	is	an	important	
reason	for	the	existence	of	the	problem	of	coordinating	macroeconomic	policies.	If	the	inte-
rest	rate	were	less	than	the	growth	rate	of	output,	then	the	ratio	of	public	debt	to	output	would	
exhibit	a	stable	trajectory,	and	this	would	remove	many	possible	questions.	
Based	on	these	two	assumptions,	Sargent	and	Wallace	consider	the	following	theoretical	
experiment31.	At	the	initial	point	in	time	the	central	bank	decreases	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money,	and	this	brings	about	a	decrease	in	the	volume	of	seigniorage32.	For	a	given	(prede-
termined)	 trajectory	of	 the	primary	budget	deficit,	 the	 less	 the	volume	of	 seigniorage,	 the	
higher	the	public	debt	at	all	points	 in	time	in	the	future.	Indeed,	by	compensating	for	the	
decrease	 in	 the	volume	of	 seigniorage,	 the	government	 is	 forced	 to	borrow	more	 in	order	
to	service	the	existing	debt,	and	this	brings	about	an	increase	in	the	volume	of	borrowings.	
However,	for	many	reasons	the	public	debt	cannot	increase	infinitely.	According	to	the	argu-
ment	by	Sargent	and	Wallace,	for	instance,	the	increase	of	public	debt	is	bounded	from	above	
by	the	volume	of	private	savings	in	the	economy,	or,	what	is	more	likely,	by	some	other,	lesser	
quantity.	 In	order	 to	 stabilize	 the	 increasing	public	debt	 in	 the	 future	 (to	 fix	 its	volume	at	
a	certain	point	in	the	future)	it	will	be	necessary	to	have	a	higher	volume	of	seigniorage,	and	
therefore	a	higher	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	rate	of	inflation.	Modeling	the	demand	for	
money	according	to	the	original	quantity	theory	of	money,	Sargent	and	Wallace	showed	that	
a	 lower	growth	rate	of	base	money	(rate	of	 inflation)	 today	will	 inexorably	be	replaced	by	
30	 There	exists,	however,	a	different	method	of	coordination,	mentioned	but	not	modeled	by	Sargent	and	
Wallace.	It	involves	a	dependent	role	for	the	government,	rather	than	the	central	bank.	In	this	case	monetary	
policy	is	independent	of	the	needs	of	financing	the	deficit,	and	the	government,	taking	the	flow	of	seigniorage	
to	be	exogenous,	is	forced	to	correct	the	trajectory	of	the	budget	deficit	in	accordance	with	some	principle	for	
managing	the	public	debt.	We	will	return	to	this	case	in	the	following	chapters.	
31	 We	do	not	give	the	formal	model	here.	The	result	of	Sargent	and	Wallace	will	be	seen	to	be	one	of	the	
possible	cases	in	the	analysis	given	in	the	third	and	fourth	chapters.	
32	 We	will	discuss	the	validity	of	this	conclusion	later.	
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a	higher	growth	 rate	of	base	money	 (inflation)	 in	 the	 future.	 If,	however,	 the	demand	 for	
money	decreases	with	an	increase	 in	expected	rate	of	 inflation	(as,	 for	example,	 for	 func-
tion	[2.11]),	and	these	expectations	are	formed	in	accordance	with	the	hypothesis	of	perfect	
foresight,	then	the	unavoidable	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	at	a	certain	point	in	
time	will	already	bring	about	an	increase	in	inflation	even	today.	
This	conclusion	can	indeed	be	considered	as	a	“fiscal	theory	of	inflation”.	In	a	situation	
of	inevitable	policy	interaction	with	the	dependent	role	of	monetary	policy,	the	central	bank	
is	not	able	to	permanently	decrease	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	that	is,	to	conduct	long-
term	policies	to	bring	inflation	down.	In	this	sense	inflation	becomes	not	only	a	monetary,	but	
a	fiscal	phenomenon	as	well,	since	influencing	it	requires	not	only	monetary	policy	actions,	
but	also	fiscal	actions	that	have	to	do	with	correcting	the	budget	deficit	of	the	government.	
T.	Sargent’s	and	N.	Wallace’s	1981	paper	can	be	termed	revolutionary	without	overstate-
ment;	it	changed	the	perceptions	of	how	to	conduct	macroeconomic	policy.	The	problem	it	
raised	about	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	created	an	interesting	discussion	
in	the	1980s.	The	logic	that	T.	Sargent	and	N.	Wallace	suggested	can	be	modified,	improved	
or	added	to	in	many	directions.	At	the	present	time	it	presents	both	academic	and	practical	
interest.	
While	the	theoretical	results	were	undoubtedly	interesting,	many	economists	were	skepti-
cal	about	how	realistic	the	basic	assumptions	were33.	Darby	(1984)	considers	that	T.	Sargent’s	
and	N.	Wallace’s	assumption	that	the	interest	rate	is	greater	than	the	growth	rate	of	output	
does	not	hold	for	the	economy	of	the	USA	and	other	developed	countries.	As	we	noted	above,	
this	assumption	is	indeed	critical	for	all	analysis	of	macroeconomic	policy.	Answering	Dar-
by’s	criticism,	Miller	and	Sargent	(1984)	note	that	the	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	
can	(and	should)	be	considered	in	a	wider	context,	and	not	just	literally.	The	growth	of	public	
debt	as	a	result	of	a	tightening	of	monetary	policies	can	bring	about	an	increase	in	the	interest	
rate	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	If	so,	then	Darby’s	methodology,	which	included	the	consider-
ation	of	the	average	interest	rate	for	previous	periods,	could	be	erroneous34.
Agreeing	 that	 the	assumption	 r	>	gy	 is	not	 incontestable,	Bhattacharya,	Guzman	and	
Smith	(1998)35	showed	that	this	assumption	is	not	necessary	for	the	existence	of	“unpleasant	
monetarist	arithmetic”.	The	authors	include	an	extra	asset	in	Sargent-Wallace’s	model	that	
is	available	to	the	private	sector	and	financial	intermediaries.	In	doing	so,	savings,	as	an	ad-
ditional	asset,	conform	to	the	requirement	of	required	partial	reservation.	It	was	shown	that,	
taking	these	additions	into	account,	the	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	can	exist	if	the	
33	 Sargent	and	Wallace	give	their	analysis	based	on	a	somewhat	simplified	version	of	the	model	of	over-
lapping	generations.	Buiter	(1982)	notes	that	one	of	the	drawbacks	of	the	Sargent	and	Wallace	model	is	the	
absence	of	a	microeconomic	basis	for	the	demand	for	money.	In	reality,	this	is	hardly	a	serious	problem.	Later	
papers	(which	will	be	discussed	shortly)	that	touch	on	“monetary	arithmetic”	as	a	rule	were	based	on	dynamic	
optimization	models.	A	more	interesting	point	of	Buiter’s	is	the	following	rhetorical,	but	nonetheless	impor-
tant	question:	is	it	possible,	by	analyzing	monetary	policy	that	to	a	smaller	or	greater	extent	controls	the	money	
base,	to	determine	its	ability	to	control	inflation?	We	will	avoid	this	(now	rhetorical)	question.	
34	 In	this	sense,	the	analysis	by	Darby	(1984)	is	the	subject	to	Lucas	(1976)	critique.
35	 See	also	Bhattacharya	and	Haslag	(1999).
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economy	contains	at	least	one	asset	with	a	rate	of	return	that	is	greater	than	the	growth	rate	
of	output.	In	the	real	world	such	assets,	obviously,	almost	always	exist.	
Dornbusch	(1996)	suggests	additional	considerations	that	strengthen	“unpleasant	mone-
tarist	arithmetic”.	First.	Tight	monetary	policy	leads	to	higher	interest	rates,	and	thus	higher	
debt	 service	and	more	 rapid	accumulation	of	public	debt.	Second.	Tight	monetary	policy	
may	worsen	fiscal	position	by	lowering	tax	revenues	and	increasing	unavoidable	government	
spending.	Third.	Higher	interest	rates	can	depress	economic	growth,	thus	leading	to	more	
rapid	growth	of	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio.	Although	these	considerations	may	be	very	important	
in	practice,	we	do	not	include	them	into	our	analysis	to	be	able	to	concentrate	on	the	“direct”	
logic	of	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”.
In	papers	by	Liviatan	(1984)	and	Drazen	(1985)	it	is	shown	that	the	result	of	“unpleasant	
monetarist	arithmetic”	holds	only	if	the	economy	is	characterized	by	an	inelastic	demand	for	
money	with	respect	to	the	nominal	interest	rate.36	In	Chapters	4	and	5	we	will	also	suggest	
certain	interesting	additions	to	the	analysis	by	Sargent	and	Wallace.	
Seigniorage: is it important for fiscal and monetary policy interaction?
Seigniorage	indeed	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation.	However,	is	it	an	
important	part	of	government	revenue,	and	is	this	true	for	all	countries	and	in	all	times?	
In	fact,	there	are	three	separate	questions:	
What	is	the	seigniorage	to	GDP	ratio	and	is	it	an	important	part	of	government	re-
venue	(or	spending)?
Is	there	empirical	evidence	for	a	strong	relationship	between	the	budget	deficit	and	
seigniorage?
What	is	the	relationship	between	the	inflation	rate	and	seigniorage?
Let	us	consider	these	questions	in	turn.	International	statistics	show	that	seigniorage	in	
industrial	countries	is	relatively	small,	both	as	a	fraction	of	GDP	and	as	a	fraction	of	govern-
ment	 spending.	However,	 it	may	be	an	 important	 source	of	budget	 revenue	 in	developing	
countries	(see	Table	2.1).	Fischer	(1982)	reports	the	seigniorage	to	GNP	ratios	worldwide	in	
1960—1973	and	1973—1978.	More	recent	evidence	for	the	1971—1990	period	is	provided	
by	Click	(1998).	For	the	90	countries	in	the	sample,	the	average	seigniorage	to	GDP	ratio	is	
about	2.5	percent.	On	average,	seigniorage	finances	10.5	percent	of	government	spending.	
Seigniorage	is	less	than	1	percent	for	a	sub-sample	of	28	countries,	consisting	of	all	industrial	
countries	 as	well	 as	 some	 that	 are	developing.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 seigniorage	 to	GDP	
ratio	is	more	than	5	percent	of	GDP	in	8	countries	in	the	sample.	It	 is	 interesting	to	note	
that	seigniorage	as	a	 fraction	of	government	spending	does	not	produce	the	same	pattern.	
For	example,	seigniorage	is	0.4371	percent	of	GDP	in	Canada	and	it	is	0.4737	percent	in	the	
United	Kingdom.	At	the	same	time	seigniorage	as	percent	of	government	spending	is	2.0144	
36	 Velasco	(1993)	arrived	at	like	results	after	modifying	the	Drazen	model	for	an	open	economy,	floating	
exchange	rate	and	perfect	capital	mobility.
•
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in	Canada,	but	it	is	1.2800	in	the	United	Kingdom.	For	some	developing	countries	seignior-
age	is	 indeed	a	major	source	of	revenue.	For	example,	seigniorage	as	a	percent	of	govern-
ment	spending	is	18.9687	in	Mexico	(3.7207	percent	of	GDP),	and	it	is	62.0003	in	Argentina	
(9.7299	percent	of	GDP).	Seigniorage	is	important	even	in	some	developed	countries	in	the	
period	under	consideration:	Switzerland,	Japan,	Spain,	Greece,	Iceland	and	Italy	have	sei-
gniorage	well	above	5	percent	of	government	spending.
Table 2.1. Average	annual	rate	of	seigniorage	in	selected	countries,	1971—1990
Country
Seigniorage 
as percent  
of GDP
Seigniorage  
as percent  
of government 
spending
Country
Seigniorage  
as percent  
of GDP
Seigniorage 
as percent  
of government 
spending
Denmark 0.3943 1.0512 Thailand 1.0872 6.3018
United States 0.4295 1.9552 Philippines 1.2251 8.9611
Canada 0.4371 2.0144 Indonesia 1.3908 6.8590
United Kingdom 0.4373 1.2800 Korea 1.5690 9.6979
Belgium 0.4910 1.0187 Malaysia 1.5749 5.2696
Netherlands 0.5352 1.0184 Spain 2.0267 7.5584
France 0.5520 1.3863 Colombia 2.3178 17.5651
Norway 0.5630 1.4598 Italy 2.3572 7.4229
Finland 0.5966 2.1217 Brazil 3.0394 13.7132
Switzerland 0.6187 6.7397 Greece 3.1291 10.5149
Germany 0.6869 2.3539 Mexico 3.7207 18.9687
Austria 0.6940 1.8944 Argentina 9.7299 62.0003
Sweden 0.7234 1.9301 Chile 10.3001 32.5765
Japan 0.9585 5.6200 Israel 14.8424 22.2781
Source:	Click,	1998	(extract	from	Table	1,	p.	155).
The	most	obvious	way	to	test	 the	fiscal	 theory	of	 inflation	is	 to	check	for	a	relationship	
between	government	deficit	and	seigniorage.	King	and	Plosser	(1985)	check	for	contemporane-
ous	correlation	between	money	creation	and	deficits	in	the	USA.	They	found	positive	correla-
tion	in	the	1929—1952	period,	but	little	or	no	correlation	in	the	1953—1982	period.	This	result,	
however,	does	not	imply	weakness	of	FTI,	as	long	as	there	is	a	more	general	consideration:	if	
fiscal	policy	is	dominant	(if	the	trajectory	of	the	budget	deficit	is	taken	as	exogenous),	then	there	
is	a	constraint	on	future	monetary	policy	(future	seigniorage	revenues).	That	is,	FTI	predicts	
a	positive	dynamic	relationship	between	seigniorage	and	past	deficits	under	fiscal	dominance.	
King	and	Plosser	 (1985)	 found	 that	past	deficits	do	predict	 seigniorage.	However,	 they	also	
found	 that	by	 adding	 variables	 that	 the	Federal	Reserve	might	 also	 respond	 to	 (such	as	 the	
nominal	interest	rate,	the	growth	rate	of	output	or	the	unemployment	rate)	into	the	regression,	
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the	significance	of	the	predictive	power	of	past	deficits	is	reduced.	More	recent	investigation	by	
Fischer,	Sahay	and	Vegh	(2002)	shows	that	the	relationship	between	the	deficit	and	seigniorage	
is	strong	only	in	high-inflation	countries	(during	high-inflation	episodes).	
There	are	several	difficulties	in	the	interpretation	of	these	results.	First	of	all,	the	testing	
strategy	involves	the	assumption	of	fiscal	dominance	that	may	hold	in	some	periods	but	not	in	
others.	Secondly,	here	we	again	can	stress	the	original	point	by	Miller	and	Sargent	(1984)	that	
“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	just	shows	the	important	consequences	of	current	tight	
monetary	policy	for	the	future	alternatives	for	both	fiscal	and	monetary	policy.	In	particular,	
we	show	in	the	following	chapters	that	there	are	many	possible	scenarios	of	fiscal	and	mo-
netary	policy	interaction.	Some	of	them	predict	inflationary	consequences	of	fiscal	deficits,	
while	others	do	not.	
The	 final	question	of	 the	 inflationary	consequences	of	 seigniorage	 raises	 little	doubts.	
The	most	 interesting	finding	 in	this	respect	 is	 the	nonlinear	nature	of	 the	relationship	be-
tween	inflation	and	seigniorage.	Fischer,	Sahay	and	Vegh	(2002)	report	the	presence	of	the	
so-called	Laffer	curve	effect,	that	is,	of	a	fall	in	seigniorage	as	inflation	continues	to	rise.	This	
effect	 is	visible	and	significant	 in	high-inflation	countries.	Haslag	(1998)	provides	the	evi-
dence	on	the	systematic,	positive	relationship	between	a	country’s	monetary	policy	settings	
(growth	rate	of	base	money	in	particular)	and	its	reliance	on	seigniorage.	This	relationship	is	
nonlinear	for	OECD	countries.
2.5. The fiscal theory of the price level
In	the	middle	of	the	1990s	yet	another	interesting	approach	in	the	analysis	of	macroeco-
nomic	policy	appeared,	the	“fiscal	theory	of	the	price	level	determination”	by	M.	Woodford	
and	K.	Sims37.	In	principle,	this	theoretical	approach	is	not	a	direct	base	for	the	analysis	that	
we	suggest	in	the	following	chapters;	rather,	we	will	proceed	in	the	context	of	FTI.	However,	
the	existence	of	certain	points	where	different	theories	overlap	requires	that	we	give	a	gene-
ral	characterization	of	this	alternative	theory,	its	main	assumptions,	results	and	applications.	
Moreover,	 if	 the	analysis	 in	 this	work	 in	certain	aspects	uses	“traditional”	monetary	 logic	
in	constructing	models,	it	would	be	unfair	to	pass	by	a	new,	interesting	(if	not	generally	ac-
cepted)	theory	and	its	logic	in	determining	macroeconomic	policies.
A simplified interpretation of the theory
The	Fiscal	Theory	of	the	Price	Level	(FTPL)	states	that	the	equilibrium	price	level	is	de-
termined	by	the	ratio	of	the	volume	of	nominal	public	debt	to	the	present	value	of	real	budget	
surpluses	(plus	the	present	value	of	seigniorage).	Indeed,	rewriting	equation	(2.8),
37	 Woodford	(1995,	1997,	1998,	2000,	2001),	Sims	(1994).	See	also	the	earlier	investigation	by	Leeper	
(1991)	 and	 following	 papers	 by	Bergin	 (2000),	Benassy	 (2003),	 and	Canzonery,	Cumby	 and	Diba	 (1998),	
Christiano	and	Fitzgerald	(2000),	Cochrane	(1999,	2000,	2001),	Daniel	(2001),	Dupor	(2000),	Gordon	and	
Leeper	(2002),	Kocherlakota	and	Phelan	(1999),	Leeper	(2003),	Schmitt-Grohe	(2000).
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	 b(t) =
B(t)
P(t)
= S(τ)− d(τ)( )e−r (τ−t )dτ
t
∞
∫ 	 (2.29)	
for	a	given	accumulated	(predetermined)	volume	of	nominal	public	debt	and	expected	future	
values	of	the	budget	deficit	and	seigniorage	(which	are	exogenous	for	this	policy)	we	arrive	at	
the	price	level	for	each	point	in	time:
	 P(t) =
B(t)
S(τ)− d(τ)( )e−r (τ−t )dτ
t
∞
∫
.	 (2.30)
Such	approaches	to	the	modeling	of	macroeconomic	policies	raises	many	questions	or	even	
doubts	as	to	the	consistency	of	the	theory.38	Below	we	will	attempt	to	understand	more	fully	
the	essence	of	FTPL	and	give	the	most	common	points	where	this	theory	faces	criticism.	
The	fact	that	one	of	the	main	macroeconomic	indexes,	namely	the	price	level,	is	deter-
mined	from	a	single	equation	(2.30),	should	not	disturb	us	to	a	great	extent.	The	simplest	
version	of	the	monetarist	approach	can	also,	in	essence,	determine	the	price	level	given	only	
the	equation	of	exchange	MV	=	Py.	In	the	context	of	the	principle	of	neoclassical	dichotomy	
the	variable	y,	real	output,	is	determined	in	the	real	sector	of	the	economy,	while	the	velocity	
of	money	V	is	assumed	for	simplicity	to	be	constant,	so	that	the	price	level	is	determined	by	
the	amount	of	money	in	circulation	M.	In	other	words,	given	the	exogenously	determined	
(for	this	simple	and	to	a	certain	extent	trivial	assumptions)	variables	y	and	V,	the	central	bank	
can	influence	the	price	level	via	M.	The	Cagan	model	considered	above	acts	in	an	analogous	
fashion,	and	also	presents	a	traditional	monetarist	approach	to	the	determination	of	the	price	
level.	
Budget constraint for the government or equilibrium condition?
In	practice,	papers	by	the	founders	of	FTPL	use	equation	(2.29)	in	the	context	of	“stan-
dard”	optimization	models39.	What	is	different	about	FTPL	is	the	meaning	conveyed	by	equa-
tion	(2.29).	The	traditional	approach	is	to	search	for	a	general	economic	equilibrium	(and	
the	majority	of	“standard”	optimization	models	 can	be	classified	as	 equilibrium	models),	
while	equation	(2.29)	is	a	budget	constraint	of	the	government.	The	logic	of	using	a	budget	
constraint	that	is	the	same	both	for	the	private	sector	as	well	as	the	government	assumes	that	
the	decisions	of	economic	agents	must	satisfy	the	budget	constraint	for any price level.	Thus,	
38	 Buiter	consistently	criticizes	FTPL	 in	his	papers,	proclaiming	 it	“logically	 incoherent”.	See	Buiter	
(1998,	1999,	2002,	2004).	In	reality,	the	dispute	over	FTPL	in	academic	literature	is	probably	one	of	the	most	
intense	of	the	last	few	decades.	
39	 Most	papers	by	supporters	or	critics	of	FTPL	use	basic	optimization	models	with	money	in	the	utility	
function,	with	cash-in-advance	constraint,	or	shopping-time	models.	There	can	also	be	assumptions	about	the	
flexibility	of	prices,	or	certain	other	nominal	rigidities	(Woodford,	1997).	In	the	Appendix	to	the	second	chap-
ter	we	will	also	consider	the	Sidrausky	model	with	money	in	the	utility	function	of	a	representative	agent.	
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economic	agents	take	the	price	level	as	given	and	base	their	decisions	on	it.	Based	on	this,	and	
on	the	first	order	conditions	and	certain	other	additional	conditions,	these	models	determine	
the	equilibrium	price	level.	FTPL,	however,	considers	(2.29)	not	to	be	a	budget	constraint,	
but	rather	to	be	the	equilibrium	condition	itself	40.	In	other	words,	the	government	must	sa-
tisfy	condition	(2.29)	not	for	any	price	level,	but	just for the equilibrium price level.	This	is	the	
essence	of	FTPL.
From	the	standpoint	of	the	standard	macroeconomic	approach	that	is	grounded	in	the	
principle	of	sustainable	fiscal	policy41,	 the	government	and	the	central	bank	must	conduct	
their	policies	so	that	condition	(2.29)	is	satisfied	for	given	(predetermined)	variables	M(t)	and	
B(t)	and	any	possible	price	level.	In	other	words,	the	joint	choice	of	the	trajectories	d(τ)	and	
S(τ)	for	τ	≥ t	cannot	be	completely	exogenous.	FTPL	states	that	the	government	is	not	at	all	
required	to	achieve	sustainability	for	its	policies	at	the	price	level	determined	by	the	market.	
The	government	itself	can	influence	the	price	level	by	conducting	certain	policies42.
Government bonds as stocks: an asset pricing interpretation 
 In	the	modern	world,	money	issued	by	the	state	is	not	explicitly backed	(“fiat”	or	“un-
backed”	money).	 In	 accordance	with	 traditional	monetarist	 theory,	 the	 positive	worth	 of	
money	is	explained	by	the	demand	for	 it	as	 for	a	special	asset	 for	conducting	transactions	
(given	its	limited	supply).	FTPL	is	based	on	a	different	interpretation:	money	and	nominal	
government	bonds	have	an	implicit backing	as	the	obligations	of	the	state	in	the	form	of	future	
surpluses	of	the	state	budget43.	Thus,	Christiano	and	Fitzgerald	(2000)	draw	a	direct	analogy	
between	the	price	determination	of	assets	(they	used	Microsoft	as	an	example	on	p.	13)	and	
FTPL.	On	the	stock	market	the	corresponding	information	about	the	future	determines	the	
value	of	the	firm	and,	taking	into	account	the	number	of	shares	issued,	the	price	for	one	share.	
A	firm	is	not	required	(either	in	theory	or	in	practice)	to	conduct	a	certain	policy	in	the	future	
depending	on	the	current	price	of	its	shares.	In	the	opinion	of	L.	Christiano	and	T.	Fitzgerald	
and	other	proponents	of	FTPL,	the	government	is	not	required	to	conduct	a	certain	policy	
based	on	the	size	of	the	public	debt	for	the	same	reasons.	Holders	of	state	obligations	(the	pri-
vate	sector	in	the	macroeconomic	model)	determine	the	equilibrium	price	level	based	on	the	
40	 Woodford	(1995,	p.	30)	suggest	the	following	interpretation:	“It	is	well-known	that	when	Walras’s	Law	
holds	(i.e.	when	individual	economic	units’	budgets	can	be	aggregated	to	obtain	a	well-defined	present	value	
for	aggregate	expenditure),	the	joint	requirements	that	each	unit’s	budget	constraint	be	satisfied	with	equality	
and	that	each	market	clear	contain	a	redundant	equation.	(Often	this	is	taken	to	be	one	of	the	market-clearing	
conditions,	so	that	it	is	found	that	it	is	found	that	clearing	of	N–1	markets	implies	clearing	of	the	Nth	market	
as	well,	but	it	might	equally	well	be	one	of	the	budget	constraints	that	is	implied	by	the	others.)	Then	clearing	of	
all	markets	implies	that	if	the	representative	household’s	present-value	budget	constraint	holds	with	equality,	
a	similar	present-value	relation	[(2.29)]	must	hold	with	equality	for	the	government”.
41	 We	considered	this	principle	above,	and	the	main	part	of	Chapter	4	will	be	built	upon	it.	
42	 This,	however,	does	not	mean	 that	 the	government	can	choose	any	 trajectory	 for	expenditures	and	
taxes.	Since	the	price	level	cannot	be	negative,	a	positive	nominal	public	debt	should	inevitably	be	backed	by	
a	positive	present	value	of	future	budget	surpluses.
43	 We	have	already	referred	above	to	this	interpretation,	suggested	by	T.	Sargent.	In	reality,	this	interpreta-
tion	has	a	very	old	history.	It	is	one	of	the	possible	explanations	for	the	positive	value	of	money,	as	it	is	required	
for	paying	taxes.	See,	for	example,	Starr	(1974).
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ratio	of	the	nominal	volume	of	the	accumulated	debt	and	the	real	flow	of	“backing”	(present	
value	of	the	budget	surplus	and	seigniorage),	that	is,	in	accordance	with	(2.30).
It	is	important	to	emphasize	the	following.	Parallels	are	drawn	between	the	determina-
tion	of	 the	price	of	 shares	based on their number and	 the	determination	of	 the	price	 level	
based	on	the	accumulated	level	of	the	nominal debt.	Defending	the	meaning	of	(2.30)	as	of	a	
“valuation equation”	and	answering	the	critics	of	the	theory,	Cochrane	notes	that	FTPL	does	
not	at	all	deny	the	importance	of	budget	constraints	of	the	private	sector	and	the	government	
in	macroeconomic	models:	“…Government	and	private	sector	must	obey	budget	constraints	
in	buying	or	selling	real	debt,	foreign	debt,	goods,	and	any	already	defined	securities,	at	equi-
librium	as	well	as	off-equilibrium	prices”.44	We	will	return	to	the	question	about	the	real	debt	
later.	
In	connection	with	this	analogy,	J.	Cochrane	also	comes	to	the	following	conclusions.	
The	government	may	 issue	more	bonds	without	 the	corresponding	 increase	 in	 the	 flow	of	
future	budget	surpluses;	this	will	simply	increase	the	price	level45	(just	as	the	issuance	of	ad-
ditional	shares	without	changing	expectations	about	future	profits	will	simply	decrease	the	
price	of	one	share).	Also,	the	state	is	not	obligated	to	react	to	non-equilibrium	prices,	unlike,	
for	example,	the	demand	curve,	which	can	be	considered	only	if	the	budget	constraint	is	sa-
tisfied	for	any	prices.	Indeed,	Microsoft	Corporation	is	not	required	to	increase	its	dividends	
by	a	factor	of	two	if	the	price	of	its	shares	doubles.	
The wealth effect as a mechanism by which fiscal policy influences the price level
Again,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 monetary	 approach	 (the	 quantitative	 theory),	 in	 which	
the	logic	of	determining	the	price	level	based	on	the	exchange	equation	MV	=	Py	does	not	
undergo	principle	changes	 in	 larger	models	with	a	greater	number	of	variables,	 the	FTPL	
mechanism	may	be	presented	in	a	more	formal	fashion	than	simply	equation	(2.29).	Wood-
ford46	describes	the	following	mechanism:	“…an	increase	in	the	nominal	value	of	outstanding	
government	liabilities,	or	in	the	size	of	the	(appropriately	modified)	real	government	budget	
deficit	expected	at	some	future	dates,	 is	 inconsistent	with	equilibrium	at	the	existing	price	
level.	For	either	change	causes	households	to	believe	that	their	budget	set	had	expanded	(as-
suming	no	change	in	the	path	of	the	price	level),	and	so	they	demand	additional	consumption	
immediately	(as	well	as	planning	higher	consumption	in	the	future.	The	consequence	would	
be	excess	demand	for	goods	(both	now	and	in	the	future).	This	forces	up	prices…	Price	level	
determination	 thus	depends	upon	a	wealth	effect	of	price	 level	changes,	as	 in	 the	analysis	
of	Patinkin	(1956),	but	in	contrast	to	Patinkin’s	analysis	of	the	“real	balance	effect”,	I	find	
44	 Cochrane	(2000),	p.	3.	There	he	also	explains	that,	just	as	in	the	case	of	price	determination	for	shares,	
FTPL	does	not	in	any	way	contradict	the	logic	of	constructing	models	of	the	Walrasian	type.	We	will	return	to	
this	question	once	again	later.	
45	 Here	yet	another	 idea	(or	comment)	 inevitably	appears.	 If	 (2.29)	 is	not	a	budget	constraint	 for	 the	
government,	then	the	transversality	condition	(2.7)	must	also	not	apply	to	the	government.	It	must	apply	to	the	
private	sector	(to	its	budget	constraint).
46	 Woodford	(1995),	pp.	12—15.
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that	the	effect	in	question	depends	upon	the	value	of	net	outside	assets,	rather	than	upon	the	
value	of	the	monetary	base”,	and	later	in	the	text:	“…changes	in	[net	government	liabilities	
and	expectations	regarding	future	government	budgets]	do	affect	the	equilibrium	price	level,	
quite	independently	of	any	changes	in	the	path	of	the	money	supply	that	may	be	associated	
with	them”47,	and	“…the	expected	path	of	the	money	supply	does	not	matter	for	price	level	
determination,	except through its consequences for the government’s budget”.
Thus,	we	have	 two	alternative	approaches	 to	 the	determination	of	 the	price	 level:	 the	
traditional	monetarist	approach	(the	quantitative	theory	of	money)	and	the	fiscal	approach	
(FTPL).	How	can	we	explain	the	emergence	of	this	new	(fiscal)	approach?	Should	we	apply	
it	in	practice?	If	yes,	is	it	universal,	that	is,	can	it	replace	the	usual	monetary	approach	for	the	
description	of	any	situation?
FTPL and the problem of the price level indeterminacy
One	of	the	main	reasons	why	the	author	of	FTPL	M.	Woodford	and	his	followers	consider	
that	the	creation	of	FTPL	was	“necessary”	is	an	old,	but	still	very	relevant	problem	of	the	in-
determinacy	of	equilibrium	in	a	wide	spectrum	of	monetary	models.	First	of	all,	there	is	the	
(theoretical)	problem	about	the	indeterminacy	of	the	volume	of	money	supply	and	of	the	price	
level	if	monetary	policy	as	a	target	uses	the	nominal	interest	rate	instead	of	some	money	aggre-
gate.48	In	M.	Woodford’s	opinion,	the	set	of	equilibrium	conditions	in	the	traditional	approach	
(the	quantity	theory)	is	simply	incomplete.	In	order	to	remove	the	problem	of	indeterminacy	
and	choose	a	concrete	solution	for	the	price	level	in	this	class	of	models,	economists	often	use	
additional	conditions	that	raise	doubts	as	to	how	valid	or	realistic	they	are.49	FTPL	suggests	a	
new	approach:	by	changing	the	role	of	(2.29)	and	releasing	the	government	of	its	obligation	to	
“slave”	its	future	policy	in	order	to	satisfy	(2.29)	as	a	budget	constraint	(for	any	price	level!),	we	
arrive	at	an	additional	equilibrium	condition	that	removes	the	problem	of	indeterminacy50.
Translating	 this	 problem	 into	 the	 language	 of	 macroeconomic	 policy,	 we	 may	 note	
the	following.	Standard	monetarist	doctrine	assumes	(in	the	first	approximation),	that	the	
price	level	will	be	stable	if	and	only	if	an	independent central	bank	upholds	an	commitment	
(a	policy	rule)	concerning	its	targets.	In	essence,	the	independence	of	the	central	bank	and	
47	 The	quantity	M(t)	+	B(t)	is	understood	to	be	the	pure	nominal	obligations	of	the	public	sector.	For	this
variable	equation	(2.29)	may	be	written	as	
M (t)+ B(t)
P(t)
= r + π(τ)( )m(τ)− d(τ)( )e− r(τ−t )dτ
t
∞
∫ .	Indeed,	this	equa-
tion	is	also	a	forward-looking	solution	of	(2.1)	given	the	transversality	condition	 lim
t→∞
m(t)+b(t)( )e− rt = 0 .	Even
though	the	meaning	of	this	equation	is	the	same	as	that	of	(2.29),	this	form	of	representing	FTPL	seems	to	be	
more	correct	to	many	researches	than	(2.29)	(in	particular,	to	Cochrane).	
48	 Classical	papers	dealing	with	 this	phenomenon	are	Patinkin	(1949,	1961,	1965,	1969),	Sargent	and	
Wallace	(1975),	McCallum	(1981,	1983,	1986).	See	also	the	recent	paper	by	Benassy	(2000).
49	 See,	for	example,	Obstfeld	and	Rogoff	(1983).	McCallum	(1983,	1999)	designed	the	so-called	Mini-
mal-State-Variable	approach.
50	 In	 the	 terminology	of	McCallum,	 this	problem	is	 that	of	nominal	 indeterminacy.	 In	his	critique	of	
FTPL,	McCallum	(2001)	notes	 that	 in	many	cases	 the	new	 theory	deals	not	with	 the	problem	of	nominal	
indeterminacy,	but	with	 the	problem	of	multiple	equilibria	 (solution	multiplicity	or	nonuniqueness)	 in	 the	
determination	of	the	trajectory	of	the	price	level.
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the	monetary	 policy	 rule	 should	 be	 a	 device	 for	 achieving	 so-called	 “fiscal	 discipline”51.	
FTPL,	in	contrast,	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	“correct”	monetary	policy	may	be	insuffi-
cient	in	order	to	achieve	a	stable	price	level	—	it	is	also	necessary	to	conduct	a	certain	(“cor-
rect”)	fiscal	policy.
Innovations on the money market and macroeconomic sustainability
Another	interesting	problem	which	FTPL	can	be	used	to	solve,	is	the	appearance	(and	
perhaps	even	widespread	use)	of	private	money	as	replacement	for	money	that	is	issued	by	
the	central	bank.	Many	proponents	of	traditional	monetarism52	have	expressed	concern	that	
the	widespread	use	of	money	issued	by	the	private	sector	could	make	it	 impossible	for	the	
central	bank	to	control	the	money	market	and	so,	in	particular,	render	the	price	level	indeter-
minate.	Again,	FTPL	predicts	that	equation	(1.29)	will	uniquely	determine	the	price	level.	In	
this	case	the	appearance	of	private	money	does	not	change	anything	in	principle:	monetary	
policy	did	not	directly	determine	the	price	level	before,	and	the	parameters	of	fiscal	policy	
such	as	the	flow	of	future	tax	revenues	or	expenditures	hardly	depend	to	a	great	extent	on	the	
presence	or	absence	of	private	substitutes	for	money	issued	by	the	central	bank53.	Objections	
to	use	of	private	money	is	considered	by	M.	Woodford	to	be	a	serious	mistake,	since	(if	there	
is	no	problem	with	the	indeterminacy	of	the	price	level)	this	takes	away	many	positive	aspects	
of	the	de-monopolization	of	the	money	market	from	society,	such	as	an	increase	in	the	ef-
ficiency	of	the	economy	and	the	avoidance	(lowering)	of	inflation54.
The	traditional	approach	to	the	analysis	of	monetary	policy	assumes	that	the	institute	
of	the	money	market	is	stable,	that	money	aggregates	and	the	demand	function	for	money	
are	stable,	and	that	the	velocity	of	money	is	also	stable,	which	obviously	does	not	conform	
to	reality.55	Then	one	may	ask	the	obvious	question56:	how,	if	money	aggregates	are	unstable,	
can	the	central	bank	achieve	its	goals	with	respect	to	the	price	level	(inflation)	by	manipu-
lating	the	base	money,	 the	specific	volume	of	which	 in	the	modern	developed	economy	is	
rather	small?	FTPL	is	able	to	remove	this	problem	as	well,	if	the	price	level	(and	its	stability)	
are	determined	not	by	monetary	policy,	but	by	fiscal	policy.	Moreover,	in	order	to	determine	
the	stable	price	level	and	achieve	it,	not	only	monetary	policy	but	money	itself	stops	playing	
51	 The	term	“fiscal	discipline	device”	is	quite	a	widespread	term	and	presents	an	interesting	area	for	re-
search.	See,	for	instance,	Tornell	and	Velasco	(1998).	From	the	point	of	view	of	traditional	monetarism,	even	
though	the	absence	of	fiscal	discipline	may	entail	inflationary	consequences,	these,	as	a	rule,	are	considered	
negligible	in	economies	with	low	inflation,	which	have	an	insignificant	level	of	seigniorage.	
52	 See,	for	example,	Friedman	(1999).
53	 It	is	important,	however,	to	note	that	the	appearance	of	private	money	may	significantly	influence	the	
present	value	of	seigniorage.	From	the	point	of	view	of	FTPL	this,	or	course,	does	not	mean	indeterminacy	in	
of	the	price	level,	but	rather	its	value	may	undergo	certain	changes,	especially	if	the	portion	of	seigniorage	in	
the	economy	is	high.	
54	 See,	for	example,	Hayek	(1978).	A	recent	overview	can	be	found	in	the	paper	by	Cowen	and	Kroszner	
(1994).
55	 The	necessity	of	stable	institutions	of	the	money	market	in	order	to	attain	macroeconomic	stability	is	
often	used	as	an	argument	against	innovations	on	the	financial	market.	
56	 See	Friedman	(1999).
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a	role!	This	conclusion	of	FTPL57	is	very	timely	and	relevant	in	the	context	of	recent	discus-
sions	about	the	so-called	post-monetary	economy58.
Types of macroeconomic policy and FTPL
In	order	to	determine	(distinguish)	the	classes	of	situations	in	which	either	the	traditional	
monetarist	approach	or	FTPL	is	applicable,	the	following	definitions	of	macroeconomic	po-
licy	have	been	introduced	in	the	economic	literature.	The	Ricardian	type	of	policy	is	a	mac-
roeconomic	policy	in	which	monetary	policy	plays	a	dominating	role	(we	will	use	the	term	
Money Dominant (MD) below)59.	By	definition,	an	MD	policy	is	a	macroeconomic	policy	for	
which	equation	(2.29)	is	satisfied	for	any	price	level,	not	just	the	equilibrium	one.	Equation	
(2.29)	then	becomes	the	budget	constraint	for	the	government	in	its	traditional	meaning	and	
does	not	have	a	direct	relationship	to	the	determination	of	the	equilibrium	price	level.	The	
equilibrium	price	 level	 is	determined	 (in	 line	with	 the	monetarist	paradigm)	by	monetary	
policies,	i.e.	based	on	the	exchange	equation.	As	an	illustration	of	an	MD	policy,	Woodford	
(1995)	gives	the	following	rule	for	fiscal	policy:
	 T (t) = G(t)− S(t)+ γrb(t), 0 < γ ≤1.	 (2.31)
For	this	fiscal	policy,	the	budget	constraint	of	the	government	(as	an	equation	for	the	dyna-
mics	of	the	public	debt)	reduces	to	the	equation:
	 &b(t) = (1− γ)rb(t).	 (2.32)
Here	the	rate	of	growth	of	the	public	debt	equals	(1	—	γ)r	<	r,	so	that	the	no-Ponzi	game	
condition	(2.7)	is	automatically	satisfied	(for	any	price	level).
Another	simple	example	of	an	MD	policy	is	provided	by	the	quantity	theory	of	money	
with	an	additional	assumption	about	the	constant	velocity	of	money60.	Indeed,	in	this	case,	
57	 Woodford	(1998)	models	an	analogous	situation	in	discussing	the	so-called	“cashless	limit”,	in	which	
the	portion	of	transactions	in	which	the	use	of	money	is	necessary	approaches	zero.	
58	 An	overview	of	the	current	discussion	about	the	perspectives	of	the	development	of	an	“economy	with-
out	money”	and	the	modeling	of	a	monetary	policy	in	such	a	world	can	be	found	in	Woodford	(2000).
59	 The	term	Ricardian type of policy was	introduced	by	M.	Woodford,	who	considers	the	automatic	satis-
faction	of	the	budget	constraint	(2.29)	for	any	price	level	(the	irrelevancy	of	fiscal	policy)	a	simple	extension	
of	the	well-known	principle	of	Ricardian equivalency	(Barro,	1974).	Many	authors	prefer,	however,	to	use	diffe-
rent	terminology.	In	an	early	paper	by	Leeper	(1991)	the	concept	of	Ricardian	policy	in	a	first	approximation	
corresponding	to	“passive	fiscal	policy”	(given	“active	monetary	policy”).	The	terminology	used	here	of	MD	
and	FD	policies	(which	we	consider	more	appropriate)	 is	 taken	from	the	paper	by	Canzoneri,	Cumby	and	
Diba	(2001).	It	should	also	be	clearly	understood	that	the	difference	between	Ricardian	and	non-Ricardian	
policies	(between	MD	and	FD	policies)	does	not	in	any	way	signify	the	difference	between	sustainable	and	
unsustainable	fiscal	policies.
60	 This	assumption	is,	of	course,	unrealistic.	If	we	assume	that	the	velocity	of	money	may	change	depend-
ing	at	least	on	the	nominal	interest	rate,	then	we	come	to	a	standard	model	for	the	dynamics	of	the	price	level	
(a	version	of	the	Cagan	model),	in	which	an	extra	condition	is	introduced	in	order	to	find	a	stable	solution;	
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if	the	central	bank	controls	the	supply	of	money,	then	the	exchange	equation	determines	the	
price	level.	The	government	is	forced	to	passively	correct	the	parameters	of	current	and	future	
fiscal	policies	in	order	that	(2.29)	is	satisfied.
In	contrast,	a	Non-Ricardian policy is	when	the	main	role	in	determining	macroecono-
mic	equilibrium	(in	particular,	the	equilibrium	price	level)	is	played	by	fiscal	policy	(referred	
to	below	as	an	FD	policy,	Fiscal Dominant).	The	assumptions	and	logic	of	FTPL	correspond	
to	this	policy,	in	which	the	condition	(2.29)	is	satisfied	only for	the	equilibrium	price	level,	
and	does	not	to	be	satisfied	for	non-equilibrium	prices;	thus	equation	(2.29)	is	an	equilibrium	
condition,	not	a	budget	constraint61.
The	majority	of	both	proponents	and	opponents	of	FTPL	agree	that	the	theory	is	based	
on	the	idea	that	it	is	possible	for	the	government	to	choose	a	behavior	that	is	qualitatively	dif-
ferent	from	that	of	households.	Thus,	Kocherlakota	and	Phelan	(1999)	characterize	an	FD	
policy	as	a	certain	“equilibrium rejection device”.	Indeed,	given	that	equation	(2.29)	must	not	
necessarily	be	satisfied	for	any	price	level	under	an	FD	policy,	the	government	may	choose	
a	certain	fiscal	policy	(now	or	by	acting	on	future	expectations)	and	so	reject	certain	trajecto-
ries	in	the	dynamics	of	the	price	level	(inflation),	namely	those	for	which	(2.29)	is	guaranteed	
to	fail.	Alternatively,	the	government	can	also	choose	a	certain	trajectory	(make	it	compatible	
with	equilibrium)	in	the	same	way62.	
Cochrane	 (1999)	 notes	 an	 important	 difference	 between	 FD	 and	MD	 policies	 from	
a	 dynamic	 point	 of	 view.	The	FD-type	 (FTPL)	 considers	 in	 essence	 the	 forward-looking	
dynamics	of	the	public	debt:	its	real	value	is	determined	by	future	fiscal	policy,	and	the	equi-
librium	price	 level	 is	 forced to	adapt	to	these	expectations.	However,	MD	policies	and	the	
traditional	monetarist	approach	use	(2.29)	as	a	budget	constraint,	and	though	this	may	be	
from	the	standpoint	of	present	value,	but	nevertheless	the	public	debt	itself	is	determined	by	
its	history.	Thus	for	the	given	accumulated	nominal	debt	and	the	price	level	on	the	money	
market,	the	government	must	adapt	its	future	fiscal	policy	in	order	to	satisfy	(2.29).
What	type	of	macroeconomic	policy	should	we	choose?	From	a	theoretical	point	of	view,	
in	M.	Woodford’s	opinion,	an	MD	policy	is	probably	a	“special	case”,	not	the	main	one.	The	
opponents	of	FTPL,	however,	believe	that	ignoring	(2.29)	as	a	constraint	cannot	be	a	basis	
for	any	models.	
Monetarism and FTPL: different cases of one theory?
As	we	pointed	out	above,	the	standard	monetarist	approach	and	FTPL	differ	in	essence	
only	in	one	aspect	—	in	the	interpretation	of	(2.29)	in	the	macroeconomic	model	(and	this	is	
however,	the	validity	of	this	assumption	is	doubted	by	many	macroeconomists.	See,	for	example,	Cochrane	
(1999).
61	 Yet	 there	 is	another	possible	 interpretation	of	FD-regime.	In	 this	case	 the	government	conducts	 its	
policy	as	some	kind	of	commitment	that	does	not	have	anything	to	do	with	the	volume	of	debt,	while	the	MD-
regime	characterizes	fiscal	policy	as	a	choice	of	trajectory	of	the	budget	deficit	depending on	the	volume	of	real	
debt.	See	Christiano	and	Fitzgerald	(2000).	
62	 Actually,	this	idea	justifies	the	terminology	“fiscal	theory	of	determination of	the	price	level”.
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what	determines	the	different	types	of	policies	described	above).	This	gives	many	researches63	
reason	to	consider	the	monetary	model	and	FTPL	as	different	cases	of	one	theory.	Indeed,	
practically	any	model	for	the	analysis	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	contains	a	pair	of	equa-
tions64,	one	of	which	determines	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	while	the	other	deter-
mines	the	budget	constraint	of	the	government	(in	the	usual	terminology).	For	example,	this	
could	be	the	equation	of	the	quantity	theory	of	money	and	(2.29).	Both	equations	contain	
the	price	level	P(t)	as	a	variable	that	needs	to	be	solved	for.	For	the	exogenously	determined	
variables	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	we	therefore	naturally	come	to	the	problem	of	over-
determined	the	price	level.	Therefore,	the	choice	of	variables	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	
must	be	constrained65	—	the	policies	must	be	coordinated.	Thus,	the	question	of	how	(2.29)	
should	be	interpreted	is	a	problem	of	how	to	coordinate	the	policies	and	thus	gives	rise	to	dif-
ferent	theoretical	approaches.	
In	accordance	with	 the	monetarist	model	 (with	MD-type	coordination of	policies),	 the	
central	bank	is	the	first	to	determine	the	nominal	volume	of	money.	The	equilibrium	price	level	
is	then	determined	from	the	exchange	equation.	For	a	given	price	level	the	government	is	obli-
gated	to	build	its	current	and	future	policy	so	that	(2.29)	is	satisfied	as	a	budget	constraint.	
In	the	context	of	FTPL,	“active”	fiscal	policy	determines	the	price	level,	and	for	a	given	
predetermined	nominal	stock	of	debt	the	government	chooses	a	certain	trajectory	of	future	
budget	surpluses.	For	 the	price	 level	 that	 is	 thus	determined,	 the	central	bank	 is	 forced	to
“passively”	adapt	the	nominal	stock	of	money,	M =
PY
V
.	As	a	rule,	it	is	implicitly	assumed
that	the	government	is	able	to	not	only	determine	the	future	state	of	the	budget,	but	to	control	
the	future	flow	of	seigniorage66.	In	the	context	of	our	further	research,	this	hypothesis	cannot	
be	assumed.	
Strictly	speaking,	FTI	is	also	unable	to	ignore	the	role	of	seigniorage	in	the	problem	of	co-
ordinating	fiscal	and	monetary	policy.	As	we	showed	above,	the	logic	of	“unpleasant	monetarist	
arithmetic”	is	built	about	changes	in	seigniorage	and	the	accompanying	consequences	for	infla-
tion.	This	to	an	important	degree	makes	FTI	different	from	FTPL,	even	though	in	both	cases	
fiscal	policy	 (by	assumption)	makes	 the	 first	move	and	monetary	policy	 is	considered	 to	be	
exogenously	given.	We	will	return	to	this	difference	between	FTI	and	FTPL	below.
63	 See,	for	example,	the	complete	explanation	in	the	paper	by	Cochrane	(2000).
64	 For	this	reason	we	analyze	a	pair	of	equations	in	the	following	chapters,	and	provide	the	description	of	
“the	rest	of	the	economy”,	containing	this	pair,	in	the	Appendix.
65	 The	problem	of	constraints	placed	on	the	choice	of	the	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	variables,	may	be	
modeled	in	various	ways.	In	particular,	the	game-theoretic	approach	can	be	used	for	this	purpose.	Thus,	in	
the	papers	cited	above,	T.	Sargent	and	N.	Wallace	use	a	description	of	the	coordination	of	policies	as	a	game of 
chicken	(who	will	be	first	to	compromise	—	the	government	or	the	central	bank),	though	they	do	not	explicitly	
model	it.	However,	as	justly	noted	by	Cochrane	(2000),	the	use	of	the	game-theoretic	approach	is	not	only	not	
necessary,	but	can	also	result	in	an	incorrect	emphasis	on	the	analysis.	All	that	should	interest	us	in	the	end	is	
a	 characterization	of	 the	macroeconomic	policy	of	 the	 government	 (it	 is	 not	 important	who	wins	 in	what	
games)	and	what	equilibrium	price	levels	are	so	determined.	
66	 Typically,	in	using	FTPL	for	the	analysis	of	developed	market	economies,	the	portion	of	seigniorage	
used	in	the	financing	of	the	operational	deficit	is	often	considered	to	be	negligible.	This	consideration,	how-
ever,	cannot	be	extended	to	real	developing	or	transitional	economies.	
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The structure of public debt and FTPL
Does	the	choice	of	which	debt	instruments	are	used	in	the	model	influence	the	results	
of	FTPL?	The	answer	is	yes.	First	of	all,	what	is	most	important	is	that	FTPL	would	not	
exist	if	we	were	constructing	a	model	for	the	economy	in	which	there	were	only	real	or	in-
dexed	government	bonds.	From	a	technical	point	of	view,	in	this	case	the	quantity	B(t)	in	
equation	(2.29)	would	not	be	predetermined,	but	would	change	in	proportion	to	the	price	
level	P(t)	(i.e.,	be	indexed).	In	simpler	terms,	the	intermediate	equality	in	(2.29)	should	not	
be	considered,	as	we	should	deal	only	with	the	real	value	of	debt,	b(t).	From	the	point	of	
view	of	the	logic	of	formulating	the	macroeconomic	model,	we	may	again	consider	(2.29)	
to	be	the	budget	constraint	of	the	government	which	must	be	satisfied	for	any	price	level.	If	
the	current	fiscal	or	monetary	policy,	future	expectations	or	any	other	factors	bring	about	
a	change	in	the	price	level,	the	government	will	be	forced to	index	the	nominal	value	of	its	
obligations.	In	this	case	the	present	value	of	budget	surpluses	(plus	seigniorage)	cannot	in	
any	way	determine	the	price	level,	but	must	be	determined	in	accordance	with	the	given	
real volume	of	public	debt.	Thus,	if	FTPL	is	to	be	discussed	at	all,	it	is	necessary	that	the	
government	have	at	least	some	nominal	debt	instruments	(which	of	course	is	what	we	see	
in	reality).
Secondly,	the	dynamics	equation	(2.8)	in	continuous	time	may	be	considered	to	be	the	
limiting	case	of	the	model	of	the	dynamics	of	the	one-period	public	debt	in	discrete	time.	
What	will	 change	 in	 the	mechanism	of	FTPL	 if	we	 assume	 the	 existence	of	multi-period	
(long-term)	debt?	Cochrane	(1999,	2001)	shows	that	the	main	prediction	of	FTPL	about	the	
direct	impact	of	expected	fiscal	policy	on	the	price	level	does	not	change.	The	mechanism,	
however,	does	undergo	certain	modifications.	The	existence	of	long-term	bonds	means	that	
the	 total	nominal	 value	of	 issued	bonds	 stops	being	predetermined.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	
the	appearance	of	relative	prices	of	bonds	with	different	maturity.	In	this	case	the	results	of	
(for	example)	an	expected	increase	in	the	budget	deficit	could	be	not	only	an	increase	in	the	
current	price	level,	but	in	the	relative	price	of	bonds	as	well.	The	last	is	nothing	but	an	expec-
tation	that	price	levels	in	the	future	will	increase	(as	a	result	of	a	rise	in	the	budget	deficit).	
Thus,	we	see	the	inflationary	consequences	of	an	increase	in	the	budget	deficit	not	only	(and	
not	as	much)	now,	but	in	the	future.	An	analysis	of	the	role	of	policies	for	the	management	
of	public	debt	(including	questions	maturity)	in	order	to	determine	the	price	level	from	the	
standpoint	of	FTPL	can	be	found	in	the	paper	by	Cochrane	(2001).
Strange predictions or fallacy of FTPL?
Kocherlakota	and	Phelan	(1999)	showed	that	under	FD-type	policy	a	temporary	(one-
time)	decrease	in	the	supply	of	money	may	bring	about	hyperinflation,	which	obviously	seems	
strange.	McCallum	(2001)	came	to	an	analogous	result.	He	showed	that	one	of	the	possible	
results	of	FTPL	is	a	price	level	trajectory	that	approaches	infinity	(i.e.,	a	bubble).	In	prin-
ciple,	this	does	not	contradict	the	transversality	condition	as	the	level	of	real	money	balances	
approaches	zero.	Answering	this	criticism,	Cochrane	(2000)	agrees	that	this	theoretical	result	
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is	valid,	but	denies	that	this	in	any	way	means	that	FTPL	does	not	adequately	describe	reali-
ty,	 in	which	an	explosive	 trajectory	of	price	 levels	 is	not	observed.	This	simply	means	 that	
this	special	policy	specification	(constant	money	supply	and	budget	surplus	in	the	paper	by	
McCallum)	is	not	applied	in	practice.	
Another	important	point	in	the	criticism	by	McCallum	is	that	under	certain	(quite	gene-
ral)	assumptions,	 the	price	 level	 is	not	explosive,	but	rather	approaches	zero.	This	 is	what	
contradicts	 the	 transversality	condition	 for	 real	money	balances67,	 and	 this	means	 that	no	
well-defined	equilibrium	exists	in	the	model.	In	particular,	McCallum	shows	that	such	a	re-
sult	may	be	observed	if	the	(initial)	level	of	the	nominal	public	debt	is	not	large	enough	and/or	
future	budget	surpluses	are	very	high.	In	principle,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	theory	is	comp-
letely	 inconsistent,	 but	 does	 introduce	 certain	 additional	 constraints	 on	macroeconomic	
policy	that	are	compatible	with	the	logic	of	constructing	FTPL.
Christiano	and	Fitzgerald	(2000)	note	(and	this	is	quite	clear	in	view	of	the	elements	of	
criticism	just	considered),	that	an	essential	drawback	of	FTPL	is	that	it	is	a	“fragile	theory”,	
in	the	sense	that	small	changes	in	the	assumptions	significantly	influence	its	applications	to	
reality.	Indeed,	FTPL	is	built	for	an	entirely	FD	policy.	Therefore,	any	(realistic)	departure	
from	the	FD	policy	will	inevitably	result	in	the	failure	of	FTPL	to	determine	the	equilibrium	
price	level.
Nonetheless,	returning	to	the	discussion	above,	the	most	serious	problem	in	the	con-
struction	of	FTPL	is	the	question	of	interpreting	(2.29)	as	a	budget	constraint, or	as	a va-
luation equation.	Buiter	 (1998,	1999)	 insists	 that	 the	 interpretation	of	 (2.29)	as	a	budget	
constraint	 (for	 any	price	 level)	 is	 the	only	one	possible,	 and	a	 refusal	of	 this	 traditional	
interpretation	makes	FTPL	internally	inconsistent.	Cochrane	insists	no	less	forcibly	that	
there	is	another	interpretation:	“…There	are	three	steps	in	defining	a	competitive	Walrasian	
equilibrium:	First,	one	define	what	 the	securities	are	—	what	 state-contingent	 stream	of	
goods	is	promised	for	each	share	or	unit	of	security.	Second,	one	finds	demand	and	supply	
curves	for	those	securities,	as	well	as	demand	and	supply	curves	for	goods.	Third,	one	finds	
prices	that	clear	markets.	The	decision	of	how	much	nominal	debt	and	money	to	issue	is	
a	definition	of	 securities.	This	action	occurs	without	constraint,	before	 the	"auctioneer"	
announces	any	prices,	for	government	and	private	issuers	alike”.68	In	accordance	with	this	
interpretation	(2.29)	is	indeed	not	a	constraint,	but	rather	an	equilibrium	condition	for	the	
supply	and	demand	of	assets.	
67	 McCallum	(2001)	formulates	the	transversality	conditions	separately	for	real	money	balances	and	pub-
lic	debt,	but	not	for	their	sum	(for	example,	М.	Woodford	introduces	a	combined-asset	transversality	condi-
tion).	McCallum	 insists	 on	 the	necessity	 of	 considering	 two	 separate	 conditions,	 since	 the	 situation	when	
b(t)→−∞ 	and	 m(t)→ +∞ 	allows	for	the	possibility	of	infinite	credit	from	the	state	to	the	private	sector	and	
this	obviously	seems	unreal,	and	yet	does	not	contradict	the	transversality	condition	for	b(t)	+	m(t).	Here	this	
consideration	becomes	 important	 from	another	 point	 of	 view:	 for	 a	 combined	 transversality	 condition	 the	
problem	described	above	of	a	price	level	approaching	zero	does	not	exist.	See	footnotes	14	and	15	in	the	paper	
by	McCallum	(2001).	In	the	main	text	of	this	work	we	will	follow	McCallum	and	use	separate	conditions	for	
the	real	money	balances	and	the	public	debt.	
68	 Cochrane	(2000),	p.	16.
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Theory and empirical evidence
In	fact	it	is	impossible	to	verify	the	MD	or	FD	hypotheses	from	an	empirical	standpoint,	
as	most	investigators	agree69.	Therefore,	there	will	probably	never	be	a	last	point	in	the	question	
of	which	theory	should	be	used	to	formulate	macroeconomic	policy.	Indeed,	the	differences	
between	MD	and	FD	policies	involve	whether	fiscal	policy	is	adjusted	based	on	the	given	price	
level,	or	 if	alternatively	 the	price	 level	adjusts	 towards	equilibrium	for	expected	fiscal	policy.	
However,	all	that	we	can	observe	is	equilibrium.	It	is	impossible	to	determine	what	adjusted	to	
what.	Also,	if	we	define	an	FD	policy	as	a	situation	in	which	(2.29)	applies	only	for	the	equilib-
rium	price	level	as	opposed	to	any	price	level	(as	in	the	case	of	MD	policy),	then	we	still	arrive	
at	the	same	problem:	we	do	not	have	statistics	for	non-equilibrium	prices	in	economics.70
The	question	about	which	of	the	hypotheses	is	more	likely	to	conform	to	reality	should	
not	be	solved	by	a	formal	test.	For	example,	Woodford	(1995)	gives	the	following	argument	
for	FD	policies	(for	FTPL):	if	we	take	the	most	widespread	view	on	monetary	policy	and	the	
specification	of	demand	for	money	in	the	economy	of	the	USA,	then	the	equilibrium	price	
level	cannot	be	determined	for	an	MD	policy	in	accordance	with	quantity	theory,	and	this	
indirectly	confirms	the	role	of	(2.29)	in	determining	the	price	level71.	
Constraints on fiscal policy and the price level stability
The	fact	that	FTPL	states	that	the	determination	and	the	stability	of	the	price	level	de-
pend	on	fiscal	policy	could	be	of	theoretical	help	in	the	application	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty.	
Indeed,	from	the	point	of	view	of	FTPL	the	instability	of	the	fiscal	sphere	(for	FD	policies)	
will	inevitably	result	in	the	instability	of	the	price	level	(and	other	macroeconomic	indicators)	
irrespectively of	what	monetary	policy	is	pursued72.	In	order	to	achieve	price	level	stability73
69	 Thus,	Kocherlakota	and	Phelan	(1999)	note	that	“…whether	the	government	can	follow	a	non-Ricardi-
an	policy	is	a	religious,	not	a	scientific	question”.
70	 Empirical	analysis	of	the	budget	constraint	(2.8)	has	a	long	history.	As	a	rule,	these	were	investigations	
into	the	problem	of	the	government’s	solvency.	See,	for	example,	Hamilton	and	Flavin	(1986),	Campbell	and	
Shiller	(1987).	While	interesting	in	themselves,	these	papers,	however,	are	unable	to	shed	light	on	the	choice	
between	FD	and	MD	macroeconomic	policies.
71	 Canzonery,	Cumby	and	Diba	(1997,	2001)	suggest	a	test,	the	essence	of	which	lies	in	the	analysis	of	
the	correlation	between	innovations	in	the	budget	surplus	and	public	debt.	If	an	increase	in	the	budget	surplus	
brings	about	an	increase	in	the	real	price	of	bonds,	then	the	economy	is	characterized	by	an	FD	policy;	and	
if	 it	brings	about	a	constant	or	decreasing	real	value	of	obligations,	then	most	likely	an	MD	policy	is	being	
observed.	The	results	of	the	test	for	post-war	USA	data	seem	to	support	the	hypothesis	of	an	MD	policy.	Coch-
rane	(1999)	criticized	such	approaches	from	the	standpoint	of	forward	and	backward-looking	dynamics	of	the	
debt	under	different	policy	regimes	(see	above	in	the	text).	In	his	opinion,	the	forecast	which	determines	the	
sign	of	the	reaction	function,	demands	that	various	processes	which	characterize	the	dynamics	of	the	surplus	
be	determined,	and	yet	does	not	give	any	conclusions	about	the	type	of	policy.	He	also	notes	that	in	reality	the	
quantity	theory	of	money	in	its	pure	form	does	not	allow	for	a	direct	test	either,	as	from	an	empirical	point	of	
view	it	is	simply	a	determination	of	the	velocity	of	money.
72	 Woodford	(1997).	Here	the	average	(expected)	level	of	inflation	could	easily	be	determined	by	mone-
tary	policy,	which	controls	the	nominal	interest	rate.	This	prediction	of	FTPL	is	called	“Woodford’s	Really	
Unpleasant	Arithmetic”	by	Christiano	and	Fitzgerald	(2000).
73	 We	should,	however,	note	that	from	a	theoretical	point	of	view	the	instability	of	the	price	level	is	not	al-
ways	accompanied	by	a	welfare	loss.	See,	for	example,	Chari,	Christiano	and	Kehoe	(1991),	Chari	and	Kehoe
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the	“right”	monetary	policy	must	 be	 accompanied	by	 certain	 constraints	on	 fiscal	 policy.	
While	the	upper	bound	of	the	level	of	the	real	public	debt	and	of	the	level	of	the	budget	deficit	
spelled	out	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	are	probably	too	strict,	it	is	also	true	that	their	existence	
from	the	point	of	view	of	FTPL	is	necessary	both	as	a	formal	requirement	and	as	a	credible	
signal	to	the	private	sector	that	the	government	(union)	will	strive	to	conduct	stable	policies.	
2.6. Concluding remarks
As	a	conclusion	we	give	an	important	comparison	of	FTPL	and	of	the	“unpleasant	mone-
tary	arithmetic”	of	Sargent	and	Wallace.	One	of	the	interesting	points	where	FTPL	and	FTI	
differ	is	that	the	latter	states	that	there	are	possible	inflationary	consequences	for	a	certain	fis-
cal	policy	because	of	its	provoking	inevitable changes	in	current	or	future	monetary	policy74.	
FTPL,	by	contrast,	quite	allows	for	inflation	caused	by	the	increase	in	budget	deficit	in	the	
absence of	any	changes	in	the	money	supply	either	now	or	in	the	future.	A	certain	interpre-
tation	of	(2.29)	does	indeed	allow	for	such	a	scenario.	In	both	cases	future	fiscal	policy	will	
influence	the	price	level	(inflation):	from	the	standpoint	of	FTPL	—	directly	via	the	level	of	
the	budget	deficit	(d(τ),	τ	>	t);	and	from	the	standpoint	of	FTI	—	indirectly,	by	influencing	
the	level	of	seigniorage	(S(τ),	τ	>	t)	necessary	for	the	sustainability	of	public	debt.	
Here	 there	 is	 an	 interesting	 quantitative	 difference.	 If	we	 consider	 the	mechanism	of	
FTPL,	then	the	discounted	future	values	of	the	budget	deficit	and	of	seigniorage	determine	
the	current	price	level.	And	the	discount	rate	equals	to	the	interest	rate	of	the	debt,	r	(i.e.,	
discount	factor	equals	e–r (τ —	1)).	If	we	consider	the	problem	from	the	standpoint	of	FTI,	then	
the	main	role	will	be	played	by	future	values	of	the	base	money	which	are	discounted	by	a	rate	
equal	to	the	inverse	of	the	semi-elasticity	of	money	demand	α–1	(i.e.,	discount	factor	equals
e
-
1
α
(τ−t )
),	as	written	in	the	forward-looking	solution	(2.22)	in	the	Cagan	model.	By	comparing	
the	discount	rates	r	and	α–1,	we	can	quantitatively	estimate	the	role	of	distant	changes	in	the	
budget	deficit	in	order	to	determine	the	price	level	in	the	context	of	FTPL	and	FTI	(which	
uses	the	Cagan	model	as	an	integral	part).	Thus,	Cochrane	(1999),	in	analyzing	data	for	the	
US	economy,	came	to	the	conclusion	that	FTPL	predicts	a	stronger	reaction	of	the	price	level	
than	in	the	Cagan	model75,	76.
	(1999).	FTPL	also	allows	for	the	possibility	that	to	a	certain	extent	the	instability	of	the	price	level	may	be	even	
desired.	Unexpected	shocks	in	the	price	level	act	like	a	tax	on	holders	of	nominal	public	debt	(in	essence,	they	
act	like	an	inflation	tax).	From	the	point	of	view	of	optimal	macroeconomic	policy,	this	method	of	absorbing	
shocks	in	certain	situations	may	be	better	than,	for	example,	changes	in	distortionary	taxes.	
74	 The	classical	investigation	of	hyperinflation	episodes	by	Sargent	(1982)	gives	an	important	role	to	the	
expected	stabilization	of	the	fiscal	sphere.	However,	this	does	not	have	a	direct,	but	rather	indirect	influence	on	
the	level	of	inflation	—	a	decrease	in	budget	deficit	should	bring	about	a	decrease	in	seigniorage,	which	leads	
to	a	decrease	in	expected	rate	of	inflation	in	Sargent’s	logic.	
75	 Building	a	model	for	discrete	time,	Cochrane	arrives	at	the	following	estimates	for	the	discount	factors:	
0.15	for	the	Cagan	model	and	0.95	for	the	analog	of	equation	(2.29)	in	FTPL.	
76	 On	this	basis,	Cochrane	makes	far-going	conclusions.	If,	indeed,	the	FTI	mechanism	(or	the	Cagan	
model)	 is	weak	from	a	quantitative	point	of	view,	 then	many	real	economic	events	(for	example,	 the	Asian	
crisis	of	1997,	the	recent	currency	crisis	in	Argentina,	the	monetary	reforms	in	New	Zealand,	etc.)	in	which
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We	should,	however,	note	that	such	approaches	should	be	corrected	for	when	changes	in	
fiscal	and	monetary	policy	were	made;	changes	in	the	base	money	do	not	have	to	take	place	at	
the	same	time	as	changes	in	fiscal	policy.	Thus,	there	are	many	interesting	and	diverse	forms	
of	coordination	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	in	the	context	of	FTI.	It	is	this	aspect	and	cer-
tain	other	interesting	problems	in	this	area	that	are	dealt	with	in	Chapter	5.	
economists	put	the	fiscal	sphere	and	its	problems	at	the	forefront,	should	be	well	explained	from	the	standpoint	
of	FTPL.	Indeed,	an	investigation	into	the	nature	of	the	Asian	crises	by	Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	
(2001)	supports	this	conclusion.	Cochrane	notes	that	FTPL	can	also	be	used	to	interpret	the	Russian	crisis	of	
1998	(see,	also,	a	general	analysis	of	the	default	risk	in	the	context	of	FTPL	in	the	paper	by	Uribe,	2002).	In	the	
following	analysis	we	prefer	the	interpretation	of	the	1998	crisis	in	the	framework	of	FTI,	rather	than	FTPL.
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Chapter 3
Nonlinear dynamics of inflation and public debt
3.1. Introduction
We	 showed	 in	 the	 second	 chapter	 that	 in	many	 cases	 a	 high	 level	 of	 inflation	 can	be	
explained	by	the	nature	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies;	as	Milton	
Friedman	noted,	“inflation	is	always	and	everywhere	a	monetary	phenomenon”.	Indeed,	for	
most	episodes	of	high	inflation	in	developing	countries	we	can	say	that	the	source	of	inflation	
is	an	imbalance	in	the	fiscal	sphere.	However,	is	the	causality	between	inflation	and	the	deficit	
actually	so	clear?	
This	question	is	obviously	important.	It	is	hard	to	not	agree	with	Stanley	Fischer	when	he	
says	that	“...given	that	policymakers	do	not	create	inflation	out	of	a	clear	blue	sky,	it	is	almost	
certain	that	countries	with	high	inflation	rates	are	countries	that	are	already	in	trouble	for	
fiscal	or	other	reasons,	and	thus	that	it	will	be	either	impossible	or	extremely	difficult	to	deal	
definitely	with	the	issue	of	causation”.1	On	the	other	hand,	even	though	an	imbalance	in	the	
fiscal	sphere	may	be	considered	to	be	one	of	the	major	reasons	for	high	inflation,	statistical	
data	often	do	not	explicitly	show	a	correlation	between	a	decrease	in	the	deficit	and	a	fall	in	
the	inflation	rate	(see,	for	example,	(Bruno,	1993)).
In	this	chapter	we	will	attempt	to	elucidate	the	nonlinear	interrelationship	between	in-
flation,	 the	 budget	 deficit	 and	 public	 debt,	 and	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 role	 of	 this	 nonlinear	
relationship	in	determining	the	interaction	between	the	government	and	the	central	bank.	In-
deed,	one	of	the	first	reasons	that	might	explain	the	absence	of	a	simple	and	clear	relationship	
between	changes	in	the	budget	deficit	and	inflation	is	that	economic	dynamics	are	nonlinear.	
At	present	most	economists	agree	that	in	many	cases	the	non-linearity	of	economic	systems	
can	play	an	important	role.2	A	simplified,	linear	(or	linearized)	model	of	economic	dynamics	
may	not	adequately	reflect	the	nature	of	economic	processes.	This	general	problem	is	dis-
cussed	in	Bullard	and	Butler	(1993)	in	the	context	of	modeling	the	interaction	between	fiscal	
and	monetary	policies.	In	particular,	it	is	shown	that	nonlinearity	of	economic	dynamics	is	a	
crucial	feature	of	Sargent	and	Wallace’s	FTI,	and	ignoring	this	may	result	in	incorrect	mac-
roeconomic	policies.3	
We	will	consider	two	problems	in	this	chapter	that	may	make	the	interaction	between	the	
fiscal	and	monetary	spheres	complex	and	nonlinear.	The	first	is	that	of	the	possibility	of	there	
being	non-unique	equilibrium	level	of	 inflation	at	which	the	money	market	and	the	 fiscal	
sphere	will	be	in	steady	states.	If	so,	changes	in	the	fiscal	sphere	will	have	qualitatively	differ-
1	 Fischer	(1995),	p.	22.
2	 See,	for	instance,	Grandmont	(1987),	Lorenz	(1989),	Barnett-Geweke-Shell	(1989),	Granger-Teras-
virta	(1993).
3	 Flashel,	Franke	and	Semmler	(1997,	ch.	9)	suggest	an	interesting	nonlinear	modification	of	the	Cagan	
model	for	adaptive	expectations	and	perfect	anticipation	presented	in	the	first	chapter.
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ent	effects	on	the	money	market	depending	on	which	of	the	equilibria	the	economy	was	in.	
Analogously,	changes	in	monetary	policies	may	also	have	different	effects	on	the	fiscal	sphere	
depending	on	the	equilibrium.	This	consideration	will	be	at	the	core	of	our	analysis	in	this	
and	following	chapters.
The	 second	problem	 that	may	make	 the	 interaction	between	 the	 fiscal	 and	monetary	
spheres	complex	is	that	of	the	real	effects	of	inflation.	In	the	general	case	the	real	primary	
budget	deficit	should	not	be	considered	to	be	exogenous	and	completely	determined	by	go-
vernment	policies.	There	are	several	mechanisms	that	determine	the	dependence	of	real	bud-
get	income	and	expenditures	on	the	rate	of	inflation,	even	when	inflation	can	be	perfectly	
anticipated.	We	will	 show	below	 that	 the	dependence	of	 the	 budget	 deficit	 on	 the	 rate	 of	
inflation	can	be	either	negative	or	positive.	If	the	budget	deficit	decreases	with	an	increase	in	
inflation,	then	the	set	of	steady	states	and	their	properties	are	qualitatively	different	than	if	the	
budget	deficit	do	not	depend	on	inflation.	
This	chapter	has	the	following	structure.	In	Section	3.2	we	present	the	standard	version	of	
the	model	for	the	Inflation	tax	Laffer	curve,	which	considers	the	financing	of	the	budget	defi-
cit	by	seigniorage.4	We	suggest	a	modification	for	this	model	in	the	third	section	to	account	
for	the	effect	of	inflation	on	the	real	budget	deficit.	Section	3.4	presents	a	general	model	for	
the	budget	deficit	finance.	We	consider	the	dynamic	equations	for	public	debt	and	real	money	
balances.	The	microeconomic	basis	for	this	model	is	given	in	the	Appendix.5	Continuing	the	
logic	of	the	second	section,	we	suggest	in	Section	3.5	a	modification	of	the	general	model	for	
the	financing	of	deficit	to	account	for	the	real	effects	of	inflation.	The	system	we	arrive	at	has	
interesting	nonlinear	properties.	Section	3.6	explores	bifurcation	in	the	system	of	public	debt	
and	real	money	balances.	In	Section	3.7	we	give	a	qualitative	interpretation	for	the	Russian	
crisis	of	1998	as	a	fold	bifurcation	in	the	system	of	public	debt	—	real	money	balances.	Con-
clusions	are	drawn	in	Section	3.8.
3.2. Monetization of the budget deficit:  
The inflation tax Laffer curve
Let	us	again	consider	the	government’s	budget	constraint	(2.1),	only	not	from	the	point	
of	view	of	public	debt	dynamics,	but	from	the	point	of	view	of	inflation.	By	definition,	seig-
niorage	is	the	real	revenue	from	money	emission,	
	 S =
&M
P
= &m+mπ = µm.	 (3.1)
4	 The	version	given	here	is	closest	to	the	exposition	of	the	model	given	in	Heymann	and	Leijonhufvud	
(1995).	A	slightly	different	interpretation	of	this	model	can	be	found	in	the	textbooks	by	Blanchard	and	Fischer	
(1989,	ch.	4)	or	Romer	(2001,	ch.	10),	and	also	in	an	article	by	Bruno	and	Fischer	(1990).
5	 A	version	of	Sidrausky’s	model	can	be	used	as	a	microeconomic	basis.	An	analogous	analysis	can	be	
found	in	papers	by	Liviatan	(1984)	and	Drazen	(1985).
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Seigniorage	may	be	 further	decomposed	 into	 two	components:	 the	 so-called	pure seignio- 
rage	 &m 	(increase	in	real	money	balances),	and	the	inflation tax	mπ.	Seigniorage	can	also	be	
written	as	µm,	the	product	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	real	money	balances.	Using	
(3.1),	the	government’s	budget	constraint	can	be	written	as6:	
	 &b + &m = rb+ d −mπ .	 (3.2)
Now	let	us	return	to	the	macroeconomic	policy	considered	in	Section	2.2,	which	keeps	
public	debt	at	a	steady	level:	b(t)	=	b0.	Using	the	definition	(3.1),	equation	(2.6)	can	be	writ-
ten	as
	 &m = rb
0
+ d( )−mπ = D −mπ ,	 (3.3)
where	the	variable	D	is	the	operational	budget	deficit.	If	the	money	market	is	in	a	steady	state,	
when	the	rate	of	inflation	is	equal	to	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	( &m = (µ − π)m = 0, µ = π ),	
the	operational	budget	deficit	is	financed	only	by	the	inflation	tax;	the	former	completely	de-
termines	the	volume	of	seigniorage:
	 D = mπ.	 (3.4)
Just	as	in	(2.6),	equation	(3.4)	is	a	constraint	on	macroeconomic	policy,	indeed	a	joint	
constraint	on	both	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	Following	the	Cagan	model,	we	can	consider	
the	real	money	balance	to	be	a	function	of	expected	inflation.	We	also	assume	that	expected	
inflation	and	actual	inflation	are	equal,	 πe = π;	this	is	possible	if	adaptive	expectations	are	
steady	( &πe = 0 )	or	if	expected	inflation	is	determined	by	the	hypothesis	of	perfect	foresight.	
Equation	(3.4)	can	then	be	written	as	
	 D = m(π)π.	 (3.5)
Further	analysis	of	the	condition	(3.5)	requires	a	certain	assumption	about	the	interac-
tion	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	If	fiscal	policies	are	dependent,	then	(3.5)	can	be	
interpreted	in	the	following	way:	Given	the	policy	of	the	central	bank	(for	simplicity,	given	the	
chosen	constant	growth	rate	of	base	money	µ)	and	given	the	volume	of	the	public	debt	b0,	the	
government	is	forced	to	adjust	the	volume	of	primary	budget	deficit	d	so	that	
6	 The	right	side	of	(3.2)	is	interpreted	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter	to	be	the	increment	of	a	representa-
tive	agent	in	real	assets:	a	=	m	+	b.
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	 d = µm− rb
0
.	 (3.6)
Note	that	(3.6)	completely	determines	the	volume	of	the	primary	budget	deficit.7	
If	the	monetary	policy	is	dependent,	then	(3.5)	can	be	understood	to	mean	the	following:	
The	central	bank	must	adopt	a	monetary	policy	with	a	growth	rate	of	base	money	equal	to	µ,	
chosen	on	the	basis	of	the	operational	deficit	D	(assumed	to	be	constant	for	simplicity);	D	in	its	
turn	is	determined	by	the	volume	of	the	accumulated	debt	b0	and	the	primary	deficit	d.	In	other	
words,	the	central	bank,	being	dependent,	is	forced	to	set	a	growth	rate	of	base	money	so	that	
seigniorage	covers	the	operational	deficit	of	the	budget.	This	model	is	the	basis	for	the	inflation 
tax Laffer curve	shown	in	Fig.	3.1.	As	in	the	case	of	usual	taxes,	if	one	makes	only	the	most	
general	assumptions	regarding	the	demand	function	for	the	real	money	balances8,	the	infla-
tion	tax	will	exhibit	a	nonlinear9	dependence	on	inflation,	which	acts	as	a	“tax	rate”.	Indeed,	
the	initially	high	rate	of	inflation	is	associated	with	a	high	level	of	inflation	tax;	however	after	
a	certain	point	the	increase	of	inflation	has	to	do	with	the	decrease	in	inflation	tax.	
Unlike	the	first	case,	here	the	fiscal	policy	parameter	is	generally	determined	only	partly	
by	the	dominating	monetary	policy.	Equation	(3.5)	can	have	up	to	two	steady	states	for	a	con-
stant	value	of	d.	Stability	analysis	of	the	initial	equation	(3.3)	gives	the	following	results10.	The	
stability	of	the	two	equilibrium	states	mostly	depends	on	expected	inflation.	The	equilibrium	
that	corresponds	to	low	inflation	(µ	=	πL)	will	be	stable	when	expectations	adapt	very	slowly.	
To	be	more	precise,	the	system	will	approach	this	point	for	any	values	of	inflation	less	than	
its	value	in	the	equilibrium	with	high	inflation11	if	there	are	adaptive	expectations	(2.14)	with	
small	values	of	the	parameter	θ	(αθ	<	1,	where	α	is	the	semi-elasticity	of	money	demand).	
The	equilibrium	with	high	inflation	(µ	=	πH)	will	be	unstable,	and	for	higher	values	of	infla-
tion	the	system	may	exhibit	hyperinflation,	an	unbounded	increase	in	the	rate	of	inflation.	
In	this	case	an	increase	in	the	budget	deficit,	shown	by	a	higher	horizontal	 line	D,	will	be	
accompanied	by	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and,	accordingly,	a	spurt	in	
inflation.
7	 However,	there	is	an	important	problem	here	that	we	will	return	to	later:	can	the	government,	playing	
a	dependent	role,	set	any value	of	d	in	accordance	with	(3.6)?	Obviously	not,	if	we	take	into	account	natural	
constraints	on	the	expenditure	and	income	items	in	the	budget.	
8	 It	is	necessary	for	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	(as	a	function	of	inflation	expectations,	or	the	
nominal	interest	rate	in	the	general	case)	to	have	elastic	and	inelastic	parts.	Inelastic	demand	will	be	observed	
where	the	Laffer	curve	(Fig.	3.1)	increases,	while	elastic	demand	will	be	observed	where	this	curve	is	decreas-
ing.	The	maximum	of	the	curve	corresponds	to	unit	elasticity.	It	is	not	difficult,	for	example,	to	check	that	the	
Cagan	function	(2.11)	satisfies	this	condition.	
9	 Here	and	below	we	use	the	term	“nonlinear”	not	only	literally,	as	in	“nonlinear	function”,	but	also	as	
a	qualitative	property	of	an	economic	system.	For	example,	the	nonlinearity	of	the	system	for	the	Laffer	infla-
tionary	tax	curve	model	is	obviously	connected	with	there	being	more	than	one	equilibrium.	
10	 For	more	details	see	Bruno	and	Fischer	(1990),	Heymann	and	Leijonhufvud	(1995),	Smirnov	(1997).
11	 The	existence	of	at	least	one	stable	steady	state	in	the	economy	in	this	case,	and	the	fact	that	the	dy-
namics	of	the	public	debt	will	be	unstable	in	accordance	with	(2.2),	agree	well	with	the	earlier	result	of	Blinder	
and	Solow	(1973).	In	particular,	the	dynamics	of	an	economy	are	stable	if	the	budget	deficit	is	financed	by	
monetary	emission,	and	unstable	if	it	is	financed	by	debt.
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For	large	values	of	θ	(αθ	>	1),	and	also	in	cases	when	expectations	satisfy	the	hypothesis	
of	perfect	foresight,	the	situation	is	different,	and	the	economy	falls	into	the	“high	inflation	
trap”.	If	the	system	is	on	the	“wrong	side”	of	the	Laffer	curve,	then	the	increase	in	the	deficit	
brings	about	a	decrease	in	the	steady	level	of	inflation12.
It	is	also	important	to	note	that	in	the	general	case	the	inflation	tax	is	bounded	from	
above.	There	exists	a	value	Dmax	which	corresponds	to	a	unique	equilibrium	growth	rate	of	
base	money	that	maximizes	the	volume	of	inflation	tax.	If	fiscal	policies	keep	the	opera-
tional	deficit	at	a	level	greater	than	Dmax,	monetary	policy	will	simply	not	be	able	to	keep	
the	money	market	 in	equilibrium.	Depending	on	 the	properties	of	 inflationary	expecta-
tions	and	the	parameters	of	money	demand,	the	economy	will	face	either	hyperinflation	or	
hyperdeflation.13	In	its	turn,	a	high	level	of	operational	deficit	can	be	determined	by	either	
a	high	level	of	primary	deficit	(a	problem	which	the	government	can	alleviate	to	a	certain	
extent),	or	 a	 (predetermined)	high	 level	of	 accumulated	debt.	These	considerations	un-
derline	the	importance	of	constraints	on	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	We	will	discuss	this	
problem	in	detail	below.	
12	 These	conclusions	are	very	like	those	of	the	Cagan	model	discussed	in	the	first	chapter,	which	is	hardly	
accidental.	The	dynamics	of	inflation	are	determined	first	of	all	by	the	reactions	of	economic	agents	who	pre-
sent	demand	for	real	money	balances.	
13	 Formally,	this	problem	can	be	analyzed	as	a	bifurcation	(see	Smirnov	(1997)).	We	will	return	to	this	
later,	in	the	context	of	a	more	general	system.	See	also	Buiter	(1987).
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Fig. 3.1. The inflation tax Laffer curve
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3.3. The effect of inflation on the real primary deficit  
in the inflation tax Laffer curve model
As	we	pointed	out	in	the	introduction,	the	assumption	that	the	deficit	is	exogenous	and	
independent	of	inflation	—	and	therefore	the	accompanying	assumption	that	the	deficit	fi-
nance	by	seigniorage	is	likewise	independent	of	inflation,	which	was	used	implicitly	above	—	
is	not	always	realistic.	There	are	many	factors	that	can	bring	about	either	a	decrease	or	an	
increase	in	the	real primary	budget	deficit	d	under	inflation.	The	first	group	of	factors	include	
the	increase	of	real	tax	revenues	for	the	budget	(as	a	result	of	applying	a	progressive	income	
tax	scale	in	nominal	terms	(with	discrete	indexes)	or	because	of	the	distortionary	nature	of	
taxing	the	nominal interest	income;	the	decrease	in	the	real	volume	of	transfers	and	govern-
ment	expenditures	given	 in	nominal	 terms	 (and	with	non-continuous	 indexation),	 the	 so-
called	Patinkin effect.14	The	second	group	of	factors	should	include,	first	of	all,	the	so-called	
Olivera-Tanzi effect.	This	effect	consists	in	a	decrease	of	the	real	revenue	volume	and	an	in-
crease	in	the	real	deficit,	which	takes	place	because	a	significant	part	of	the	taxes	and	other	
budget	 incomes	are	determined	 in	nominal	 terms	and	often	reach	 the	budget	with	a	given	
time	lag.15
In	the	general	case,	of	course,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	which	factors	play	the	greater	
role	and	how	the	primary	budget	deficit	will	depend	on	the	inflation	rate	in	the	final	analysis.	
However,	the	latter	can	be	sometimes	observed	in	practice.	For	instance,	Gavrilenkov	(1995)	
noted	a	tendency	in	Russia	for	a	softening	of	the	budget	deficit	with	an	increase	in	inflation.	
At	the	same	time,	the	Olivera-Tanzi	effect	was	noted	in	the	analysis	of	economies	in	Latin	
America.16	
Taking	a	certain	dependency	of	the	primary	(and	therefore	operational)	budget	deficit	on	
inflation,	equation	(3.3)	can	be	written	as	
	 &m = D π( )−m π( )π.	 (3.7)	
If	 the	 factors	 of	 the	 first	 group	 (i.e.	 the	Patinkin	 effect)	 have	 the	 greater	 impact,	 i.e.	
′D •( ) < 0 ,	 then	 the	budget	deficit	 curve	will	have	a	negative	 slope.	Fig.	3.2	 illustrates	 the	
simplest	case,	when	the	dependence	of	the	deficit	on	inflation	is	linear17.	Up	to	three	steady	
14	 Cardoso	 (1998)	 refers	 to	 it	 as	 the	“Patinkin effect”.	 In	 exploration	of	 Israel’s	 stabilization	program	
of	1985,	Patinkin	(1993)	stressed	the	importance	of	the	negative	effect	of	inflation	on	government	spending.	
Cardoso	(1998)	states	that	this	effect	was	dominating	in	Brazil	in	last	decades.
15	 This	list	of	factors,	of	course,	is	not	meant	to	be	complete.	All	of	the	factors	in	essence	are	distortional	
effects	of	inflation,	determined	by	so-called	nominal	state	institutions.	A	brilliant	overview	of	the	real	effects	of	
inflation	can	be	found	in	the	paper	by	Fischer	and	Modigliani	(1979).
16	 Olivera	(1967),	Tanzi	(1977).
17	 The	assumption	that	the	dependence	of	the	deficit	on	inflation	is	linear	is	obviously	ad hoc.	Its	simplest	
explanation	is	given	in	Smirnov	(1997).	If	the	dependence	D(π)	is	nonlinear,	then	the	system	may	have	even	
more	than	three	steady	points.	We	do	not	consider	this	case,	firstly	because	it	is	“exotic”,	and	secondly	because	
the	main	properties	of	the	system	due	to	its	nonlinearity	can	be	demonstrated	for	the	simpler	case	shown	in	
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states	are	possible.	For	instance,	if	the	inflation	expectations	satisfy	the	hypothesis	of	perfect	
foresight,	the	states	with	low	or	very	high	inflation	will	be	stable	(points	A	and	C).	Equilibrium	
at	point	B	will	be	unstable.	An	important	feature	of	this	system,	which	arises	from	its	non-
linearity,	is	the	following:	the	equilibrium	that	the	system	will	approach,	either	point	A	(low	
inflation)	or	point	C	(high	inflation),	depends	on	the	initial	inflation	expectations.	Therefore,	
monetary	policy	plays	an	important	role;	it	can,	by	influencing	inflation	expectations,	bring	
the	economy	with	a	given	budget	deficit	to	point	A,	to	a	state	with	low	inflation.18	
If	the	Olivera-Tanzi	effect	is	dominant	in	the	economy	and	 ′D •( ) > 0 ,	then	the	budget	
deficit	curve	will	have	a	positive	slope.	Figure	3.3	illustrates	a	possible	situation.	It	seems	most	
likely	that	the	Olivera-Tanzi	effect	will	not	affect	the	principal	result,	namely	that	there	are	
two	steady	states,	the	stability	of	which	can	be	determined	just	as	in	the	basic	case.19
3.4. Basic model of the dynamics of public debt and inflation 
We	will	use	 the	 following	model	as	 the	basis	 for	 studying	 the	 interaction	of	 fiscal	and	
monetary	policies	in	both	this	and	later	chapters:
	
&b = d + rb−µm,
&m = µ − π m( )( )m.
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
	 (3.8)	
The	first	equation	of	this	system,	which	is	simply	equation	(2.1),	describes	the	dynamics	of	
public	debt.	As	in	Section	2.2,	we	will	consider	equation	(2.1)	to	be	the	budget	constraint	for	
the	government	and	the	equation	for	the	dynamics	of	public	debt.	The	second	equation	in	
system	(3.8)	is	equation	(2.13),	which	describes	the	dynamics	of	real	money	balances	(and,	
implicitly,	inflation).	From	this	point	on	we	will	analyze	the	dynamics	of	the	money	market	
based	on	the	hypothesis	of	perfect	foresight	when	forming	inflation	expectations.	Then,	using	
hypothesis	(i)	in	Cagan’s	model,	we	can	use	the	inverse	function	theorem	to	write	the	level	
of	inflation	as	a	monotonic	decreasing	function	of	real	money	balances:	π	=	π(m),	π′(m)	<	0.	
The	second	equation	in	(3.8)	characterizes	monetary	policy.	
Fig.	3.2.	It	is	more	important	that,	unlike	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	model,	equilibrium	always	exists	for	the	
case	shown	in	Fig.	3.2;	in	other	words,	for	any	fiscal	policy	the	central	bank	is	able	to	keep	the	money	market	in	
a	steady	state,	possibly	with	a	very	high	rate	of	inflation.	However,	again,	if	the	dependence	D(π)	is	nonlinear,	
then	it	is	theoretically	possible	that	there	will	be	no	steady	states	of	the	system	for	high	budget	deficits.	The	
analysis	given	below	of	the	singularity	and	bifurcation	of	the	system	is	for	the	simple	case	shown	in	Fig.	3.2.	
This	is	sufficient	to	arrive	at	the	major	results.	
18	 In	this	respect,	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	from	this	model	are	close	to	the	so-called	problem	
of	coordination	failure	in	models	with	multiple	equilibriums	suggested	by	the	New	Keynesian	economics.	An	
overview	of	the	problem	can	be	found	in	the	textbook	by	Romer	(2001,	ch.	6).
19	 As	above,	a	nonlinear	specification	of	D(π)	can	hypothetically	result	in	a	system	with	a	greater	number	
of	steady	states.	But,	again,	this	would	be	“exotic”.	For	example,	in	Dornbusch,	Sturzenegger	and	Wolf	(1990)
the	following	specification	of	the	Olivera-Tanzi	effect	is	suggested:	 d = G − T 1+σπ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,	where	G	is	govern-
ment	expenditures,	T	 is	the	tax	revenue	and	the	parameter	 0≤ σ <∞ 	characterizes	the	extent	to	which	the	
Olivera-Tanzi	effect	influences	the	economy	(its	absence	corresponds	to	a	value	of	zero).	It	is	not	difficult	to	
see	that	for	this	reasonable	specification	the	system	will	have	two	steady	states.	
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Fig. 3.2. Steady states in the inflation tax Laffer curve model for ′D •( ) < 0  
(the Patinkin effect)
Fig. 3.3. Steady states in the inflation tax Laffer curve model for ′D •( ) > 0  
(the Olivera-Tanzi effect)
!m
( )!D
!
( )!D
!m
L! H! !
À
Ñ
À
48
	We	should	make	an	important	point.	Formally,	writing	the	system	(3.8)	as	we	have	im-
plicitly	 assumes	 that	 the	monetary	 policy	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 and	 the	 fiscal	 policy	 of	 the	
government	are	independent	of	each	other.	Even	though	the	government	uses	seigniorage	as	
one	way	of	financing	the	budget	deficit	(the	last	item	in	the	right	side	of	the	first	equation	of	
the	system),	the	dynamics	of	the	real	money	balances,	which	are	determined	by	the	second	
equation	of	the	system,	is	not	in	any	way	connected	with	the	volume	of	real	public	debt.	How-
ever,	as	we	pointed	out	in	Section	2.2,	the	first	equation	of	the	system	should	be	considered	
to	be	a	joint constraint	on	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	We	will	return	to	this	fundamental	
consideration	later.	
System	(3.8)	is	a	standard	starting-point	for	the	analysis	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.20	
This	system	allows	for	many	interpretations,	depending	on	the	assumptions	that	are	made	
with	regard	to	the	specification	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	and	how	they	interact.	We	will	
start	by	characterizing	the	stability	of	the	system,	assuming	that	the	variables	have	backward	
looking	dynamics.21	The	linearized	system	at	an	equilibrium	point	(b*, m*)	for	constant	values	
of	the	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	variables,	d	and	µ,	can	be	written	as
	
&b
&m
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
r −µ
0 − µ
ε∗
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
b − b∗
m−m∗
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .	 (3.9)
This	system	shows	that	the	steady	state	is	an	unstable	node.22	The	eigenvalues	of	the	Jacobi	
matrix	for	the	steady	state	are	positive,	one	of	them	is	equal	to	the	interest	rate,	and	the	other	
is	the	reciprocal	of	the	modulus	of	the	semi-elasticity	of	the	demand	function	with	respect	to
the	real	money	balances:	λ
1
= r	and	λ
2
= − µ
ε∗
= − 1
α
,	where	ε∗ = π(m
∗)
′π (m∗)m∗
< 0 	is	the	elasticity
of	money	demand	with	respect	to	inflation	expectations	(or,	in	the	general	case,	to	the	nomi-
nal	interest	rate).
The	set	of	steady	states	of	real	public	debt	and	real	money	balances	is	determined	by	the	
following	equations:
	 &b = 0, b =
µm− d
r
, 	 (3.10)
	 &m = 0, π(m* ) = µ. 	 (3.11)	
20	 See	Drazen	(1985),	and	also	Heymann	and	Leijonhufvud	(1995).
21	 In	other	words,	we	consider	system	(3.8)	with	the	additional	initial	conditions	b(0)	=	b0	and	m(0)	=	m0.	
An	interpretation	of	the	backward	looking	dynamics	of	public	debt	and	real	money	balances	was	given	in	the	
first	chapter.	An	analysis	of	the	possible	interactions	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	under	backward	looking	
dynamics	of	b	and	m	will	be	considered	in	the	next	chapter.	In	this	chapter	we	will	only	consider	the	foundation	
for	further	analysis	as	well	as	a	few	other	questions.	
22	 Distance	from	the	point	of	equilibrium	will	hardly	change	the	qualitative	behavior	of	the	system.	In	
particular,	the	sign	of	the	trace	of	the	Jacobi	matrix	guarantees	the	absence	of	periodic	solutions	according	to	
the	Bendicson	criteria.	See,	for	example,	Lorenz	(1989).
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The	money	market	will	be	 in	a	steady	state	( &m	=	0)	 if	 the	rate	of	 inflation	is	equal	 to	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money:	π(m*)	=	π*	=	µ.	No	matter	what	the	situation	is	in	the	fiscal	
sphere,	there	is	a	unique	equilibrium	value	for	the	volume	of	real	money	balances	m*	for	every	
value	of	the	money	policy	parameter.	This	result	 is	depicted	by	the	horizontal	 line	MM	 in	
Fig.	3.4,	the	phase	diagram	for	system	(3.9).	
Fig. 3.4. Phase diagram for public debt and real money balances
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As	we	discussed	in	Section	2.2,	a	steady	volume	of	public	debt	requires	that	the	payments	
for	servicing	the	public	debt	should	be	equal	 to	the	seigniorage	minus	the	primary	deficit:
rb	=	µm	—	d.	The	slope	of	the	corresponding	line	BB,	which	is	equal	to	 ′b
m
=
µ
r
,	depends	on
the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	If	the	central	bank	does	not	issue	additional	money	and	µ	=	0,	
then	BB	will	be	a	vertical	line.	On	the	other	hand,	for	sufficiently	high	values	of	µ,	the	line	BB	
will	be	 rather	 flat.	 In	essence,	 this	means	 that	 the	 steady	 states	of	 the	public	debt	are	not	
sensitive	to	the	state	on	the	money	market	in	an	economy	with	low	inflation	(with	low	values	
of	µ),	but	will	be	sensitive	to	it	in	an	economy	with	high	inflation	(with	high	values	of	µ).	This	
fact	can	be	easily	explained	by	referring	to	the	shape	of	the	standard	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	
shown	in	Fig.	3.1.	For	a	low	level	of	inflation	(which	would	be	equal	in	the	steady	state	to	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money)	even	a	large	change	in	the	operational	deficit,	one	that	would	
require	the	same	increase	in	the	volume	of	seigniorage,	could	be	affected	by	a	small	change	
in	µ	(the	inflation	tax	curve	is	rather	steep	in	this	case).	The	opposite	is	true	for	high	rates	of	
inflation	(growth	rates	of	the	money	base).
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An	analogy	for	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	can	be	seen	if	we	consider	the	set	of	steady	
states	in	the	fiscal	and	monetary	spheres	( &m 	=	0,	 &b 	=	0)	for	various	values	of	the	parameter	µ.	
Using	 the	 condition	 for	 a	 steady	 state	 on	 the	money	market	 in	 the	 first	 equation	 of	 sys-
tem	(3.8),	we	arrive	at	the	equation	for	the	SS curve:
	 b(m) =
π(m)m− d
r
. 	 (3.12)	
The	SS curve,	shown	in	Fig.	3.5,	is	concave	to	the	vertical	axis	and	has	a	maximum	(for	
the	volume	of	government	debt)	that	is	achieved	only	for	unit	elasticity	of	the	demand	func-
tion	for	real	money	balances,	i.e.	ε*	=	–1;	this	is	the	same	behavior	we	observe	in	the	inflation	
tax	curve.	Changes	in	the	fiscal	policy	parameter	d,	the	primary	budget	deficit,	influence	only	
the	curve	BB.	An	increase	in	the	primary	deficit	shifts	this	curve,	and	therefore	the	SS curve	
as	well,	to	the	left.
As	shown	in	Fig.	3.5,	in	the	general	case	there	could	be	up	to	two	steady	values	for	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	and	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	for	a	given	volume	of	
debt.	However,	what	is	important	is	that	this	system,	unlike	the	reduced	model	considered	
above	for	the	financing	of	the	budget	(the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	model),	does	not	exhibit	
any	principle	difference	in	terms	of	stability	for	equilibria	with	high	or	 low	inflation;	both	
equilibria	are	unstable.	
A	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	various	forms	of	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	
policies	based	on	this	dependence	will	be	given	in	later	chapters.
Fig. 3.5. The set of steady states of public debt and real money balances  
for various values of the growth rate of base money
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3.5. A model for the dynamics of public debt and inflation  
with real effects of inflation
As	in	the	inflation	tax	model,	the	assumption	that	the	primary	deficit	depends	on	infla-
tion	will	also	significantly	influence	the	properties	of	system	(3.8)	in	the	model	for	the	dy-
namics	of	public	debt	and	inflation.	
Let	us	consider	the	case	of	a	negative	dependence	of	 the	budget	deficit	on	the	rate	of	
inflation	(the	Patinkin	effect).	As	before,	we	consider	the	following	simple	linear	specifica-
tion:
	 D π( ) = d0 1−π m( )( )+ rb,	 (3.13)
where	d0	is	the	“design	primary	deficit”,	or	the	deficit	that	we	would	have	if	there	were	no	
inflation	effects.23	System	(3.8)	could	then	be	written	as	
	
&b = d
0
1− π m( )( )+ rb −µm,
&m = µ − π m( )( )m.
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
	 (3.14)	
23	 Cardoso	(1998)	calls	it	the	“virtual deficit”.	She	proposes	the	non-linear	dependence	of	actual	primary	
deficit	on	inflation:	positive	when	inflation	is	low	and	negative	when	inflation	is	high.	It	seems	to	quite	promi-
nent	to	incorporate	this	idea	into	our	model,	but	we	shelve	it.
Fig. 3.6. Public debt and the growth rate of the base money in the steady state
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It	 is	not	hard	 to	 see	 that	 the	 stability	of	 the	equilibria	will	not	qualitatively	change	 in	
comparison	with	system	(3.8).24	The	principle	change	with	respect	to	the	basic	model	is	that	
the	shape	of	the	SS curve	(the	set	of	steady	points	for	various	values	of	the	monetary	policy	
parameter)	critically	depends	on	the	primary	budget	deficit:
	 b =
π(m)m− d
0
(1− π(m))
r
.	 (3.15)
To	illustrate,	consider	for	instance	the	demand	function	for	real	money	balances	defined	as
	 m
d =
1
1+ πe( )
2 .	 (3.16)
The	SS curve	will	assume	a	Z	shape	for	positive,	comparatively	small	values	of	the	calcu-
lated	deficit	(see	Fig.	3.7).	Indeed,	in	this	case	the	derivative	of	the	function	of	real	debt	with	
respect	to	real	money	balances	has	two	zeroes25:
	
b(m) =
1
r
m
1
m
−1 − d
0
1− 1
m
−1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
, 0 <m <1.
′b (m) = −2m
2
+m− d
0
2rm2
1
m
−1
= 0, m
1,2
=
1m 1−8d
0
4
, d
0
<
1
8
.
	 (3.17)	
As	we	see	from	Fig.	3.7,	in	this	case	there	is	no	maximum	possible	steady	value	of	pub-
lic	debt.	We	suggest	the	following	possible	explanation.	If	the	government	is	able	to	achieve	
a	primary	surplus	by	increasing	inflation	(the	growth	rate	of	base	money),	then	it	can	also	
increase	the	volume	of	borrowing	by	having	a	source	for	the	servicing	of	the	debt.	In	addition,	
this	model	demonstrates,	analogously	to	Smirnov’s	model	(1997),	that	for	certain	values	of	
the	public	debt	there	exist	three	values	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	that	correspond	to	
the	steady	states	of	the	system.	The	nonlinear	dependence	of	the	steady	states	of	public	debt	
on	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	is	given	in	Fig.	3.8.
24	 Linearization	of	the	system	(3.14)	in	a	neighborhood	of	the	equilibrium	point	shows	that	the	steady	
state	is	still	an	unstable	node.	Moreover,	the	eigenvalues	of	the	Jacobi	matrix	remain	the	same	in	the	steady	
state.	This	is	obvious,	since	the	second	equation	in	(3.14)	remains	independent	of	b,	just	as	in	system	(3.8).	
25	 The	choice	of	the	functional	form	(3.16)	in	this	paper	is	justified	by	the	possibility	to	find	the	zeros	of	
the	derivative	in	(3.17)	analytically.	Numerical	investigation	of	the	Cagan	function	(3.11),	carried	out	by	the	
author	using	MathCad®	2000	Pro,	gave	qualitatively	the	same	results	for	reasonable	values	of	the	parameters	
in	the	Cagan	function.	It	should	nevertheless	be	pointed	out	that	the	results	of	the	model	to	a	certain	extent	
depend	on	the	parameterization	of	the	model.	However,	as	noted	above,	this	analysis	is	not	meant	to	arrive	
at	the	most	general	results	possible,	but	rather	we	aim	to	elucidate	the	potentially	important	role	played	by	
the	nonlinearity	of	the	system	in	order	to	explain	the	complex	interactions	of	the	parameters	of	fiscal	and	mo-
netary	policy.	
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Fig. 3.7. The set of steady states of public debt and real money balances  
for low values of the designed budget deficit
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Fig. 3.8. The interconnection between public debt and the growth rate of base money  
in the economy’s steady state for low values of the designed budget deficit
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Fig. 3.10. Interconnection between public debt and the growth rate of base money  
in the economy’s steady state for high values of the designed budget deficit
Fig. 3.9. The set of steady states of public debt and real money balances  
for high values of designed budget deficit
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For	sufficiently	high	values	of	the	calculated	deficit	(d0	>	1/8	for	the	demand	function	
[3.16])	the	derivative	in	(3.17)	is	always	less	than	zero	and	the	SS curve	has	a	negative	slope	
(see	Fig.	3.9).	In	this	case	the	steady	volume	of	the	public	debt	always	increases	with	an	in-
crease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	(see	Fig.	3.10).	However,	is	should	be	pointed	out	
that	the	steady	values	of	debt	are	less	sensitive	to	changes	in	the	rate	of	growth	of	the	base	
money	for	mid-range	values	of	the	latter.	
If	we	consider	a	positive	dependence	of	the	budget	deficit	on	the	rate	of	inflation	(the	
Olivera-Tanzi	effect)	in	a	simple	linear	specification,
	 D π( ) = d0 1+π m( )( )+ rb,	 (3.18)
we	will	see	that	just	as	in	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	model,	our	modification	of	the	system	
(3.8)	does	not	qualitatively	change	its	properties.	The	set	of	steady	points	of	the	SS curve	for	
the	demand	 function	 for	 real	money	balances	 (3.16)	 and	 the	 zeroes	of	 the	corresponding	
derivative	can	be	written	as	
	
b(m) =
1
r
m
1
m
−1 − d
0
1+
1
m
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⎛
⎝
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⎥
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0
2rm2
1
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= 0, m
1,2
=
1m 1+8d
0
4
, m
1
< 0.
	 (3.19)	
Equations	(3.19)	show	that	the	set	of	steady	states	has	the	same	shape	as	in	Fig.	3.5.
3.6. Analysis of bifurcations  
in the system of public debt and real money balances
The	macroeconomic	dynamics	 in	 the	 system	of	 real	money	balances	and	public	debt	
can	be	investigated	in	a	way	that	allows	one	to	avoid	the	problem	of	unstable	steady	states	
in	system	(3.8).	In	addition,	the	analysis	given	below,	which	is	analogous	to	the	models	that	
were	discussed	in	Section	3.2,	can	be	used	to	describe	the	qualitative	differences	in	the	con-
sequences	of	changing	macroeconomic	policy	depending	on	the	inflation	regime.	
Consider	the	set	of	steady	values	of	the	debt	as	the	fiscal	policy	parameters.	The	central	
bank,	by	conducting	monetary	policy	via	open	market	operations,	is	able	to	choose	(perhaps	
non-uniquely)	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	that	corresponds	to	the	economy’s	steady	state	
for	any	possible	value	of	the	public	debt.
The	functional	dependence	of	the	steady	values	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	on	
the	fiscal	policy	parameters	(the	volume	of	the	public	debt	b	and	the	primary	deficit	d)	for	
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system	(3.8),	which	does	not	account	for	the	effect	of	inflation	on	the	primary	deficit,	can	
be	written	as
	 µ =
d + rb
m
.	 (3.20)
Inserting	this	expression	into	the	second	equation	of	the	system	(3.8),	we	get	a	functional	
description	of	the	vector	field	of	the	dynamics	of	real	money	balances	for	various	values	of	the	
fiscal	policy	parameters	(the	volume	of	the	public	debt	b	and	the	primary	deficit	d)	and	the	
servicing	rate	of	public	debt	r:
	
&m = F (m,D), D = d + rb,
F (m,D) = D − π(m)m. 	 (3.21)	
An	investigation	of	the	singularity	and	stability	of	the	steady	states	of	(3.21)	results	in	several	
conclusions.	The	system	has	two	steady	states	(one	stable	and	the	other	unstable),	if	the	value	
of	the	operational	deficit	D26 is	less	than	the	maximum	of	the	inflation	tax	π(m)m.	The	steady	
state	is	unique	if	the	maximum	inflation	tax	equals	the	operational	deficit,	and	does	not	exist	if	
the	operational	deficit	is	greater	than	the	maximum	inflation	tax.	Therefore,	the	system	has	a	
catastrophe	point	of	the	“fold	bifurcation”	type27.	The	vector	field	and	bifurcation	diagram	for	
the	demand	function	for	real	money	balances	(3.16)	are	shown	in	Fig.	3.11	and	3.12.
Diagrams	with	the	same	qualitative	properties	result	for	the	system	modified	to	account	
for	the	Olivera-Tanzi	effect;	this	follows	from	the	uniqueness	of	the	extreme	in	(3.19)	on	the	
feasible	set.	
We	are	mostly	interested	in	investigating	the	system	in	which	an	increase	in	the	rate	of	
inflation	results	in	a	decrease	in	the	primary	deficit.	Using	the	parameters	of	fiscal	policy	to	
express	the	steady	value	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	putting	this	expression	into	the	
equation	for	the	dynamics	of	the	real	money	balances,	we	find	
	 µ =
d
0
1− π(m)( )+ rb
m
.	 (3.22)
	
&m = f (m,d
0
,b),
f (m,d
0
,b) = rb + d
0
1− π(m)( )− π(m)m.
	 (3.23)
26	 Analysis	of	the	bifurcation	of	this	system	allows	us	to	consider	the	operational	deficit	as	a	single	pa-
rameter	without	paying	undue	attention	to	its	components	(the	primary	deficit	and	the	servicing	of	the	debt).	
Indeed,	an	increase	in	the	primary	deficit	shifts	the	SS curve	in	Fig.	2.5	to	the	left,	while	an	increase	in	the	
stationary	volume	of	the	public	debt	simply	means	a	shift	of	the	vertical	level	line	to	the	right.	
27	 An	analogous	results	was	arrived	at	in	Smirnov	(1997).	The	bifurcation	point	corresponds	to	the	peak	
of	the	SS curve	(or	to	the	peak	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve),	where	the	elasticity	of	money	demand	is	equal	
to	–1.	See	a	classification	of	bifurcations	in	economic	systems	in,	for	instance,	Azariadis	(1993)	or	Lorenz	
(1989).
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Fig. 3.11. The vector field for the model without inflation effects on the budget deficit
Fig. 3.12. Bifurcation diagram in the model without inflation effects on the budget deficit
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In	this	case	we	have	a	first-order	system	with	two	parameters,	changes	in	which	(unlike	
(3.21))	should	be	considered	separately.	Changes	in	the	steady	volume	of	public	debt	b,	keep-
ing	the	designed	primary	deficit	d0	constant,	result	in	a	shift	in	the	vertical	level	line	in	Fig.	3.7.	
On	the	other	hand,	an	increase	in	the	(positive28)	value	of	the	designed	primary	deficit	d0	will	
“straighten”	the	Z-shaped	curve	SS,	and	it	will	finally	assume	the	shape	shown	in	Fig.	3.9.
We	will	consider	first	the	effect	of	increasing	the	steady	volume	of	the	public	debt	for	the	
chosen	value	of	the	designed	primary	deficit	d0	for	the	range	where	the	set	of	steady	states	SS	
has	a	Z-shape	(i.e.,	0	<	d0	<	1/8	for	the	demand	function	(3.16)).	As	we	pointed	out	in	the	
previous	section,	there	are	in	the	general	case	three	steady	values	for	the	volume	of	demand	
for	real	money	balances	for	a	fixed	level	of	public	debt,	and	therefore	there	are	three	cor-
responding	values	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	rate	inflation.	An	investigation	of	
the	singularity	and	stability	of	the	steady	states	brings	us	to	the	following	conclusions.	The	
equilibria	with	high	or	low	inflation	are	stable,	and	the	equilibrium	for	the	mid-range	rate	of	
inflation	is	unstable.	In	addition,	system	(3.23)	has	two	catastrophe	points	of	the	“fold	bifur-
cation”	type	with	respect	to	the	parameter	b.	The	corresponding	vector	field	and	bifurcation	
diagram	are	given	in	Fig.	3.13	and	3.14.	The	bifurcation	diagram	shows	that	the	dynamics	of	
the	system	will	exhibit	hysteresis.	Consider	the	situation	when	the	system	is	initially	on	the	
top	(stable,	 in	this	 interpretation)	branch	of	the	SS curve.	If	the	government	increases	the	
volume	of	the	accumulated	debt29	and	the	central	bank	conducts	the	correct	operations	on	
the	open	market,	the	steady	growth	rate	of	base	money	should	be	increased;	this	will	bring	
about	a	decrease	in	the	steady	demand	for	real	money	balances.	An	increase	in	the	volume	of	
public	debt	along	the	top	branch	of	the	SS curve	will	be	accompanied	by	a	relatively	smooth	
increase	in	the	rate	of	inflation.	The	situation	will	catastrophically	change	when	the	system	
reaches	the	singularity	point	(the	point	of	the	top	extreme).	An	increase	in	public	debt	will	
bring	about	a	sharp	increase	in	the	equilibrium	rate	of	inflation	and	a	decrease	in	the	demand	
for	real	money	balances;	the	system	jumps	to	the	lower	branch	of	the	SS curve,	and	move-
ment	(to	the	left)	along	this	curve	represents	hyperinflationary	processes	in	the	economy.	The	
dynamics	of	the	system	that	is	initially	on	the	lower	branch	of	the	SS curve	can	be	described	
analogously.	A	decrease	in	the	volume	of	public	debt	should	be	associated	here	with	a	tighten-
ing	of	monetary	policy	and	an	increase	in	the	demand	for	real	money	balances.	This	type	of	
financial	stabilization	at	a	certain	point	in	time	will	bring	about	an	instant	improvement	in	
the	situation,	and	the	system	will	move	to	a	low-inflationary	state30.
Investigation	of	the	steady	dynamics	of	the	economic	system	that	is	initially	on	the	mid-
dle,	unstable	branch	of	the	SS curve	(for	instance,	at	point	A),	brings	us	to	some	interesting	
28	 It	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	specification	of	our	model	for	the	deficit	finance,	which	takes	into	
account	the	negative	effect	of	inflation	on	the	budget	deficit,	is	not	symmetric	with	respect	to	the	fiscal	policy	
parameters,	and	does	not	allow	us	to	consider	negative	values	of	the	designed	primary	deficit;	however,	there	
is	no	point	in	doing	so	anyway.	
29	 For	a	given	level	of	the	designed	primary	deficit,	this	could	be	because	of	the	necessity	of	servicing	the	
existing	public	debt.	
30 Here	we	 consider	 b	 as	 a	 parameter	 and	 analyze	 the	movement	 of	 the	 equilibrium	 point	 following	
changes	in	this	parameter.	See	technical	discussion	of	this	bifurcation	in	Azariadis	(1993,	p.	146—147).
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Fig. 3.14. Bifurcation diagram (with respect to the parameter b) 
for the model with a negative influence of inflation on the budget deficit
Fig. 3.13. Vector field (with respect to the parameter b)  
for the model with a negative influence of inflation on the budget deficit
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results.	Here	an	 increase	 in	public	debt	 (again	assuming	 that	 the	designed	primary	deficit	
remains	unchanged)	must	be	accompanied	by	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	
and	a	visible	monetary	stabilization	of	inflation	(a	shift	from	point	A to	point	B).	However,	
after	arriving	at	the	singularity	point	B,	the	system	will	undergo	a	catastrophe:	a	vanishingly	
small	increase	in	the	debt	will	bring	about	a	shift	to	the	hyperinflationary	branch	(the	system	
will	jump	from	point	B to	point	C).	On	the	other	hand,	a	tightening	of	fiscal	policy	(a	decrease	
in	 the	 steady	public	debt)	will	 initially	 result	 in	 forced	expansionary	monetary	policy	and	
an	increase	in	inflation	(a	shift	from	point	A to	point	D).	However,	after	arriving	at	point	D,	
bifurcation	will	ensue	and	the	economy	will	shift	to	the	low-inflation	branch	(the	system	will	
jump	from	point	D to	point	E).	The	character	of	coordination	between	fiscal	and	monetary	
policy	will	qualitatively	change:	stabilization	of	 the	public	debt	 in	equilibrium	must	be	af-
fected	with	a	monetary	stabilization	of	inflation,	and	the	system	will	move	to	the	left	along	
the	top	branch	of	the	SS curve31.	
A	 deeper	 economic	 interpretation	 of	 these	 equilibrium	 processes	 for	 a	 transitional	
economy	will	 be	 given	 below.	 Let	 us	 turn	 now	 to	 an	 investigation	 of	 the	 bifurcation	 of	
the	system	if	the	second	parameter	of	fiscal	policy	changes,	namely	the	designed	primary	
deficit	d0
32.	Assume	that	the	volume	of	public	debt	b	is	fixed	at	a	level	where	three	possible	
equilibrium	values	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	are	possible.	Analysis	of	the	stability	
and	singularity	of	the	system	(3.23)	gives	us	a	bifurcation	that	is	principally	different	from	
the	one	considered	above.	In	this	case	the	dynamics	of	the	system	will	not	be	of	the	“fold	
bifurcation”	type;	the	dynamics	will	display	a	catastrophe	akin	to	the	“pitchfork	bifurca-
tion”	type.	An	increase	in	the	designed	primary	deficit	will,	as	noted	above,	bring	about	a	
“straightening”	of	the	SS curve	in	Fig.	3.7.	The	top	steady	state	for	real	money	balances	
will	move	down,	and	the	bottom	steady	state	will	move	up.	A	change	in	the	position	of	the	
middle	(unstable)	steady	state	will	be	different	depending	on	the	volume	of	public	debt.	If	
the	latter	is	relatively	small,	then	the	middle	steady	state	will	move	down,	and	at	a	certain	
point	it	will	coalesce	with	the	bottom	state	and	both	will	disappear;	the	system	will	jump	
to	the	top	(low-inflation	and	stable)	branch.	This	catastrophe	is	shown	on	the	bifurcation	
diagram	(Fig.	3.15).	A	further	increase	in	the	designed	primary	deficit	d0	brings	about	an	
(asymptotic)	 increase	 in	 the	 steady	 value	 of	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 base	money	 (a	 decrease	
in	 the	 volume	 of	 demand	 for	 real	money	 balances)	 up	 to	 the	 level	 that	 corresponds	 to	
the	maximum	volume	of	 inflation	 tax	 revenue	π(m)m	 (given	 the	 functional	 form	(3.16),	
the	maximum	of	inflation	tax	is	equal	to	1	and	it	is	achieved	at	µ	=	0.5).	As	can	be	seen	
31	 Note	that	if	parameter	b	changes	for	the	constant	growth	rate	of	money	when	economy	stays	at	point	A,	
then	it	will	jump	to	the	stable	branch	(upper	or	lower	part	of	SS	curve).	But	we	actually	suggest	a	little	bit	dif-
ferent	interpretation,	assuming	that	an	increase	in	b	is	accompanied	by	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	money	
just	to	move	economy	from	one	unstable	steady	state	to	another	(this	is	done	continuously	or	step	by	step	to	
move	economy	from	point	A	to	B).	As	economy	is	posited	in	the	steady	state,	no	matter	it	is	stable	or	unstable	it	
will	be	kept	there	(if	there	is	no	shock,	of	course).	This	way	of	modeling	was	suggested	in	the	original	paper	by	
Drazen	(1985).	It	may	seem	artificial,	but	it	helps	us	to	stress	the	potential	danger	of	conducting	tight	monetary	
policy	at	the	time	when	public	debt	is	rising.
32	 This	analysis	was	also	carried	out	using	MathCad®	2000	Pro.
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from	(3.15),	the	real	budget	deficit,	which	takes	into	account	the	negative	influence	of	in-
flation,	will	adjust	the	present	value	of	inflation	tax	in	order	to	provide	for	the	correspond-
ing	level	of	public	debt.	The	factor	(1	—	π(m)),	which	characterizes	this	effect,	approaches	
zero	and	decreases	the	real	primary	deficit	to	the	level	at	which	the	volume	of	inflation	tax	
is	close	to	its	maximum	and	sufficiently	high	to	support	the	existing	volume	of	public	debt	
without	requiring	further	borrowing.	
Figure	3.16	gives	the	bifurcation	diagram	for	relatively	high	volumes	of	public	debt	(as	
before,	we	assume	that	three	steady	states	exist).	Here	the	middle	equilibrium	value	of	de-
mand	for	real	money	balances	increases,	and	at	a	certain	point	coalesces	with	the	low	infla-
tion	equilibrium;	the	system	jumps	to	the	high-inflation	branch.	A	further	increase	in	the	de-
signed	deficit	d0	brings	about	a	decrease	in	the	steady	value	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	
(an	increase	in	the	volume	of	demand	on	real	money	balances)	to	the	level	that	corresponds	
to	the	maximum	inflation	tax	revenue	π(m)m.	In	this	case	we	observe	a	real	primary	surplus,	
which	is	a	second	resource	for	keeping	the	public	debt	at	the	given	level	(the	first	resource	is	
the	inflation	tax,	which	is	close	to	its	maximum	value).
Figure	3.17	shows	the	hypothetic	intermediate	situation,	when	all	three	equilibria	coa-
lesce	at	one	point,	i.e.	the	system	has	a	pure	“pitchfork	bifurcation”.	Analysis	of	an	increase	
in	the	designed	primary	deficit	gives	results	that	are	analogous	to	those	given	above.
Consider	now	the	values	of	the	fiscal	policy	parameter	(public	debt	b)	for	which	there	is	
only	one	steady	state	of	the	money	market.	An	increase	in	the	designed	primary	deficit	should	
Fig. 3.15. Bifurcation diagram (with respect to the parameter d0)  
for a low volume of public debt
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Fig. 3.16. Bifurcation diagram (with respect to the parameter d0)  
for a high volume of public debt
Fig. 3.17. Bifurcation diagram with respect to the parameter d0).  
“Pitchfork bifurcation”
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be	associated	with	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	for	low	values	of	the	debt,	and	
a	decrease	for	high	values	of	the	debt.	In	the	first	case	the	steady	volume	of	demand	for	real	
money	balances	decreases,	and	in	the	second	it	increases;	as	before,	this	steady	volume	will	
approach	the	level	that	is	determined	by	maximum	inflation	tax	revenue.33
3.7. The Russian crisis of 1998  
as a fold bifurcation
On	August	17,	1998,	in	the	face	of	adverse	conditions	the	Central	Bank	of	Russia	(CBR)	
was	forced	to	devalue	the	ruble.	While	on	August	14	one	US	dollar	was	worth	6.29	rubles,	a	
few	weeks	later,	on	September	9,	it	became	worth	more	than	21	rubles.	At	the	same	time,	the	
Russian	Federal	Government	imposed	a	moratorium	on	the	repayment	of	part	of	its	debt	and	
announced	an	intention	to	restructure	it;	this	was	de facto	a	default.	By	the	end	of	the	year,	
there	was	a	significant	increase	in	the	annual	rate	of	inflation:	it	was	well	below	10	percent	
before	the	crisis,	and	it	increased	to	84	percent	after	the	crisis.	
While	the	nature	of	the	1998	crisis	is	rather	complex,	it	seems	possible	to	partly	interpret	
it	from	the	point	of	view	of	bifurcation	theory	within	the	framework	of	our	analysis,	as	a	kind	
of	fiscal-monetary	coordination	failure.	
Figure	3.18	shows	the	monetary	situation	before	and	after	the	crisis.	In	the	period	before	
the	crisis,	monetary	policy	was	tight.	While	the	average	monthly	growth	rate	of	money	was	
2.2	percent	in	1997,	in	the	first	seven	months	of	1998	it	was	just	0.3	percent.	Inflation	was	also	
rather	moderate	or	even	low:	the	average	monthly	growth	rate	of	CPI	was	0.9	percent	in	1997,	
and	0.6	percent	in	the	period	from	January	to	July	1998.	The	official	target	level	of	annual	
inflation	was	8	percent	in	1998.
At	the	same	time,	the	fiscal	situation	remained	remarkably	bad	(both	for	that	period	and	
in	perspective	as	well).	Table	3.1	illustrates	this	point.
For	several	years,	the	Government	had	failed	to	meet	the	announced	target	level	of	ope-
rational	deficit.	The	dynamics	of	public	debt	was	 in	 fact	dramatic.	While	primary	deficits	
were	persistently	high,	a	substantial	squeeze	in	seigniorage	and	rising	interest	payments	led	to	
rapid	debt	accumulation.34,	35	Figure	3.19	shows	the	dynamics	of	internal	Russian	public	debt	
in	market	instruments	(GKO	and	OFZ	—	federal	bonds).
33	 The	next	step	in	our	investigation	should	be	the	analysis	of	the	joint	bifurcation	when	the	fiscal	policy	
parameters	d0	and	b	change.	However,	given	the	complexity	of	the	theoretical	classification	of	possible	catas-
trophes	and	the	difficulties	illustrating	them	graphically,	we	will	leave	this	for	further	study.	A	possible	effect	of	
changes	in	the	volume	of	public	debt	and	the	calculated	primary	deficit,	either	in	the	same	direction	or	not,	
could	be	the	acceleration	or	delay	of	the	approaching	catastrophe,	as	well	as	amplification	(or	damping)	of	the	
nonlinear	effects	of	the	influence	of	fiscal	policy	on	the	equilibrium	of	the	money	market.	
34	 The	seeming	stabilization	in	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio	is	merely	a	result	of	an	appreciation	in	the	real	
exchange	rate.	See	details	in	Kharas,	Pinto,	and	Ulatov	(2001).
35	 While	interest	rates	on	GKO’s	were	double-digit,	the	growth	rate	of	GDP	was	negative	(only	in	1997	
was	it	positive,	and	close	to	zero).	As	was	discussed	in	Section	2.2,	this	fact	is	important	for	the	stability	proper-
ties	of	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio	dynamics.	
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For	a	constant	budget	deficit,	we	can	interpret	the	simultaneous	monetary	contraction	
and	the	rise	of	public	debt	in	1997—1998	in	terms	of	equations	(3.22)—(3.23)	and	Fig.	3.14,	
which	illustrates	the	hysteresis	effect.	Assume	that	the	economy	is	initially	in	a	state	of	mo-
derate	 inflation	 (point	A	 in	Fig.	 3.14).	An	 increase	 in	 the	 accumulated	public	debt	 is	 ac-
companied	by	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	money	and,	therefore,	in	the	rate	of	inflation.	
However,	after	the	debt	achieves	a	certain	critical	value	(point	B	in	Fig.	3.14),	the	economic	
system	bifurcates	and	jumps	to	a	state	with	high	(hyper)	inflation	(point	C	in	Fig.	3.14),	in	
which	a	further	increase	in	the	volume	of	accumulated	debt	is	accompanied	by	an	increase	in	
the	steady	level	of	inflation.	What	is	especially	noteworthy	is	that	near	the	bifurcation	point	B	
the	system	shows	a	gradual	adjustment	of	the	public	debt	and	a	rather	rapid	decrease	in	the	
growth	rate	of	money;	these	may	give	the	erroneous	impression	of	macroeconomic	stabiliza-
tion.	This	result	agrees	with	the	phenomenon	noted	in	Vavilov	(1999),	when	there	seemed	to	
be	a	stabilization	in	Russian	debt	during	the	last	months	before	the	crisis	that	corresponds	to	
a	logistic	equation	(see	also	Fig.	3.19).	
Limitations
Our	explanation	of	the	nature	of	the	August	1998	crisis	is	based	on	the	mechanism	of	the	
interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	and	disregards	many	important	aspects	of	
that	event.	First	of	all,	as	it	often	happens,	the	Russian	crisis	was	a	combination	of	government	
default,	currency	devaluation,	and	a	banking	crisis.	Many	authors	(in	particular,	Montes	and	
Popov,	1999)	agree	that	the	most	important	part	of	the	general	financial	crisis	was	a	specu-
lative	attack	on	the	ruble	that	can	be	best	described	by	first-generation	models	of	currency	
crises.36	Indeed,	a	remarkable	tightness	of	monetary	policy	and	its	success	in	fighting	inflation	
before	the	crisis	was	a	result	of	the	specific	exchange	rate	policy	of	the	CBR	—	roughly	speak-
36	 Krugman	(1979),	Flood	and	Garber	(1984).
Table 3.1. Fiscal	and	monetary	policy	indicators,	1995—1997
Year 1995 1996 1997
Operational	deficit	(actual,	percent	of	GDP) 5.7 8.4 7.0
Operational	deficit	(target,	percent	of	GDP) 6.0 4.2 3.2
Primary	deficit	(actual,	percent	of	GDP) 2.2 2.5 2.4
Interest	payments	(percent	of	GDP) 3.6 5.9 4.6
Government	debt	(percent	of	GDP) 50 48 50
Government	debt	(billions	USD) 170 201 218
Seigniorage	(percent	of	GDP) 3.62 1.26 1.36
Real	GDP	growth	(percent	a	year) –4.0 –3.4 0.9
Inflation	rate	(percent	a	year) 131 22 11
Real	exchange	rate	appreciation	(percent) 10 22 6
	 Source:	Kharas,	Pinto,	and	Ulatov	(2001).
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Source:	CBR;	HSE	Economic	Journal,	Statistics	(various	issues).
Fig. 3.18. Growth rate of money and inflation in Russia, 1995—1999
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ing,	a	fixed	exchange	rate	regime.37	In	this	respect,	one	should	also	stress	an	additional	factor	
that	was	 important	both	for	the	collapse	 in	the	exchange	rate	and	for	the	debt	confidence	
crisis:	the	Asian	crisis	of	1997	led	investors	to	scrutinize	Russian	exchange	and	public	debt	
markets	(as	well	as	the	vulnerable	Russian	banking	sector)	more	carefully.
Second.	Our	simple	model	does	not	account	for	the	debt	structure.	In	particular,	it	is	the	
maturity	structure	that	is	important	here.	A	substantial	volume	of	the	government	debt	was	
in	the	form	of	short-term	ruble	treasury	bills	(called	GKOs)	that	bear	a	high	rollover	risk.	In	
fact,	as	Table	3.1	shows,	the	debt	to	GDP	ratio	was	indeed	high,	but	not	extremely	high	(from	
a	historical	perspective).	One	element	of	the	stabilization	package	implemented	just	before	
the	crisis	was	a	swap	out	of	GKOs	into	long-term	Eurobonds.	However,	this	was	done	far	too	
late	and	did	not	help	prevent	the	crisis.38	Thus,	very	poor	debt	management	policy	may	also	
be	seen	to	be	a	source	of	the	crisis.
Third.	The	rollover	risk	along	with	the	devaluation	risk	led	to	extremely	high	real	inter-
est	rates	on	short-term	debt.	They	were	on	average	higher	than	50	percent	in	the	period	of	
37	 Central	Bank	of	Russia	announced	a	target	level	of	6.2	rubles	for	the	USD	with	a	15	percent	band	for	
the	period	of	1998—2000.
38	 In	general,	there	is	theory	and	evdince	that	debt	swaps	do	not	avert	crisis	when	an	open	economy	ap-
proaches	default.	See,	i.g.,	Velasco	and	Lorrain	(1993),	and	Aizenman,	Kletzer	and	Pinto	(2002).	
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Source:	CBR;	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.
Fig. 3.19. Internal debt in market instruments (GKO-OFZ) in Russia, 1997—1998
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1995—1997,	and	even	higher	(and	rising)	a	month	before	the	crisis.	This	factor	simply	makes	
the	problem	of	 fiscal-monetary	coordination	more	acute,	 as	 rising	 interest	 rates	 lead	 to	a	
more	rapid	growth	of	public	debt.39
Fourth.	Chapters	3	and	4	of	this	thesis	provide	an	analysis	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	
interactions	assuming	backward-looking	dynamics	of	the	system.	In	practice,	it	 is	difficult	
to	judge	what	factors	were	of	major	importance	for	the	crisis:	the	current	state	of	the	system	
(large	fiscal	deficits	and	accumulated	public	debt	in	1998),	or	the	expectations	that	the	Rus-
sian	Government	would	not	be	able	to	meet	its	obligations	in	the	near	future	by	providing	
sufficient	surpluses	and	that	it	would	therefore	be	forced	to	monetize	the	outstanding	debt.	
We	will	return	to	this	point	in	Chapter	5.
3.8. Conclusion
Let	us	return	to	the	question	posed	at	the	beginning.	Are	we	able	to	positively	state	that	
there	is	unique,	positive	(linear)	interrelation	between	the	deficit	and	the	debt	on	one	hand,	
and	forced	monetary	expansion	and	inflation	on	the	other?	The	investigation	presented	here	
seems	to	give	a	negative	answer.	The	dependence	is	non-linear,	and	it	depends	on	the	infla-
39	 Drazen	and	Helpman	(1990)	provide	an	example	of	an	analysis	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	under	
conditions	in	which	there	is	uncertainty	about	the	future	stabilization	policy	mix.	In	their	paper,	the	interest	
rate	includes	a	risk	premium	that	depends	on	the	instantaneous	probability	of	a	future	policy	switch.	
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tionary	regime	of	the	economy.	Changes	in	the	primary	deficit	and	the	volume	of	accumu-
lated	debt	may	have	completely	different	effects	on	inflation.40
We	have	considered	in	this	chapter	a	model	for	the	financing	of	the	operational	budget	
deficit	in	which	we	assume	that	there	is	a	negative	relationship	between	the	real	primary	defi-
cit	and	inflation.	This	approach	removes	the	problem	presented	by	the	existence	of	maximum	
volumes	of	the	deficit	and	of	the	public	debt	for	steady	financing.	If	the	economy	is	initially	
in	a	state	with	low	inflation	or	with	high	(hyper)	inflation,	an	increase	in	the	steady	volume	
of	the	public	debt	requires	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	In	the	case	of	low	
inflation	the	system	will	inevitably	come	to	a	catastrophe	and	jump	from	the	low-inflation	
branch	to	the	hyperinflation	branch.	This	process,	as	noted	above,	displays	hysteresis.	If	the	
economy	accumulates	inflationary	potential	in	the	form	of	an	increasing	government	debt,	
then	sooner	or	later	the	money	market	will	undergo	sudden	changes.	
On	the	other	hand,	this	model	more	or	less	realistically	describes	the	process	of	stabili-
zation	of	hyperinflation;	one	of	the	conditions	for	this	is	a	decrease	in	the	real	value	of	the	
accumulated	public	debt41.	This	process	must	first	be	accompanied	by	a	gradual	decrease	in	
the	steady	growth	rate	of	base	money.	After	reaching	the	singularity	state	the	economy	will	
bifurcate	—	the	steady	level	of	inflation	jumps	to	a	lower	level,	and	the	economy	will	move	to	
low	inflation	regime.	
At	the	same	time	even	a	significant	 increase	 in	the	designed	primary	deficit	 that	 is	 fi-
nanced	 without	 additional	 government	 borrowings,	 can	 have	 less	 severe	 implications	 for	
inflation.	Depending	on	 the	 initial	 state,	 the	economy	may	undergo	either	an	 increase	or	
a	decrease	 in	the	equilibrium	rate	of	 inflation;	however,	a	 further	 increase	 in	the	designed	
budget	deficit	 stabilizes	 inflation	expectations	at	 a	moderate	 level.	This	allows	 the	central	
bank	to	achieve	inflation	tax	revenues	close	to	the	maximum	possible,	and	the	government	
to	bring	the	real	primary	deficit	(surplus)	to	a	level	that	is	compatible	with	the	steady	state	of	
the	public	debt.
Appendix. Microeconomic basis for the dynamics 
The	analysis	given	in	this	and	following	chapters	is	based	on	the	system	of	equations	(3.8),	
which	describes	the	dynamics	of	public	debt	and	real	money	balances.	It	assumes	the	exis-
tence	of	a	demand	function	for	real	money	balances	that	decreases	with	inflationary	expecta-
tions,	for	example	the	Cagan	function	(2.11)	or	(3.16).	Here	we	give	the	micro	foundations	
for	the	main	analysis,	based	on	the	standard	intertemporal	optimization	problem	for	a	repre-
sentative	agent.	In	particular,	we	explain	the	interconnection	between	the	budget	constraints	
of	the	government	and	of	a	representative	agent,	derive	the	demand	function	for	real	money	
balances	and	introduce	the	assumptions	necessary	for	money	to	be	superneutral42.
40	 See	also	Bruno	(1995)	on	the	importance	of	non-linearity	in	inflation	dynamics.
41	 See,	for	example,	Bruno	(1993),	Sargent	(1993).
42	 The	model	considered	here	belongs	to	a	class	of	monetary	growth	models,	or	models	with	money	in	
the	utility	function.	It	was	first	suggested	in	a	paper	by	Sidrauski	(1967).	In	this	exposition	the	model	is	closest	
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Consider	a	representative	agent	with	an	infinite	time	horizon	who	maximizes	the	life-
time	utility	 from	consumption	 and	 real	money	balance.	 Including	 the	 latter	 in	 the	utility	
function	 presupposes	 that	money	 eases	 transactions,	 and	 allows	 us	 to	 derive	 the	 demand	
function	for	money43.
	 max
c,m
u c,m( )e−ρtdt
0
∞
∫ .	 (А3.1)	
Here	c	is	real	consumption,	m =
M
P
	is	the	real	money	balances,	ρ	is	a	subjective	discount
rate,	 u(c,	 m)	 is	 the	 instantaneous	 utility	 function	 with	 the	 standard	 properties	
′u
c
, ′u
m
> 0, ′′u
cc
, ′′u
mm
< 0.	The	budget	constraint	is	given	by	the	following	equation:
	 Pc + &M + &B = Py +RB − PT ,	 (А3.2)
where	P	is	the	price	level,	y	is	the	real	labor	income,	which	we	assume	for	simplicity	to	be	
constant,	T	is	the	real	lump-sum	taxes,	B	is	the	nominal	public	debt,	and	R	is	the	nominal	
interest	rate	on	public	debt.	The	representative	agent	spends	his	total	disposable	nominal	in-
come	on	consumption	and	savings.	The	latter	consists	of	increments	in	the	money	base	and	
in	government	obligations.	The	initial	values	of	the	nominal	assets	are	given	by	M(0)	=	M0,	
B(0)	=	B0.	The	budget	constraint	(А3.2)	can	be	written	in	terms	of	real	variables	for	conve-
nience:
	 c + &m+ &b = y + rb −T − πm,	 (А3.3)	
where	b =
B
P
	is	the	real	public	debt,	π	is	the	rate	of	inflation,	and	r	=	R	–	π	is	the	real	interest
rate	on	public	debt	44.	Denoting	a	=	m	+	b,	the	real	assets	of	a	representative	agent,	the	budget	
constraint	can	also	be	written	in	the	form	of	a	dynamics	equation:
	 &a = &m+ &b = y + rb − c − πm−T = y + ra− c − (r + π)m−T .	 (А3.4)	
to	the	version	used	in	Drazen	(1985).	A	canonical	representation	of	the	model	can	be	found,	for	example,	in	
Blanchard	and	Fischer	(1989),	Turnovsky	(2000),	Walsh	(1998).
43	 This	assumption	 is	central	 in	a	class	of	models	 that	 include	money	 in	 the	utility	 function.	Alterna-
tive	methods	for	deriving	demand	for	money	in	macroeconomic	dynamics	models	are	the	classes	of	models	
“shopping	time”,	“cash-in-advance	constraint”,	as	well	as	monetary	versions	of	models	with	overlapping	ge-
nerations.	Under	certain	assumptions	the	first	two	classes	are	equivalent	to	models	with	money	in	the	utility	
function	 (see,	 for	 example,	McCallum-Goodfriend	 (1987),	Feenstra	 (1986)).	Elucidation	of	 the	model	 of	
a	representative	agent	is	justified	by	the	main	goals	of	our	investigation.	We	should,	however,	point	out	that	an	
analysis	based	on	the	model	of	overlapping	generations	would	probably	give	additional	interesting	results.	See,	
for	example,	Weil	(1987,	1991).
44	 Just	as	in	the	main	part	of	the	thesis,	we	assume	that	inflationary	expectations	satisfy	the	hypothesis	of	
perfect	foresight.	
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Monetary	policy	is	characterized	by	a	constant	(or	piecewise	constant)	growth	rate	of
base	money	equal	to	
&M
M
= µ.	The	money	market	is	in	equilibrium	and	at	each	point	of	time
the	dynamics	of	real	money	balances	can	be	described	by	the	equation
	 &m = µ − π( )m.	 (А3.5)	
The	government	finances	the	operational	budget	deficit	(which	is	defined	as	the	govern-
ment	expenditure,	G,	minus	net	taxes,	T,	both	taken	for	simplicity	to	be	constant,	plus	debt	
service)	by	new	public	borrowings	and	seigniorage.	The	later	is	comprised	of	pure	seigniorage
and	 inflation	 tax,	
&M
P
= &m+ πm .	The	budget	constraint	of	 the	government	 in	 terms	of	 real
variables	can	be	written	as	
	 G −T + rb =
&M
P
+ &b.	 (А3.6)	
The	budget	constraint	of	a	representative	agent	(А3.3)	and	the	budget	constraint	of	the	
government	(А3.6)	together	form	the	fundamental	macroeconomic	identity:
	 y = c +G .	 (А3.7)	
Given	the	formulated	problem	of	intertemporal	optimization,	
	 max
c,m
u c,m( )e−ρt dt
0
∞
∫ s.t. &a = y + ra − c − (r + π)m−T ,	
we	write	the	Hamiltonian	function	
	 H (t,c,m,b,λ) = u(c,m)e−ρt + λe−ρt y + ra − c− (r + π)m−T⎡⎣ ⎤⎦,	
where	the	co-state	variable	λ	characterizes	the	shadow	price	of	an	increase	in	real	assets	(the	
opportunity	cost	of	savings)	in	terms	of	marginal	utility	of	foregone	consumption.	The	first	
order	conditions	are:
	
∂H
∂c
= 0, ′u
c
(c,m) = λ,	 (А3.8)
	 ∂H
∂m
= 0, ′u
m
(c,m) = λ r + π( ),	 (А3.9)
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∂
∂t
λ(t)e−ρt⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = −
∂H
∂a
, &λ = λ(ρ− r),	 (А3.10)
	 lim
t→∞
λ(t)e−ρt = 0 .	 (А3.11)
Condition	(A3.8)	gives	the	optimal	consumption	choice,	in	which	the	marginal	utility	
equals	the	shadow	price	of	a	unit	of	savings.	Condition	(A3.9)	equates	the	marginal	utility	
from	an	additional	unit	of	real	money	balance	to	the	opportunity	cost	of	savings	(the	nomi-
nal	interest	rate)	in	units	of	utility	from	consumption.	Finally,	condition	(A3.10)	determines	
the	dynamics	equations	of	 the	co-state	variable.	Considering	the	Hamiltonian	function	to	
be	a	generalized	utility	function,	this	condition	requires	the	increment	in	utility	(indirectly)	
resulting	from	an	increase	in	assets,	taken	with	a	negative	sign,	to	equal	the	increase	of	the	
shadow	price	of	savings	over	time.	Condition	(A3.10)	guarantees	that	the	rate	of	growth	of	
the	co-state	variable	will	be	determined	by	the	difference	between	the	subjective	discount	rate	
and	the	interest	rate.	Condition	(A3.11)	is	the	standard	no-Ponzi	game	condition	for	such	
problems.	Taking	(A3.9)	and	(A3.9)	together,	we	can	write	a	combined	first	order	condition:
	
′u
m
(c,m)
′u
c
(c,m)
= r + π.	 (А3.12)	
This	condition	gives	in	an	implicit	form	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	as	a	func-
tion	of	the	nominal	interest	rate	and	consumption.	In	order	to	write	the	demand	function	in	
an	explicit	from	and	to	analyze	the	dynamics	of	the	money	market,	it	is	necessary	to	intro-
duce	the	following	important	assumption.	We	assume	that	the	function	of	current	utility	is	
additively-separable	with	respect	to	its	arguments:
	 u(c,m) = v(c)+w(m).	 (А3.13)	
For	this	functional	form,	the	first	order	condition	(A3.8)	can	be	written	as	
	 ′vc(c) = λ .	 (А3.14)
Using	the	macroeconomic	identity	(А3.7)	and	assuming	that	labor	income	and	govern-
ment	expenditures	are	constant,	we	find	the	constant	level	of	consumption;	taking	into	ac-
count	(А3.14)	we	also	find	the	constant	value	of	the	co-state	variable.	Using	(А3.12),	money	
demand	can	be	determined	as	a	function	that	decreases	with	respect	to	the	nominal	interest	
rate45:
45	 This	follows	from	the	standard	assumptions	we	made	concerning	the	instantaneous	utility	function.	
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	 ′w
m
(m) = λ(r +π).	 (А3.15)	
In	addition,	a	constant	co-state	variable	allows	us	to	use	condition	(A3.10)	to	determine	
the	constant	level	of	the	real	interest	rate:
	 r = ρ .	 (А3.16)	
Finally,	using	the	results	given	above,	we	can	describe	the	dynamics	of	the	public	debt	
and	real	money	balances:	
	
&b = rb + (G −T )− πm,
&m = µ + r − ′wm(m)λ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
m.
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩
⎪
	 (А3.17)	
System	(A3.17)	is	a	prototype	for	the	system	(3.8)	which	we	consider	in	the	main	text	of	
this	chapter.	It	is	not	difficult	to	see	that	the	corresponding	steady	state	of	the	system	is	an	
unstable	node	for	the	given	initial	values	of	public	debt	and	real	money	balances.	The	Cagan	
function	for	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	that	is	used	in	the	analysis,	
	 md = Ae−απ
e
	 (2.11)	
corresponds	to	the	utility	function	
	 w(m) =m α
1
−α
2
lnm( ), α1,α2 > 0,	 (А3.18)	
where	 A = e
α1
α2
−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , α = λα
2
46.	
In	conclusion,	it	is	necessary	to	make	certain	important	comments	concerning	the	metho-
dology	of	constructing	this	economic	model	and	its	properties.	First	of	all,	the	economy	has	
the	property	of	a	neoclassical	dichotomy,	and	money	is	superneutral.	Indeed,	consumption	
and	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	are	determined	by	conditions	 (А3.7)	and	(А3.16),	which	do	not	
contain	nominal	 variables	or	 the	growth	 rate	of	base	money.	Changes	 in	monetary	policy	
(changes	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money)	affect	the	demand	for	money	only	via	inflation	
expectations,	not	by	changing	the	real	interest	rate.	An	assumption	that	is	of	significant	im-
portance	for	this	result	is	that	of	additive	separability	of	the	current	utility	function47.
46	 We	should	point	out	that	in	this	specification	the	semi-elasticity	of	demand	for	money,	α,	is	determined	
by	the	co-state	variable	λ,	which	in	its	term	depends	on	consumption.	
47	 For	a	more	general	form	of	the	utility	function,	the	economic	system	dichotomizes	and	will	be	accom-
panied	by	the	superneutrality	of	money	only	in	a	steady	state.	See,	for	example,	Blanchard	and	Fischer	(1989),	
Turnovsky	(2000),	Walsh	(1998).
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Second.	The	considered	version	of	 the	monetary	growth	model,	unlike	 the	canonical	
model	by	Sidrauski,	presupposes	constant	labor	income	and	does	not	consider	the	accumula-
tion	of	capital.	The	assumption	that	income	is	constant	can	be	weakened	(without	significant	
complications	or	changes	to	the	main	results),	for	instance	by	replacing	it	by	assuming	a	con-
stant	growth	rate	of	output48.	Introducing	physical	capital	in	the	model	does	not	change	the	
main	results	either.	We	will	have	an	additional	first	order	condition,	in	accordance	with	which	
the	interest	rate	on	government	bonds	must	be	equal	to	the	marginal	productivity	of	capital.	
The	properties	of	neoclassical	dichotomy	and	the	superneutrality	of	money	are	also	based	on	
the	hypothesis	of	additive	separability	of	the	instantaneous	utility	function.	Monetary	policy,	
as	before,	does	not	affect	the	interest	rate;	however,	during	the	transitional	dynamic	the	latter	
is	not	constant	anymore,	and	it	is	determined	by	the	accumulation	of	capital.	The	interest	
rate	is	constant	and	equal	to	the	subjective	discount	rate	only	on	the	balanced	growth	trajec-
tory;	this	is	equivalent	to	the	assumption	that	the	growth	rate	of	output	is	constant.	Consi-
deration	of	a	variable	interest	rate	(i.e.,	the	accumulation	of	capital	on	the	transitional	trajec-
tory)	is	of	course	interesting	in	the	analysis	of	macroeconomic	policy.	However,	this	would	to	
a	significant	extent	complicate	the	model	and	also	move	our	topic	of	discussion	—	that	of	the	
interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	—	to	the	background	both	because	it	would	
become	impossible	to	arrive	at	the	necessary	analytical	solutions	to	the	model,	and	because	
of	the	difficulties	in	analyzing	dynamic	systems	higher	than	the	second	order49.	For	these	rea-
sons	we	do	not	include	the	labor	market	in	our	analysis,	nor	do	we	include	labor	in	the	utility	
function	and	we	do	not	introduce	the	corresponding	production	function50.
48	 It	would	perhaps	be	more	logical	to	consider	variables	as	shares	of	output	in	this	version	of	the	model.	
We	will	consider	this	question	in	the	third	chapter.	
49	 An	analysis	of	this	sort	can	be	found	in	the	book	by	Turnovsky	(2000).	The	author	indeed	considers	the	
influence	of	macroeconomic	policy	for	the	deterministic	case,	and	also	for	optimal	stochastic	dynamic	models	
with	a	more	complete	specification	then	that	given	here.	He	considers,	however,	a	completely	different	class	of	
problems,	not	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	
50	 In	particular,	it	is	well	known	that	inclusion	of	the	labor	market	in	the	Sidrauski	model	guarantees	that	
money	will	not	be	superneutral	in	transitional	dynamics	even	for	additively	separable	utility	functions.	
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Chapter 4
Fiscal and monetary policy interaction I: 
The role of constraints 
4.1. Introduction
Two	important	problems	which	both	developing	and	developed	countries	face	are	infla-
tion bias	and	deficit bias.	Researchers	believe	that	the	main	reason	for	inflation	bias	in	deve-
loping	countries	(and	in	countries	with	a	transitional	economy)	is	significant	financing	of	the	
budget	deficit	by	seigniorage1.	This	implies	that	inflation	bias	can	be	explained	by	deficit	bias	
in	many	cases,	especially	in	high-inflation	economies.2
Over	the	last	few	years	the new political economy	has	become	a	popular	avenue	of	research.	
Positive	analysis	that	explains	deficit	bias	is	based	on	the	actual	mechanisms	for	forming	the	
government	budget.	Politicians’	and	society’s	imperfect	understanding	of	optimal	policies	or	
of	strategic	interaction	during	the	political	process	can	be	potential	sources	of	inefficient	fis-
cal	policies	that	lead	to	an	undesirably	high	deficit.	Overviews	of	studies	in	this	area	are	given	
in	Drazen	(2000)	and	Persson	and	Tabellini	(2000).	The	analysis	presented	in	this	chapter	is	
devoted	to	a	different	problem.	Considering	the	deficit	bias	problem	to	be	a	given,	the	fol-
lowing	questions	arise:	Can	the	inflation	bias	problem	be	avoided	if	the	deficit	bias	problem	
is	present?	Can	chronic	inflation	be	brought	under	control	only	by	following	tight	monetary	
policies	that	are	formally	independent	of	fiscal	needs?	How	can	stabilizing	monetary	policies	
be	developed?	What	measures	should	be	taken	first,	and	which	measures	might	turn	out	to	be	
premature	and	result	only	in	a	waste	or	resources?
The	stabilization	of	the	economies	in	Latin	America,	Israel	and	of	the	transitional	eco-
nomies	in	Eastern	Europe	—	economies	with	high	inflation	—	over	the	last	decades	shows	
that	it	is	important	to	not	only	adopt	the	appropriate	measures,	but	to	do	so	in	the	correct	or-
der.	Even	though	it	goes	without	saying	that	the	dynamics	of	each	of	these	economies	had	its	
distinctive	features,	it	is	still	possible	to	discuss	the	rules	for	conducting	monetary	and	fiscal	
stabilization	policies	that	have	been	worked	out	in	practice;	these	rules	concern	the	type,	se-
quence	and	timing	of	policies.	One	of	the	main	conclusions	that	we	come	to	after	the	analysis	
1	 This	does	not	mean	that	any	episode	of	undesirably	high	inflation	in	a	developing	country	can	be	ex-
plained	by	seigniorage,	though	the	latter	is	indeed	a	typical	reason.	The	statistics	are	that	while	seigniorage	to	
output	ratio	is	very	low	in	developed	countries	(less	than	1%),	it	is	rather	high	in	developing	countries	(see,	for	
example,	Agenor	(2000,	ch.	3)).	One	of	the	most	common	reasons	for	inflation	bias	in	developed	countries	is	
the	dynamic	inconsistency	of	low-inflationary	policies	(Romer,	2001,	ch.	10).	On	the	other	hand,	one	of	the	
most	plausible	explanations	for	the	fact	that	a	significant	part	of	the	budget	deficit	is	financed	by	seigniorage	
in	developing	countries	is	that	the	internal	financial	market	is	underdeveloped	and	that	access	to	international	
financial	markets	is	limited.
2	 Fischer,	Sahay	and	Vegh	(2002,	p.	855)	note	that:	“…no	obvious	long-	or	short-run	relationship	be-
tween	inflation	and	fiscal	balance	is	found	for	the	low	inflation	countries	or	during	the	low	inflation	episodes	
in	the	high	inflation	countries.	The	relationship,	however,	is	quite	strong	in	the	high-inflation	during	the	high	
inflation	episodes”.	See	also	the	empirical	study	of	this	problem	in	Catao	and	Terrones	(2001).
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of	historical	cases	when	inflation	was	stabilized	is	that	of	the	impossibility	of	stopping	high	
inflation	even	in	the	middle	run	by	using	only	monetary	policies	that	were	not	first	supported	
by	stabilization	in	the	fiscal	sphere.	Coordinated	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	are	needed	for	
stabilization	of	the	economy.		
The	analyses	given	in	this	chapter	and	in	the	next	have	a	common	goal.	By	considering	
various	ways	in	which	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	interact,	we	wish	to	determine	the	general	
principles	 for	developing	policies	 that	would	stabilize	 the	 fiscal	and	monetary	spheres.	We	
also	wish	to	explain	the	nature	of	the	mistakes	we	observe	in	stabilization	programs.	Follow-
ing	the	logic	suggested	in	Section	2.2,	we	will	first	analyze	the	policies	that	can	be	used	to	
move	the	fiscal	sphere	and	monetary	market	from	one	steady	state	to	another.	Afterwards,	in	
Chapter	5,	we	will	provide	a	general	analysis	of	a	macroeconomic	policy	that	is	inherently	
sustainable.	From	a	technical	point	of	view,	the	analysis	in	this	chapter	is	based	on	a	back-
ward-looking	dynamics.	The	 fifth	 chapter	 considers	 the	 forward-looking	dynamics	 of	 the	
economy.	
This	chapter	has	the	following	structure.	In	the	second	section	we	return	to	the	general	
model	 for	the	dynamics	of	 the	public	debt	and	real	money	balances	given	in	Chapter	2.	An	
analysis	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	will	be	given	on	the	basis	of	this	
model.	We	additionally	consider	the	dynamic	stability	of	the	public	debt	to	output	ratio,	and	the	
ratio	of	real	money	balances	to	output.	If	the	interest	rate	on	public	debt	is	less	than	the	growth	
rate	of	output,	then	the	steady	state	of	the	economy	becomes	stable.	It	is	shown	that	this	impos-
es	several	constraints	on	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	If	the	interest	rate	
on	public	debt	is	higher	than	the	growth	rate	of	output,	then	the	characteristics	of	the	dynamics	
of	public	debt	and	real	money	balances	do	not	qualitatively	differ	from	the	characteristics	of	the	
dynamics	of	the	shares	of	the	corresponding	variables	in	the	output.	
Section	4.3	considers	the	possibility	of	lowering	the	inflation	rate	by	using	only	mone-
tary	policies.	It	is	shown	that	tight	monetary	policies	may	not	be	able	to	bring	the	economy	
back	into	equilibrium;	indeed,	it	may	even	bring	about	an	increase	in	inflation	rather	than	a	
decrease.	On	the	other	hand,	the	analysis	given	in	Section	4.4	shows	that	fiscal	policies	are	
able	to	independently	improve	the	situation	in	the	fiscal	sphere,	decreasing	the	size	of	public	
debt	and	thus	making	it	possible	to	increase	spending	(or	to	lower	taxes).	This	must	be	done	
at	the	expense	of	decreasing	the	budget	deficit	(or	of	increasing	the	budget	surplus),	while	the	
state	of	the	money	market	will	not	change.	In	Section	4.5	we	show	that	monetary	policies	
aimed	at	decreasing	the	steady	level	of	inflation	need	to	be	supported	by	the	government	in	
the	form	of	a	decrease	in	the	budget	deficit	that	will	help	to	decrease	seigniorage.	Sections	
4.6	and	4.7	provide	historical	examples	of	loose	monetary	policy	and	tight	fiscal	policy	that	
decrease	inflation.	We	review	and	interpret	macroeconomic	policies	in	Russia	in	2000—2003	
and	in	United	States	in	mid-1980s.	Section	4.8	studies	the	situation,	where	changes	in	the	
fiscal	sphere	require	coordinated	changes	in	monetary	policies.	
We	turn	to	the	classical	work	of	Sargent	and	Wallace	in	Section	4.9.	The	model	we	con-
sider	 also	 shows	“unpleasant	monetarist	 arithmetic”.	Moreover,	 a	 tightening	of	monetary	
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policy	is	not	only	unable	to	decrease	inflation,	but	also	requires	a	tightening	of	fiscal	policy	to	
stabilize	the	economy.	Section	4.10	considers	further	feasible	constraints	on	the	interaction	
of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	In	reality,	a	situation	in	the	economy	could	arise	in	which	
even	coordinated	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	will	not	be	able	to	avoid	a	debt	crisis	and	hy-
perinflation.	Macroeconomic	policies	should	be	determined	keeping	 this	 in	mind	and	the	
situation	should	never	be	allowed	to	approach	this	dangerous	point.	
We	draw	final	conclusions	in	Section	4.11.	The	examples	of	interaction	between	fis-
cal	and	monetary	policies	 that	were	considered	earlier	can	be	used	 to	give	one	possible	
explanation	for	the	nature	of	the	mistakes	in	macroeconomic	policy	in	Russia	that	made	
the	1998	crisis	inevitable.	Other	considerations,	however,	underline	the	future	advantages	
that	current	policies	make	possible.	The	Appendix	to	this	chapter	contains	further	mate-
rial	of	a	technical	nature,	which	deals	with	the	analysis	of	the	dynamics	of	an	economical	
system.	
4.2. Stability of the backward-looking dynamics  
and macroeconomic policies 
Let	us	 return	 to	 the	basic	model	 for	 the	dynamics	of	public	debt	and	 real	money	ba-
lances:
	
&b = d + rb−µm,
&m = µ − π m( )( )m.
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
	 (4.1)
As	was	shown	in	the	previous	chapter,	if	we	linearize	(4.1)	in	a	neighborhood	of	the	equilib-
rium	point	(b*,	m*),	then	the	system	
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⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
b − b∗
m−m∗
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ 	 (4.2)
will	have	an	unstable	steady	state	(an	unstable	node3).	The	eigenvalues	of	the	corresponding
Jacobi	matrix	are	λ1	=	r	and	 λ2 = −
µ
ε∗
.	Taking	into	account	that	the	second	equation	in	the
system	does	not	explicitly	contain	b,	it	is	not	difficult	to	describe	the	dynamics	of	real	money	
balances	and	public	debt4:
3	 It	should	be	pointed	out	that	it	is	theoretically	possible	that	µ	=	–rε*,	and	the	two	roots	will	be	equal.	
The	system	will	then	bifurcate,	and	an	equilibrium	of	a	node	type	will	become	a	diacritical	node.	Assuming	that	
the	demand	function	for	money	is	concave	to	inflation	expectations	(π″(m)	>	0),	either	the	bifurcation	point	
will	be	unique	(if	it	exists),	or,	for	a	Cagan	function	with	constant	semi-elasticity	(ε	=	απ),	any	equilibrium	
will	be	a	diacritical	node	if	αr	=	1.	However,	this	bifurcation	does	not	seem	to	be	of	interest	itself,	and	we	will	
not	consider	this	case.	
4	 Equations	(4.3)—(4.4)	were	found	from	the	linearized	system	(4.2).	The	dynamics	of	real	money	ba-
lance	and	public	debt	 far	 from	equilibrium	may	be	 somewhat	different.	However,	as	we	pointed	out	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	the	presence	of	the	limiting	cycle	for	the	system	is	unlikely.	
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	 m(t) = m∗ + (m
0
−m∗)e
− µ
ε∗
t
, 	 (4.3)
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∗
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(m
0
−m∗)e
− µ
ε∗
t
.	 (4.4)
As	was	pointed	out	above,	the	very	fact	that	the	system	(4.1)	is	dynamically	unstable	cre-
ates	certain	difficulties	and	demands	further	elucidation	of	the	character	of	macroeconomic	
policies.	Practically	 the	entire	analysis	 in	Chapter	3	was	conducted	under	 the	assumption	
that	monetary	policies	were	dependent	—	we	considered	the	dynamics	of	the	money	mar-
ket	and	forced	changes	in	the	rate	of	increase	of	the	money	base	for	exogenous	fiscal	policy	
parameters	d	and	b	for	both	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	model	and	the	following	study	of	
the	bifurcation	of	the	system.	It	was	possible	to	avoid	the	problem	of	instability	of	the	sys-
tem	(4.1)	mostly	because	of	the	fact	that	in	most	cases	stable	or	unstable	equilibria	on	the	
money	market	exist	for	these	parameters	of	fiscal	policy.
It	is,	however,	quite	obvious	that	the	assumption	that	monetary	policies	are	dependent	is	
possible,	but	hardly	universal.	This	means	that	we	need	to	consider	the	problem	of	instability	
of	(4.1)	for	a	more	general	case.	As	we	have	pointed	out	above,	the	second	equation	of	system	
(4.1),	which	describes	 the	dynamics	of	 the	money	market,	 does	not	 explicitly	 depend	on	
the	fiscal	variables.	However,	as	we	discussed	in	Section	2.2,	the	first	equation	in	the	system	
should	be	considered	to	be	a	joint	constraint	on	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	This	brings	us	
to	two	important	conclusions.	First	of	all,	the	money	market	can	be	stabilized	by	using	mo-
netary	policies	alone.	However,	this	(formal)	conclusion	is	tempered	by	the	fact	that	stabili-
zation	of	the	money	market	itself,	given	the	unstable	dynamics	of	the	fiscal	sphere,	cannot	be	
considered	to	be	a	satisfactory	result	of	macroeconomic	policies.	Secondly,	the	interaction	of	
fiscal	and	monetary	policies	are	determined	by	the	first	equation	of	(4.1)	(the	equation	for	the	
dynamics	of	public	debt	and,	at	the	same	time,	the	budget	constraint	for	the	public	sector).	
For	this	reason	possible	suggestions	for	dealing	with	the	instability	of	(4.1)	should	be	qualita-
tively	the	same	as	the	possible	solutions	to	eradicating	the	instability	of	the	backward	looking	
dynamics	of	public	debt	discussed	in	Section	2.2,	i.e.	one	should	consider	the	dynamics	of	
the	debt	to	output	ratio,	develop	a	macroeconomic	policy	that	would	keep	the	fiscal	sphere	
and	money	market	in	a	steady	state,	and	finally	develop	a	sustainable	macroeconomic	policy.	
Analysis	of	a	sustainable	macroeconomic	policy	is	considered	in	Chapter	5.	In	this	chapter,	
before	moving	 to	 the	analysis	of	 fiscal	 and	monetary	policies	 that	would	keep	m and	b at	
a	steady	state,	we	will	investigate	how	considering	the	variables	as	fraction	of	output	changes	
the	qualitative	properties	of	the	system.
Using	the	results	of	Section	2.2	(the	transition	to	[2.4]	from	[2.1])	and	considering	the	
dynamics	of	real	money	balances	as	a	fraction	of	output	instead	of	(2.11),	system	(4.1)	can	
be	rewritten	as	
	
&b
y
= r − g
y( )by + dy −µmy,
&m
y
= µ− g
y
−π m
y( )( )my,
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
	 (4.5)
77
where,	as	 in	Section	2.2,	my	=	m/y.	Linearization	of	this	system	in	a	neighborhood	of	the	
steady	state	( b
y
*,m
y
* )	gives	an	interesting,	albeit	predictable	result.	
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The	stability	of	the	steady	state	now	depends	on	the	sign	of	the	first	eigenvalue	of	the	Jacobi	
matrix,	λ1	=	r	—	g,	which	can	be	either	positive	or	negative.	The	second	eigenvector	is	posi-
tive,	as	before:	 λ
2
= − ′π (m
y
* )m
y
*
> 0 .
If	the	growth	rate	of	output	is	higher	than	the	interest	rate,	i.e.	λ1	=	r	–	gy	<	0,	the	equi-
librium	point	 ( b
y
*,m
y
* )	will	be	a	 saddle-point.	The	set	of	 steady	 states	BB	 and	MM	 can	be	
described	by	the	equations:
	
&b
y
= 0, b
y
=
µm
y
− d
y
r − g
y
, 	 (4.7)
	 &my = 0, π my
*( ) = µ − gy .	 (4.8)
Unlike	the	curve	described	by	equation	(4.10),	here	the	set	of	steady	states	of	by,	the	curve	BB	
in	Fig.	4.1,	has	a	negative	slope.	As	for	system	(4.1),	the	dynamics	equation	for	my	(the	se-
cond	equation	in	[4.5])	does	not	depend	on	by	and	the	current	fiscal	policy.	It	is	not	difficult	
to	show	that	in	this	case	the	saddle	path	coincides	with	the	set	of	steady	states	of	the	second	
equation,	the	curve	MM.	The	latter	is	horizontal,	as	before.	
Fig. 4.1. Phase diagram for by and by if r < gy
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B
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If	the	central	bank	sets	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	to	be	equal	to	the	sum	of	the	inflation	
rate	and	the	growth	rate	of	output	in	accordance	with	the	initial	level	my(0):	µ	=	gy	+	π(my(0))	
(in	other	words	if	the	economy	is	initially	in	the	steady	state	of	the	money	market),	then	the	
system	will	follow	the	saddle	trajectory	to	equilibrium.	The	government	can	allow	the	volume	
of	real	debt	to	grow,	as	the	ratio	of	debt	to	output	will	approach	the	equilibrium	level.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	central	bank	may	choose	an	arbitrary	growth	rate	of	base	money	and,	by	
conducting	the	appropriate	open	market	operations,	it	can	put	the	economy	on	the	saddle	
path	(or	directly	into	equilibrium).
The	set	of	steady	states	for	the	system	(4.5)	for	various	values	of	µ	can	be	described	by	
the	equation
	 by my( ) =
π m
y( )my − dy
r − g
y
. 	 (4.9)
In	this	case	the	curve	SS	(shown	in	Fig.	4.2)	has	a	different	shape	than	in	Fig.	3.5	in	Chap-
ter	3,	and	we	see	a	limit	below	which	there	are	no	equilibrium	values	for	the	growth	rate	of	
base	money	that	would	be	compatible	with	the	size	of	real	public	debt.	However,	this	fact	is	
not	so	important,	as	the	central	bank	can,	by	adopting	the	correct	policy,	induce	the	economy	
to	reach	equilibrium	from	any	point	on	the	plane.	For	an	economy	with	high	inflation	that	
can	be	described	by	system	(4.5)	—	as	far	as	our	model	is	applicable	considering	our	assump-
tions	—	a	larger	size	of	real	public	debt	should	be	associated	with	higher	values	of	the	growth	
rate	of	base	money.	This	is	shown	by	the	lower	branch	of	the	SS	curve	in	Fig.	4.2.	In	contrast,	
Fig. 4.2. Set of steady states of by and my for various values of µ if r < gy
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if	there	is	low	inflation,	then	higher	growth	rates	of	base	money	correspond	to	lower	steady	
volumes	of	public	debt.	The	connection	between	the	steady	volume	of	public	debt	(as	a	share	
of	output)	and	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	in	the	terms	of	this	model	is	shown	in	Fig.	4.3.
These	results	support	the	main	ideas	of	Section	2.2.	Indeed,	if	the	interest	rate	is	less	than	
the	growth	rate	of	output,	then	the	problem	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	
policies	disappears	in	the	framework	of	this	paper	(i.e.	in	the	form	of	a	joint	budget	constraint	
given	by	[2.1]).	The	fiscal	sphere	is	able	to	independently	achieve	stable	equilibrium	given	any	
initial	size	of	public	debt.	The	problem	standing	before	monetary	policy	is	in	this	case	is	very	
much	simplified	—	its	only	goal	is	to	keep	the	money	market	stable.	And	even	if	we	consider	
the	hypothetical	goal	of	coordinating	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	in	order	to	achieve	some	
predetermined	equilibrium,	then,	given	the	analysis	given	above,	attaining	this	goal	is	trivial.
Fig. 4.3. The connection between by and µ in the steady state of the economy if r < gy
yb
µ
If	 the	interest	rate	 is	higher	than	the	growth	rate	of	output,	 then	the	system	(4.5)	will	
qualitatively	have	the	same	properties	as	system	(4.1).	It	is	then	evident	that	there	is	no	prin-
ciple	difference	between	analyzing	the	systems	(4.1)	and	(4.5).	We	will	then	consider	system	
(4.1)	in	order	to	keep	notation	simple.	
We	will	now	turn	to	the	problems	that	are	directly	connected	with	the	interaction	(co-
ordination)	of	policies	in	a	situation	where	the	dynamics	of	real	money	balances	and	public	
debt	are	unstable.	In	other	words,	in	analyzing	system	(4.1),	we	will	consider	a	macroeco-
nomic	policy	that	keeps	the	fiscal	sphere	and	money	market	 in	a	steady	state,	and	further	
consider	the	consequences	of	not	keeping	to	this	policy.	We	will	consider	several	cases	that	
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describe	the	potential	of	conducting	unilateral	or	coordinated	monetary	or	fiscal	policies,	as	
well	as	the	constraints	that	macroeconomic	policies	must	satisfy.
4.3. Unilateral monetary policy
In	a	steady	state,	the	rate	of	inflation	is	equal	to	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	However,	
as	shown	in	Section	2.3,	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	in	a	money	market	with	
backward	 looking	dynamics	will	 destabilize	 the	 system	and	bring	 about	 the	 emergence	of	
a	bubble	and	an	(unstable)	increase	in	inflation.	An	increase	in	inflation	will	in	its	turn	af-
fect	the	volume	of	seigniorage	and,	consequently,	bring	about	changes	in	the	fiscal	sphere.	
Depending	on	the	initial	position	of	the	system	on	the	inflation	tax	curve,	the	volume	of	in-
flation	tax	may	at	first	either	increase	or	decrease.	However,	after	achieving	the	maximum	of	
the	inflation	tax	curve	the	volume	of	inflation	tax	(and	seigniorage)	will	begin	to	fall5.	In	such	
a	situation	the	government	will	be	forced	to	borrow	more	funds,	and	the	volume	of	public	
debt	will	increase.
Various	possible	scenarios	of	how	events	will	unfold	for	the	economy	are	shown	in	Fig.	4.4,	
depending	on	whether	the	economy	was	initially	on	the	“right”	or	“wrong”	side	of	the	infla-
tion	tax	Laffer	curve	(the	upper	and	lower	branches	of	the	SS locus).	Initially,	the	system	is	
in	steady	state	E0,	determined	by	the	intersection	of	the	curves	MM0	and	BB0
.	A	decrease	in	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money	shifts	the	equilibrium	to	point	E1,	which	is	determined	by	the	
intersection	of	MM1	and	BB1.	The	ensuing	dynamics	of	the	system	depend	on	the	branch	of	
the	SS	curve	and	the	relative	sizes	of	the	parameters	of	the	model:	changes	in	the	real	money	
balances	and	public	debt	may	be	either	to	the	left	or	to	the	right	of	the	SS	curve	(proof	of	this	
fact	for	small	changes	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	is	given	in	the	Appendix	to	the	chap-
ter7).	Fig.	4.4	gives	the	possible	trajectories	E0E2, E0A, E0C, E0D.
For	an	economy	that	was	initially	functioning	at	a	low	rate	of	inflation	(the	upper	branch	
of	the	SS curve),	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	stationary	money	base	will	certainly	eventu-
ally	bring	about	a	decrease	in	the	volume	of	real	money	balances,	an	increase	in	public	debt	
and	in	the	rate	of	inflation	—	the	system	will	come	to	the	region	to	the	bottom	and	to	the	
right	of	the	intersection	of	MM1	and	BB1,	from	which	it	cannot	escape.	If	the	vector	of	incre-
ments	of	the	variables	is	left	of	the	SS curve,	then	the	system	will	sooner	or	later	(depending	
on	whether	inflation	is	low	or	high)	re-cross	the	SS curve	(trajectory	E0E2	in	Fig.	4.4).	If	the	
system	begins	its	movement	in	the	region	to	the	right	of	the	SS	curve,	it	may	in	principle	never	
again	re-cross	it	(trajectory	E0A  in	Fig.	4.4).
5	 It	should	be	pointed	out	that,	as	the	system	is	not	in	equilibrium,	the	volumes	of	seigniorage	and	infla-
tion	tax	are	different.	In	the	case	we	are	considering	the	pure	inflation	tax	is	 &m < 0 .	Therefore,	the	directions	
of	change	of	seigniorage	and	inflationary	tax	may	be	different.	
6	 Note,	that	it	does	not	mean	that	economy	jumps	to	point	E1.	It	keeps	staying	in	point	E0,	that	is	now	out	
of	steady	state.	New	vector	field	corresponds	to	the	new	steady	state	E1.	Analysis	in	all	theoretical	experiments	
in	this	chapter	follows	exactly	the	same	logic.
7	 The	system	is	nonlinear	and	cannot	be	investigated	analytically	far	from	a	steady	state.	The	scenarios	we	
consider	seem	to	be	plausible	to	us,	but	require	additional	numerical	analysis.	
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An	economy	that	is	initially	functioning	at	a	high	rate	of	inflation	may	face	either	a	de-
crease	(trajectories	E0E2 and	E0С 	in	Fig.	4.4),	or	an	increase	in	the	volume	of	public	debt	(tra-
jectory	E0D 	in	Fig.	4.4)	with	a	decrease	in	the	real	money	balances	and	an	increase	in	the	rate	
of	inflation8.	This	behavior	will	be	determined	by	the	initial	state	of	the	system	with	respect	to	
the	intersection	of	the	curves	MM1	and	BB1.	Indeed,	the	lower	left	region,	which	corresponds	
to	a	decrease	in	the	debt	volume,	does	not	preclude	the	system	from	moving	to	the	right	region,	
where	the	debt	will	increase9	(trajectory	E0С in	Fig.	4.4).	As	in	the	first	case,	the	trajectory	E0E2	
allows	the	system	to	return	to	the	SS	curve,	while	trajectories	E0С and E0D	do	not.	
The	conclusion	is	that	tight	monetary	policies	which	destabilize	the	economy	may	not	
be	able	to	independently	(without	making	changes	in	the	fiscal	sphere)	return	the	system	to	
any	steady	state.	(trajectories	E0А, E0С and E0D	on	Fig.	4.4).	This	kind	of	tight	money	policy	
will	bring	about	an	undesirable	increase	in	inflation	and,	most	likely,	an	increase	in	public	
debt	as	well.	The	central	bank	can	in	principle	return	the	system	to	equilibrium	for	trajectory	
E0E2,	at	the	price	of	increasing	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	and	with	it	the	steady	level	of	
inflation10.
8	 This	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	SS	curve	is	concave	with	respect	to	the	vertical	axis,	and	that	
the	curve	BB1	has	a	larger	slope	than	the	curve	BB0.
9	 Hyperinflation	with	an	infinitely	decreasing	volume	of	public	debt	is	theoretically	possible,	but	hardly	
likely.	The	reason	is	that	hyperinflation	requires	the	government	to	have	a	public	debt	that	is	close	to	zero	or	
negative	in	the	initially	high	or	hyperinflationary	state.	
10	 Analogously,	the	central	bank	can	bring	the	system	to	a	state	where	 &m > 0, &b < 0	for	the	trajectories	E0А,	
E0С	and	E0D.	However,	the	shape	of	the	SS	curve	and	the	relative	magnitudes	of	the	model’s	parameters	do	not	
always	guarantee	a	return	to	one	of	the	steady	states.	We	will	return	to	this	problem	later.
Fig. 4.4. The consequences of unilateral monetary policy actions  
(decrease in the growth rate of base money)
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4.4. Unilateral fiscal policy
Unlike	monetary	policy,	fiscal	policy	is	always	able	to	shift	the	economy	from	one	steady	
state	to	another.	This	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	monetary	policy	in	this	model	is	for-
mally	independent	of	the	government’s	needs,	and	changes	in	the	fiscal	sphere	do	not	have	
any	direct	influence	on	the	money	market.	In	its	turn,	this	means	that	fiscal	policy	by	itself	
cannot	shift	 the	system	from	one	point	on	the	SS	curve	to	another.	A	change	in	the	fiscal	
policy	parameter	d,	the	initial	budget	deficit,	will	bring	about	a	parallel	shift	of	the	BB	and	SS	
curves,	and	the	economy	will	move	along	the	MM curve.	
Let’s	consider	the	following	example.	Imagine	the	government	wishes	to	have	a	higher	
level	of	government	expenditures	(i.e.	a	greater	initial	budget	deficit	or	smaller	initial	budget	
surplus)	given	a	certain	level	of	tax	(common	and	inflationary)	revenue,	and	to	keep	this	new	
expenditure	compatible	with	a	steady	public	debt	volume.	The	only	way	for	the	government	
to	achieve	this	goal	independently,	even	in	the	future,	is	to	lower	the	budget	deficit	(or	in-
crease	the	budget	surplus).	This	kind	of	fiscal	policy	will	allow	the	volume	of	public	debt	to	
decrease	with	time,	and	with	it	the	size	of	the	resources	needed	to	service	it	will	also	diminish.	
This	will	let	the	government	increase	its	expenditures.	
This	 scenario	 is	 illustrated	 in	Fig.	 4.5.	The	 economy	 is	 initially	 in	 steady	 state	E0	 on	
the	SS0	curve.	The	initial	decrease	of	the	primary	budget	deficit	will	shift	the	equilibrium	to	
point	E1	on	the	SS1	curve.	The	money	market	will	remain	in	its	steady	state	described	by	the	
MM	curve.		The	volume	of	public	debt	will	begin	to	decrease	(trajectory	E0E2 on	Fig.	4.5),	and	
after	achieving	a	certain	level	the	government	will	be	able	to	move	the	economy	to	a	steady	
state	on	the	curve	SS2	after	increasing	the	primary	budget	deficit	level.	It	is	important	to	un-
derstand	the	essence	of	this	change.	In	reality,	this	fiscal	policy	does	not	change	the	volume	of	
the	operational	budget	deficit,	which	remains	equal	to	the	volume	of	inflation	tax	in	equilib-
rium.	The	reason	is	that	the	steady	state	of	the	money	market	does	not	undergo	any	changes,	
and	in	the	final	analysis	the	public	debt	remains	fixed	at	a	new	steady	level.	The	government	
simply	changes	the	structure	of	the	budget	expenditures;	by	decreasing	the	servicing	of	the	
debt,	it	can	increase	the	primary	budget	deficit.	Decreasing	the	public	debt	increases	the	pos-
sibilities	of	the	government	in	the	future.11
The	choice	of	the	size	of	the	initial	decrease	of	the	deficit	is	determined	by	simple	con-
siderations.	On	one	hand,	the	greater	the	decrease	of	the	deficit,	the	faster	the	public	debt	
will	decrease	and	the	sooner	the	government	will	be	able	to	allow	itself	a	higher	budget	deficit.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	initial	decrease	in	the	budget	deficit	may	be	extremely	painful	for	the	
government	both	from	a	political	and	an	economic	point	of	view.	Therefore,	the	government	
11	 The	opposite	is	true	as	well:	an	accumulation	of	public	debt	narrows	the	alternatives	available	to	fiscal	
policies	in	the	future.	This	is	the	consideration	that	is	the	base	for	the	model	of	strategic	debt	accumulation	
in	political	economy,	where	a	politician	in	power	at	a	certain	time	can	influence	the	actions	of	the	politician	
that	will	replace	him	simply	by	leaving	behind	a	large	public	debt.	See	the	fundamental	works	by	Persson	and	
Svensson	(1989),	Tabellini	and	Alesina	(1990),	and	also	Romer	(2001,	ch.	11),	Drazen	(2000)	and	Persson	and	
Tabellini	(2000).
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faces	a	problem	of	optimal	choice	between	the	size	of	the	debt	today	and	the	time	that	it	will	
have	to	wait	until	it	will	have	a	higher	deficit,	compatible	with	the	steady	debt,	in	the	future.	
This	is	the	same	as,	given	certain	assumptions,	the	government	choosing	a	high	budget	deficit	
now	or	in	the	future12.
4.5. Anti-inflationary monetary policies that requires  
a decrease in the budget deficit
It	was	shown	above	 that	monetary	policy	 that	destabilizes	 the	economy	under	certain	
conditions	 is	not	able	 to	 independently	 return	 the	money	market	and	 fiscal	 sphere	 to	any	
steady	state.	We	will	consider	a	possible	scenario,	in	which	anti-inflationary	policies	of	the	
central	bank	require	additional	actions	of	a	fiscal	nature.	
Suppose	the	economy	is	initially	in	equilibrium	E0	on	the	upper	branch	of	the	curve	SS0.	
The	final	goal	of	the	central	bank	is	to	decrease	steady	inflation	from	the	level	of	the	curve	MM0	
to	the	level	of	the	curve	MM2.	Fig.	4.6	shows	one	of	the	possible	ways	to	coordinate	fiscal	and	
12	 We	do	not	consider	this	problem	of	dynamic	optimization.	It	is	qualitatively	close	to	the	problem	of	
optimization	for	a	representative	agent.	The	difference	is	only	in	that	the	representative	agent,	who	maximizes	
his	consumption	utility,	must	save	more	(i.e.	increase	his	assets)	in	order	to	have	the	possibility	of	consuming	
more	in	the	future,	while	the	government	must	decrease	its	debt	(i.e.	liabilities)	in	order	to	allow	itself	a	higher	
level	of	primary	deficit	(government	expenditures)	in	the	future.	Or,	as	it	is	more	often	presented	in	macroeco-
nomics,	the	government’s	goal	may	be	to	decrease	taxes,	which	is	what	management	of	the	public	debt	is	used	
for.	See	Barro	(1979,	1995).
Fig. 4.5. The consequences of unilateral fiscal policy actions (a decrease in the steady volume  
of public debt and an increase in the primary budget deficit level)
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monetary	policies13.	The	 initial	 increase	 in	 the	 rate	of	 increase	of	 the	money	base	 shifts	 the	
equilibrium	to	point	E1 (while	economy	keeps	staying	in	point	E0)	and	brings	about	an	increase	
of	the	real	money	balances	and	a	decrease	in	the	size	of	public	debt:	 &m > 0, &b < 0 	(trajectory	E0E2	
in	Fig.	4.614).	Coordination	of	policies	in	the	simplest	case	may	result	in	the	system	coming	to	
point	E2,	which	corresponds	to	the	target	value	of	steady	inflation.	In	doing	so	the	central	bank	
decreases	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	and	the	government	is	forced	to	decrease	the	volume	
of	primary	budget	deficit15	—	and	the	economy	is	on	the	new	curve	SS1.	The	necessity	of	de-
creasing	the	primary	deficit	after	decreasing	the	servicing	of	the	debt	is	explained	here	by	the	
decrease	in	the	volume	of	inflation	tax	on	the	“correct”	branch	of	the	inflation	tax	curve.	
4.6. Loose monetary policy and fiscal surpluses  
in Russia after the crisis, 2000—2003
A	year	after	 the	August	1998	crisis,	Russian	macroeconomic	policy	was	rethought.	As	
shown	in	Section	3.7,	the	period	before	the	crisis	was	characterized	by	a	tight	monetary	po-
licy	and	 large	 fiscal	deficits.	 In	1996	 the	growth	rate	of	money	was	equal	 to	37.6	percent,	
while	in	1997	it	was	reduced	to	25.8	percent.	For	the	first	seven	months	of	1998,	the	growth	
13	 We	again	do	not	consider	the	optimality	of	the	chosen	scheme;	we	simply	give	it	as	one	possible	ap-
proach.
14	 If	the	trajectory	E0E2	was	left	of	the	curve	SS0,	then	the	central	bank	would	be	able	to	independently	
decrease	inflation	without	the	help	of	the	government.
15	 Otherwise,	a	unilateral	monetary	policy	would	result	in	an	increase	in	public	debt.	
Fig. 4.6. An anti-inflationary monetary policy that requires a decrease in the budget deficit
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rate	of	money	even	became	negative	and	was	equal	to	–3.2	percent.	At	the	same	time,	the	
government	had	been	running	operational	deficits	from	the	beginning	of	economic	reforms	
in	1992.	In	1996	and	1997	the	operational	deficit	was	equal	to	8.4	and	7.0	percent	of	GDP	
respectively.
The	policy	turnover	can	be	seen	starting	from	2000.	Table	4.1	reports	the	data	on	the	fe-
deral	government’s	operational	budget	balance,	which	became	positive	in	2000.	At	the	same	
time,	just	after	the	crisis,	monetary	policy	became	largely	loose.	In	1999	the	annual	growth	
rate	of	money	was	equal	to	57.5	percent,	and	in	2000	it	was	61.5.	Later	on,	it	was	decreased,	
but	it	nevertheless	remained	higher	than	in	the	pre-crisis	period	(39.7,	32.4,	and	50.5	percent	
in	2001,	2002,	and	2003	respectively).	Despite	this	obviously	loose	monetary	policy,	the	in-
flation	rate	decreased	drastically	in	the	second	half	of	1999	from	very	high	to	quite	moderate	
values.	Moreover,	it	continued	to	slowly	decrease	thereafter.	Figure	4.7	illustrates	this	fact.
Table 4.1. Federal government operational budget surplus (percent of GDP), 2000—2003
3 months 6 months 9 months year
1997 –4.3 –4.3 –3.8 –3.3
1998 –3.5 –3.9 –3.0 –3.2
1999 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 –1.5
2000 2.1 3.3 3.0 2.5
2001 2.6 3.3 2.7 2.9
2002 5.0 6.3 2.4 1.4
2003 3.1 5.9 6.5 1.7
                                    Source:	HSE	Economic	Journal,	Statistics	(various	issues).
In	the	fiscal	sphere,	the	turnover	in	fiscal	balance	led	to	a	rapid	decrease	in	the	value	of	
public	debt.	Figures	4.8	and	4.9	illustrate	this	point.	After	the	default,	internal	government	
debt	 (in	 form	of	 the	market	 instruments	GKO	and	OFZ)	was	quite	 low	and	more	or	 less	
stable.	At	the	same	time,	large	fiscal	surpluses	allowed	the	government	to	significantly	reduce	
its	external	debt.
This	historical	 example	 supports	 the	 theory	given	 in	Section	4.5.16	An	 initial	 increase	
in	the	growth	rate	of	money	followed	by	a	decrease	in	the	budget	deficit	(or	an	increase	in	
the	budget	surplus)	produces	transitory	dynamics	along	the	line	E0E2	in	Fig.	4.6.	In	the	new	
equilibrium	E2	the	inflation	rate	and	the	public	debt	both	are	at	lower	levels	in	comparison	
with	the	initial	state	E0.
16	 In	addition,	the	interest	rate	was	higher	than	the	growth	rate	of	GDP	in	the	period	after	the	1998	crisis	
despite	the	positive	and	rather	high	growth	rates	of	Russian	GDP.
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Source:	CBR.
Fig. 4.8. Internal debt in market instruments (GKO-OFZ) in Russia, 2000—2003
Source:	CBR;	HSE	Economic	Journal,	Statistics	(various	issues).
Fig. 4.7. Growth rate of money and inflation rate in Russia, 1999—2003
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Limitations
Several	considerations	weaken	the	 illustrative	validity	of	 this	historical	example.	First.	
Why	 should	 this	 period	be	 considered?	 In	 fact,	 fiscal	 surpluses	were	positive	not	only	 for	
the	period	of	2000—2003,	but	 in	subsequent	years	as	well.	Nevertheless,	we	restricted	our	
example	 to	 this	period.	This	 is	due	 to	 the	extraordinary	events	 in	 the	 fiscal	and	monetary	
spheres	that	took	place	in	2004.	The	first	event	was	that,	starting	from	January	1,	2004	the	
Russian	Government	began	to	accumulate	the	Stabilization	Fund,	which	has	reached	more	
than	70	billion	US	dollars	by	 the	end	of	2006.	This	Fund	partly	 acts	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	
pumping	out	excess	liquidity	resulting	from	a	large	net	export	that,	in	its	turn,	stems	from	
favorable	 (for	Russia)	world	oil	prices	and	 from	the	CBR’s	 intervention	aimed	at	keeping	
a	high	US	dollar’s	exchange	rate.	This	implies	a	quite	different	mechanism	for	the	interac-
tion	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies,	in	which	the	central	bank	creates	inflation	via	foreign	
exchange	market	operations,	rather	then	via	open	market	operations	with	government	liabili-
ties.	Moreover,	quite	in	contrast,	fiscal	policy	is	engaged	in	quasi-monetary	activities	to	ste-
rilize	loose	monetary	policy.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	there	seems	to	be	no	sizeable	success	
in	further	reducing	the	inflation	rate	for	the	period	2004—2006	—	it	has	been	stuck	at	levels	
slightly	higher	than	10	percent	per	annum.	The	second	event	was	the	real	threat	of	a	banking	
crisis	in	Russia	in	July-August	of	2004.	The	panic	was	provoked	by	certain	real	facts	as	well	as	
rumors	about	a	number	of	banks	in	trouble	with	their	balance	sheets.	The	CBR	was	forced	to	
inject	liquidity	into	the	banking	sector	by	decreasing	its	discount	rate	(the	“refinancing	rate”,	
Source:	CBR;	HSE	Economic	Journal,	Statistics	(various	issues).
Fig. 4.9. External public debt and federal government budget surplus in Russia, 2000—2003
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in	Russian	terminology)	and	by	decreasing	the	required	reserves	ratio.	This	is	an	obvious	out-
lay	for	our	analysis.	And	this	is	something	that	is	not	considered	in	our	models.
Second.	 Returning	 to	 Russia	 in	 2000—2003,	 one	 should	 not	 view	 this	 period	 as	 an	
example	 of	 an	 active	 contractionary	 fiscal	 policy	 and	 a	 purposely	 pro-inflation	monetary	
policy.	In	fact,	these	were	simply	a	response	to	a	huge	positive	trade	balance	and	a	growing	
export	sector	starting	from	2001.	However,	as	we	are	not	concerned	with	the	real	sector	of	the	
economy	—	treating	taxes,	government	spending	and	money	supply	as	exogenous	with	the	
respect	to	the	other	components	of	the	economy	(but	not	to	each	other,	of	course)	—	and	we	
do	not	consider	the	structural	budget	surplus,	this	fact	is	not	important	here.
Third,	and	the	most	important.	The	fact	that	monetary	policy	in	Russia	after	2000	operated	
mostly	through	the	foreign	exchange	market	creates	obvious	difficulties	in	interpreting	this	his-
toric	episode	in	support	for	the	theory	developed	in	Section	4.5.	Throughout	our	analysis,	we	
assumed	that	new	money	is	created	as	the	central	bank	exchanges	base	money	for	government	
debt.	The	tremendous	growth	rates	of	money	after	the	1998	crisis,	reported	in	Fig.	4.7,	resulted	
from	the	exchange	of	base	money	for	foreign	currency	(mainly	the	US	dollars).	This	represents	
the	huge	international	reserves	accumulated	by	the	CBR	for	that	period:	while	it	was	approxi-
mately	$12.5	billion	at	the	beginning	of	2000,	it	increased	to	$76.9	billion	by	the	end	of	2003	
and	continued	to	rise.	Nevertheless,	while	one	should	interpret	data	on	loose	monetary	policy	
in	Russia	after	1999	only	in	view	of	its	open-economy	aspect,	we	still	believe	that	this	episode	
may	support	our	theoretical	example,	as	long	as	some	smaller	part	of	the	increase	in	base	money	
was	provided	via	open	market	operations	with	government	bonds.
4.7. Reaganomics I: A backward-looking interpretation
Macroeconomic	policy	in	the	U.S.	in	the	1980s	provides	a	prominent	historical	episode.	
In	the	absence	of	any	hint	of	currency	crisis,	it	is	much	easier	and	more	straightforward	to	
interpret	public	debt	and	inflation	dynamics	in	a	purely	fiscal-monetary	framework.	More-
over,	given	that	research	in	the	field	of	macroeconomic	policy	coordination	was	inspired	by	
the	original	paper	by	Sargent	and	Wallace,	which	was	in	its	turn	motivated	by	U.S.	policy	in	
the	beginning	of	the	1980s,	it	is	quite	natural	to	analyze	this	episode	by	means	of	the	model	
studied	in	this	chapter.
Indeed,	Paul	Volcker’s	attempt	to	decrease	the	inflation	rate	and	Reagan’s	deficits	have	
attracted	quite	a	lot	of	attention	in	the	literature.17	Figures	4.10	and	4.11	illustrate	the	mo-
netary	and	fiscal	stance	of	the	U.S.	economy	in	the	period	between	1978	and	1988.	In	Octo-
ber	1979,	soon	after	Paul	Volcker	became	chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	a	sharp	change	in	
monetary	policy	was	announced.	While	technically	it	was	a	shift	from	interest	rate	targeting	
to	monetary	base	targeting,	the	conceptually	new	policy	was	meant	to	resolve	the	inflation	
problem:	inflation	was	well	above	10	percent	per	annum	during	the	late	1970s.	Despite	the	
17	 On	the	main	insight	into	the	subject	and	reviews,	see	Feldstein	ed.	(1994).
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high	unemployment	cost	of	this	program,	despite	the	widely	held	view	that	the	policy	was	not	
credible	lasted	at	least	until	the	end	of	1980,	and	despite	the	fact	that	the	policy	was	indeed	
inconsistent	(see	the	non-successive	behavior	of	the	federal	funds	rate	and	the	monetary	base	
in	Fig.	4.10),	the	main	goal	was	achieved:	inflation	was	brought	down	to	single-digit	range	
and	remained	well	below	5	percent	annually	by	the	end	of	1982	(see	Fig.	4.10).18	At	the	same	
time,	the	period	of	Reagan’s	administration	was	characterized	by	very	high	budget	deficits	
and	a	sharp	increase	in	the	U.S.	debt	with	a	slowdown	only	in	the	late	1980s	(see	Fig.	4.11).	
The	question	that	we	are	trying	to	answer,	and	that	was	originally	raised	by	Sargent	and	
Wallace	(1981),	is	whether	this	fiscal-monetary	policy	mix	was	credible	(or	sustainable).	And	
if	the	answer	is	negative,	then	what	policy	options	are	available	to	stabilize	the	economy	after	
the	 period	 of	 tight	monetary	 policy	 and	 budget	 deficits?	As	was	 briefly	 discussed	 in	 Sec-
tion	2.4,	the	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	gives	a	negative	answer	to	the	first	question.19	
Later,	Sargent	(1985,	1986)	suggested	an	interpretation	of	the	non-credibility	of	disinflation	
in	the	face	of	ongoing	fiscal	imbalances	as	a	“game	of	chicken”	between	fiscal	and	monetary	
authorities	(which	was	originally	orally	proposed	by	Neil	Wallace).	In	order	to	stabilize	the	
18	 See	a	discussion	of	the	policy	in	Brimmer	(1983)	and	Blanchard	(1984)	for	early	critiques,	and	modern	
discussion	 in	Clarida,	Gali	and	Gertler	 (2000),	Sargent,	Williams,	and	Zha	 (2004),	Friedman	(2005),	and	
Goodfriend	and	King	(2005),	among	others.
19	 We	will	discuss	whether	this	policy	mix	is	inevitably	incredible	later	in	Chapter	5.	
Source: International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 4.10. Monetary policy and inflation in the U.S., 1979—1988
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public	debt	dynamics,	either	the	administration	or	the	Federal	Reserve	must	“chicken	out”.	
That	is,	either	the	government	needs	to	reduce	the	budget	deficit,	or	the	central	bank	needs	to	
ease	its	monetary	policy	and	provide	more	seigniorage	for	the	government’s	need.	
Sargent	notes	that	in	fact	the	Federal	Reserve	gave	in	first	in	August,	1982.	Specifically,	
it	 decided	 to	 reduce	 the	 federal	 funds	 rate	 after	 the	Mexican	crisis	 that	 posed	 a	 threat	 to	
financial	stability	inside	the	U.S.	However,	as	one	can	easily	see	from	Fig.	4.10,	despite	this	
policy	shift	and	a	substantial	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	from	late	1981	to	the	
middle	of	1983,	the	inflation	rate	continued	to	fall	until	the	middle	of	1983.	After	another,	
rather	modest	increase	in	1983,	the	inflation	rate	continued	to	decline	further.	Even	if	we	take	
into	account	some	reasonable	lags	in	the	response	of	inflation	to	monetary	policy,	it	seems	
that	inflation	was	falling	at	the	same	time	when	monetary	policy	was	loose.	To	complete	the	
description,	we	should	note	that	in	the	period	from	1982	until	1986	budget	deficits	were	notab-
ly	high.	During	this	period	the	public	debt	to	GDP	ratio	increased	by	more	than	10	percent	
points	(see	Fig.	4.11).	A	certain	stabilization	can	be	noted	to	have	taken	place	after	the	deficit	
reduction	in	1987	and	1988.
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 4.11. Budget deficit and public debt in the U.S., 1979—1988
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Here	we	propose	an	explanation	of	this	episode	in	the	framework	of	the	analysis	in	Sec-
tion	4.5.20	Consider	again	the	dynamics	of	public	debt	and	real	money	balances	following	an	
increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	as	shown	in	Fig.	4.6.	The	trajectory	E0E2	is	such	
that	both	inflation	and	public	debt	are	declining	(while	real	money	balances	are	rising).	But	
this	 is	not	the	only	possibility	 in	this	case.	Figure	4.12	demonstrates	that	after	an	increase	
in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	public	debt	may	decrease	while	inflation	decreases	(real	
money	balances	are	rising).	The	vector	field	associated	with	the	new	(temporal)	steady	state	
E1	allows	this	scenario	as	well	as	a	decrease	in	public	debt	depicted	earlier	in	Fig.	4.6.	The	
system	may	remain	fixed	in	the	new	steady	state	E2	if	the	government	cuts	its	budget	deficit	
(so	that	the	curve	SS	shifts	to	the	right	to	the	new	position	SS2).	And	indeed,	as	we	see	in	
Fig.	4.11,	that	was	the	fiscal	policy	adjustment	that	took	place	at	the	end	of	the	disinflation	
program	of	the	1980s.
4.8. The policy of increasing the primary deficit  
by temporarily increasing the volume of seigniorage
We	will	now	consider	the	case	in	which	the	government	is	forced	(perhaps	permanently)	
to	increase	the	volume	of	the	primary	budget	deficit.	If	the	central	bank	does	not	interfere,	
this	will	give	rise	to	an	unsustainable	growth	of	the	public	debt.	Can	a	change	in	monetary	
policy	bring	the	economy	to	a	steady	state	that	is	compatible	with	the	new	level	of	primary	
20	 In	Chapter	4	we	suggest	another	explanation	that	is	based	on	forward-looking	considerations	and	is	
closer	to	the	original	idea	of	Wallace’s	“game	of	chicken”.
Fig. 4.12. Disinflation and the rise of public debt following the ease in monetary policy
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debt?	The	answer	to	this	question	depends	on	how	much	the	deficit	changes	and	on	the	rela-
tive	magnitudes	of	the	parameters	of	the	model.	
Figure	4.13	shows	a	possible	scenario	for	events	to	unfold.	The	system	is	initially	in	equi-
librium	E0	on	the	curve	SS0.	An	increase	in	the	primary	budget	deficit	brings	about	a	shift	in	
the	set	of	steady	states	onto	curve	SS1.	The	volume	of	public	debt	will	 increase	for	the	old	
growth	rate	of	base	money	(curve MM0)	as	a	result	of	the	inadequacy	of	the	old	volume	of	
inflation	tax	for	covering	the	increased	operational	deficit.	A	possible	way	out	of	this	situation	
is	an	increase	in	the	volume	of	seigniorage	by	increasing	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	This	
corresponds	to	shifting	the	equilibrium	to	point	E1	on	the	curve	SS1	as	shown	in	Fig.	4.13	
(while	economy	keeps	staying	in	point	E0).	The	economy	is	then	in	a	state	where	 &m > 0,
&b < 0 	
with	respect	to	the	new	steady	state.	However,	the	ensuing	dynamics	of	the	system	may	either	
bring	 (trajectory	E0E2)	or	not	bring	 (trajectory	E0А)	 the	economy	 to	a	 steady	 state	on	 the	
curve	SS1.	In	the	first	case,	the	central	bank	at	a	certain	moment	must	fix	the	growth	rate	of	
base	money	at	a	level	corresponding	to	equilibrium	E2	(locus	MM2).	In	the	second,	monetary	
policy	by	itself	cannot	return	the	economy	to	any	steady	state	without	tightening	policies	in	
the	fiscal	sphere.	
4.9. Consequences of “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” for fiscal policy
Using	the	results	of	Section	4.3,	we	can	consider	the	results	of	a	temporary	decrease	in	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money	using	assumptions	analogous	 to	 those	of	Sargent	and	Wal-
lace	 (1981).	 Initially,	when	 the	central	bank	decreases	 the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	 the	
Fig. 4.13. The policy of increasing the primary deficit by increasing the volume of seigniorage
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economy	is	in	equilibrium	at	point	E0.	Depending	on	the	where	the	economy	is	on	curve	SS0	
and	the	relative	values	of	the	model’s	parameters,	the	system	will	move	along	one	of	the	pos-
sible	trajectories	E0E2, E0A, E0C, or	E0D
21 (see	Fig.	4.14).	Assume	that	at	a	certain	moment	T	
in	the	future	the	economy	will	be	at	a	steady	state.	The	characteristics	that	the	new	state	will	
have	in	comparison	with	the	initial	state	depend	on	the	trajectory	of	the	transitional	dynamics	
of	the	system.	
It	 is	obvious	 that	 for	any	transitional	 trajectory,	 the	growth	rate	of	base	money	that	 is	
compatible	with	the	new	steady	state	must	be	greater	than	it	was	initially.	This	also	means	
a	higher	level	of	steady	inflation,	which	is	what	we	call	the	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithme-
tic”	of	Sargent	and	Wallace.	If	the	economy	turns	out	to	be	on	trajectory	E0E2,	and	the	time	
interval	[0,	T]	is	sufficiently	small,	then	the	new	steady	state	G	will	correspond	to	a	higher	
level	of	primary	budget	deficit.	Even	given	an	increase	in	the	steady	level	of	the	volume	of	
public	debt,	this	can	be	considered	from	a	certain	point	of	view	to	be	an	improvement	in	the	
government’s	position.	
If	the	system	begins	to	move	along	the	trajectories	E0A, E0C, or	E0D,	then	the	correspond-
ing	new	steady	states	F, H, and	I	will	be	on	the	curves	SS2
22,	where	the	value	of	the	primary	
budget	deficit	is	higher	in	comparison	with	SS0.	Here	the	states	F and	I	are	characterized	by	
21	 The	trajectory	E0E2	on	the	lower	branch	of	the	curve	SS0	is	not	considered,	as	it	is	unlikely
22	 The	points	F, H	and	I are	shown	to	lie	on	one	curve	in	Fig.	4.14	for	clarity.	This	is	possible	if	we	choose	
varying	time	intervals		[0,	T]	for	each	of	the	corresponding	trajectories.	
Fig. 4.14. The consequences of decreasing the growth rate of base money: 
“unpleasant fiscal-monetary arithmetic”
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a	higher	volume	of	public	debt,	while	the	new	steady	state	for	trajectory	E0C	may	correspond	
to	a	decrease	in	the	steady	volume	of	the	debt.	Such	a	situation	can	be	characterized	not	only	
as	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”,	but	also	as	“unpleasant fiscal-monetary arithmetic”	—	
the	government	turns	out	to	be	in	a	worse	situation	than	it	was	initially.	
4.10. Feasibility constraints on the interaction  
of fiscal and monetary policy
The	previous	examples	may	give	the	incorrect	impression	that	it	is	always	possible	to	use	
fiscal	and	monetary	policies	to	fix	the	economy	in	a	steady	state,	if	not	bring	it	to	a	predeter-
mined	desirable	state.	However,	this	is	not	true	even	given	the	backward	looking	behavior	of	
economic	agents	and	a	developed	market	of	government	bonds.	
First	of	all,	this	is	because	of	a	limitation	from	below	(and,	possibly,	from	above)	of	an	
instrument	of	fiscal	policy	—	the	primary	budget	deficit.	Unlike	the	parameter	of	monetary	
policy	µ,	which	can	assume	practically	any	value,	the	magnitude	of	the	primary	budget	defi-
cit	 (surplus)	 is	 bounded	 from	below	 (above).	From	a	 formal	point	of	 view,	 the	 volume	of	
government	expenditures	cannot	be	negative	and	tax	revenues	has	a	maximum	defined	by	
the	standard	Laffer	curve.	In	real	life,	the	government	is	hardly	interested,	even	in	the	face	of	
a	debt	crisis,	to	decrease	expenditures	below	a	certain	positive	level	or	“squeeze”	the	maxi-
mum	possible	taxes	from	the	economy	for	obvious	economic	and	political	reasons.	There-
fore,	even	if	the	government	is	able	to	create	primary	budget	surplus,	its	magnitude	will	have	
a	natural	upper	bound23.	In	this	situation	one	can	say	that	fiscal	policy	has	a	feasibility con-
straint24.	Denote	the	minimum	volume	of	primary	deficit25	to	be	dmin.	The	existence	of	dmin	
means	that	after	the	public	debt	has	achieved	a	certain	critical	value	the	government	will	be	
unable	to	independently	stop	the	further	unsustainable	growth	of	the	debt.	
Secondly,	as	we	showed	above,	monetary	policies	are	not	always	able	to	independently	
bring	the	economy	to	any	steady	state.	Even	though	the	central	bank	can	change	the	direction	
of	change	of	the	real	money	balances	and	secure	a	decrease	in	public	debt	by	providing	an	ar-
bitrarily	high	volume	of	seigniorage	given	backward	looking	dynamics	of	the	money	market,	
the	system	may	not	return	to	the	equilibrium	curve	SS.	
23	 It	would	be	logical,	however,	to	suppose	the	existence	of	an	upper	bound	for	the	budget	deficit	as	well,	
one	that	would	be	defined	by	a	maximum	level	of	government	expenditures,	among	other	things.	The	problem	
here	is	that	of	determining	the	optimal	level	of	government	intervention	in	the	economy	(see,	for	example,	
Leslie	(1995,	ch.	1))	and	of	other	considerations	as	well.	However,	this	does	not	of	principle	importance	for	
our	investigations.
24	 See,	for	example,	Agenor	(2000).	We	should	point	out	here	one	shortcut	of	our	analysis.	The	fact	that	
we	consider	 the	 interaction	of	 fiscal	and	monetary	policies	apart	 from	general	equilibrium	in	 the	economy	
means	that	we	completely	ignore	the	following	important	problem.	Changes	in	macroeconomic	policy	now	or	
in	the	future	can	bring	about	changes	in	the	feasibility	constraint.	For	example,	macroeconomic	policy	may	
change	the	maximum	possible	volume	of	tax	revenue.	Of	course,	this	line	of	investigation	is	interesting,	but	it	
would	significantly	complicate	our	analysis	and	would	not	influence	our	key	results.	
25	 If	there	is	a	budget	surplus,	this	value	will	be	negative.	Possibly	this	boundary,	like	the	other	variables	
and	parameters	of	the	model,	should	be	defined	relative	to	emission;	however,	as	pointed	out	above,	this	is	not	
of	principle	importance	for	our	further	investigations.	
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From	a	 formal	point	 of	 view,	having	dmin	 gives	 rise	 to	 constraints	 for	 the	 existence	of	
steady	states	of	the	system	for	any	rates	of	growth	of	base	money.	There	exists	a	boundary	
curve	SSmax,
26	to	the	right	of	which	no	equilibrium	is	possible	(see	Fig.	4.15).	This	curve	in	
the	first	approximation	can	be	considered	to	be	the	boundary,	to	the	right	of	which	there	is	
a	region	that	monetary	and	fiscal	polices,	even	working	together,	are	not	able	to	move	the	
economy	out	of,	 nor	 are	 these	policies	 able	 to	 stabilize	 the	 economy.	Actually,	 it	 is	more	
probable	that	the	boundary	of	this	“crisis	region”	should	lie	somewhat	more	to	the	right	(for	
example,	curve	СС	in	Fig.	4.15).	Given	the	existence	of	µ	(see	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter),	
this	boundary	may	coincide	with	the	curve	SSmax	on	a	certain	interval.	The	nonlinear	charac-
ter	of	the	system	being	considered	does	not	allow	one	to	derive	an	equation	for	this	boundary	
using	analytical	methods.	General	considerations,	however,	seem	to	indicate	that	it	will	be	a	
curve	concave	to	the	vertical	axis,	and	it	will	determine	the	maximum	allowable	value	of	the	
public	debt	bmax
27.
In	light	of	our	results,	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	authorities	has	a	necessary	
limitation	—	their	policies	cannot	let	the	economy	approach	the	“crisis	region”,	where	the	
dynamics	of	public	debt	at	the	very	least	will	be	unstable28.	We	should	point	out	that,	by	its	
26	 In	other	words,	equilibria	located	to	the	right	of	the	curve	SSmax	correspond	to	infeasible	fiscal	poli-
cies.	
27	 This	value	may	exceed	or	be	equal	to	the	limitation	determined	by	fiscal	policy	alone.
28	 Given	 the	assumptions	of	 the	model,	 the	central	bank	can	always	bring	 the	money	market	back	 to	
a	steady	state	by	setting	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	
Fig. 4.15. Constraints on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies
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very	essence,	this	limitation	that	has	appeared	on	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	
policies	is	a	consequence	of	the	feasibility	constraints	imposed	on	fiscal	policies.	
4.11. Summary and conclusions
The	conclusions	that	can	be	made	by	considering	this	model	are	based	on	the	assump-
tions	regarding	the	inertial	character	of	the	backward	looking	dynamics	of	the	money	market.	
However,	 even	 though	 this	hypothesis	 can	hardly	be	considered	universal	or	 indisputable,	
the	results	of	our	analysis	mostly	agree	well	with	the	experience	of	macroeconomic	stabiliza-
tion.	
The	first	interesting	result	is	that	unilateral	monetary	measures	may	not	be	able	to	bring	
the	economy	back	 into	equilibrium,	while	 the	government	 (if	 this	does	not	violate	 the	 li-
mitations	on	the	variables	of	fiscal	policy)	can	always	shift	the	volume	of	public	debt	from	
one	steady	state	to	another	without	changing	the	inflation	rate.	If	inflation	has	a	significant	
inertia,	 then	 the	 reaction	of	 economic	 agents	 to	 assurances	 that	monetary	 stabilization	 is	
forthcoming	may	be	weakened.	In	this	case	 the	dynamics	of	 inflation	may	to	a	significant	
extent	be	determined	by	the	prehistory	of	the	process,	rather	than	expectations	concerning	
future	conditions.	This	conclusion	agrees	well	with	the	experience	of	stabilizing	high	infla-
tion	economies.	As	a	rule,	all	attempts	to	stabilize	an	economy	by	applying	orthodox	(purely	
monetary)	policies	have	met	with	failure.	Researches	currently	agree29	that	heterodox	stabili-
zation	should	be	of	foremost	interest	both	in	terms	of	importance,	and	in	terms	of	sequence	
of	actions.	Heterodox	stabilization	consists	first	in	the	balancing	of	the	fiscal	sphere	and	in	
moving	it	out	of	the	crisis.	A	second	important	conclusion	is	that	in	a	situation	where	the	go-
vernment	is	at	the	limits	of	its	possibilities	and	it	may	not	be	able	to	stem	the	unstable	increase	
in	public	debt,	the	central	bank	may	also	be	unable	to	bring	the	system	back	to	any	equilib-
rium.	Therefore,	in	most	cases	the	government	must	move	after	the	central	bank,	so	that	the	
economy	can	return	to	a	steady	state.	At	the	same	time,	if	the	government	is	operating	within	
the	region	of	feasible	values	of	the	fiscal	policy	parameters,	then	its	actions,	which	do	not	
influence	the	monetary	sphere,	may	not	require	a	response	from	the	central	bank.	
We	believe	that	these	general	conclusions	agree	well	with	the	results	of	macroeconomic	
policy	that	can	be	observed	in	Russia.	One	of	the	factors	that	made	the	crisis	of	1998	unavoid-
able	was	the	doomed	attempt	to	stabilize	the	financial	system	(and,	in	particular,	inflation)	
by	applying	tight	monetary	policies	that	were	not	supported	by	tight	fiscal	policies,	namely	
by	the	balancing	of	the	budgetary	sphere.	Even	if	we	suppose	that	investors	in	1996—1998	
perceived	the	government’s	fiscal	policy	to	be	stable	(which	is	doubtful),	 then	the	obvious	
mistake	of	both	the	government	and	the	central	bank	was	that	they	allowed	the	fiscal	sphere	
to	approach	the	dangerous	boundary	of	feasible	policies.	Indeed,	the	default	could	have	been	
avoided	if	the	government	had	been	able	to	at	least	temporarily	tighten	fiscal	policy	and	de-
29	 See,	 for	 example	 Beckerman	 (1992),	 Bruno	 (1993),	 Dornbusch	 (1993),	 Heymann-Leijonhufvud	
(1995).
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crease	the	primary	deficit.	But	such	possibilities	can	be	discussed	only	in	the	subjunctive,	if	
only	because	a	stable	policy	turned	out	to	be	impossible.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	fact	that	the	Russian	government	has	been	able	in	the	last	few	
years	to	form	a	budget	surplus	and	achieve	a	decrease	in	public	debt	means	that	the	govern-
ment	has	improved	the	set	of	alternatives	available	to	macroeconomic	policy	in	the	future.	
The	remaining	results	may	be	summed	up	as	follows.30	If	monetary	policy	turns	out	to	be	
unable	to	independently	shift	the	economy	to	a	new	steady	state	with	a	lower	level	of	infla-
tion,	then	the	government’s	actions	should	be	aimed	at	decreasing	the	primary	budget	deficit.	
For	an	economy	with	low	inflation,	the	decrease	in	the	inflation	tax	turns	out	to	be	greater	
than	the	decrease	in	the	public	debt	service.	In	an	economy	with	high	inflation,	on	the	con-
trary,	an	increase	in	revenues	from	issuing	money	may	not	be	enough	to	cover	the	increased	
interest	payments	on	the	debt.	
A	government	which	faces	the	necessity	of	increasing	the	primary	budget	deficit	but	does	
not	want	its	debt	to	spiral	out	of	control,	should	count	on	a	temporary	increase	in	seignior-
age.	Under	low	inflation	this	will	require	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	and	
under	high	inflation	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	should	be	decreased.	The	new	equilibrium	
(with	low	or	high	inflation)	will	be	characterized	by	a	lower	volume	of	inflation	tax	and	an	
increased	primary	deficit,	which	will	be	compensated	by	decreased	payments	for	servicing	
the	debt.
Sargent	and	Wallace’s	result,	the	principle	of	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”,	under	
certain	ratios	of	the	parameters	of	the	model	and	of	the	experiment	can	be	amplified.	A	de-
crease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	given	no	change	in	the	fiscal	sphere	can	not	be	per-
petual.	A	temporary	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	can	bring	about	not	only	an	
increase	in	inflation	both	on	the	transitional	trajectory	and	at	the	new	steady	state,	but	it	can	
also	bring	about	a	necessity	in	tightening	fiscal	policies	—	the	volume	of	the	primary	budget	
deficit	must	be	decreased	in	the	new	steady	state.	
Appendix. Analysis of the transitional dynamics of the system 
Consider	the	following	theoretical	experiment.	At	time		the	growth	rate	of	base	money	is	
µ=	µ0.	The	economy	is	in	a	steady	state,	where	m(0) = m0
∗
= m
0
, b(0) = b
0
∗
= b
0	and	µ0	=	π(m0).	
At	time	t	=	t1	the	central	bank	changes	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	so	that	µ	=	µ1.	The	
equilibrium	of	the	system	shifts	to	a	new	position,	m
1
∗
= m*, b
1
∗
= b* ,	in	which	µ1	=	π(m
*)	and
the	elasticity	of	demand	is	 ε
1
*
=
µ
1
′π (m* )m*
.
30	 We	have	discussed	only	what	we	consider	to	be	the	most	interesting	examples,	while	in	fact	the	model	
can	be	used	to	analyze	the	possibilities	and	consequences	of	the	entire	spectrum	of	possible	interactions	be-
tween	the	government	and	the	central	bank.	The	difficulties	of	carefully	analyzing	the	transitional	dynamics	of	
the	system	means	that	further	investigation	of	the	scenarios	we	consider	here	can	be	done	only	by	numerical	
methods.	
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Suppose	that	the	change	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	is	infinitely	small,	and	con-
sider	the	dynamics	of	the	system	in	a	neighborhood	of	the	new	equilibrium.	We	can	express	
the	size	of	public	debt	as	a	function	of	real	money	balances	by	using	the	dynamic	equations	
(4.3)	and	(4.4)31:
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From	here	we	can	calculate	the	derivative	of	public	debt	with	respect	to	the	size	of	the	real	
money	balances	on	the	trajectory	of	the	variables’	increments	in	a	neighborhood	of	the	equi-
librium	point:
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and	in	the	initial	condition	of	the	system:
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Here	we	used	the	fact	that	 b(m) =
µm− d
r
	in	the	steady	state.
Now	consider	the	limit	as	µ1	→	µ0	=	µ	(or	m
*	→	m0).	We	get	the	slope	of	the	dynamic	
trajectory	for	any	initial	condition	lying	on	the	curve	SS:
	 ′bm D = −ε 1+
1
ε
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
µε
µ+ rε ,	 (А4.4)
where,	 using	 the	 equality	 of	 steady	 inflation	 and	 growth	 rate	 of	 base	 money,	 we	 have
ε = ε(µ) = µ ′m (µ)
m(µ)
.
We	can	calculate	the	slope	of	the	curve	SS	from	equation	(3.12)	for	every	possible	value	
of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money:
	 ′bm SS =
µ
r
1+
1
ε
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .	 (А4.5)
31	 As	noted	above,	we	do	not	consider	the	case	µ	=	–rε*(or	αr	=	1	for	the	demand	function	with	constant	
semi-elasticity),	when	the	equilibrium	of	the	system	becomes	a	diacritical	node.	
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It	is	not	difficult	to	see	that	the	difference	between	the	slopes	of	the	dynamic	trajectory	and	
the	curve	SS,
	 Δ(µ) = ′bm D − ′bm SS =
µε
µ+ rε −
µ+ rε
r
1+
1
ε
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ,	 (А4.6)
can	be	either	positive	or	negative.	In	other	words,	the	dynamics	of	the	system	may	head	either	
to	the	right	or	to	the	left	of	the	curve	SS.
In	 particular,	 for	 the	 Cagan	 demand	 function	 (2.11)	 with	 constant	 semi-elasticity,	
ε(µ)	=	–αµ,	we	have
	 Δ(µ) = 1−αrαr −
αr +(1−αr )2
r(1−αr) µ
.	 (А4.7)
In	 this	 case	 there	 is	 a	 unique	 value	 µ = α 1+ αr
(1−αr)2
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−1
	 for	which	 the	 function	 Δ(µ)
equals	zero.	The	value	of	µ	may	assume	either	small	or	large	values,	depending	on	the	value	
of	the	semi-elasticity	of	money	demand	and	the	interest	rate.	
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Chapter 5 
Fiscal and monetary policy interaction II:
The role of expectations, inflationary and fiscal regimes
5.1. Introduction
In	Chapter	2	we	considered	one	of	the	basic	approaches	to	the	formulation	of	macro-
economic	policy,	namely	the	principle	of	a	sustainable	fiscal	policy.	This	principle	states	that	
at	every	point	in	time	the	volume	of	public	debt	must	be	backed	by	the	real	value	of	the	pure	
income	of	the	government,	which	is	generally	determined	as	the	sum	of	the	primary	budget	
surplus	 and	 seigniorage.	 In	 this	 chapter	we	will	 investigate	 unilateral	 and	 joint	 actions	 of	
the	government	and	central	bank	that	will	keep	the	public	debt	on	a	sustainable	path.	It	is	
of	principle	 importance	that	the	central	bank	is	able	to	control	the	flow	of	seigniorage	for	
given	values	of	the	primary	budget	deficit	(surplus).	This	consideration	is	obviously	of	great	
practical	importance	for	countries	in	which	seigniorage	is	a	significant	source	of	financing	
the	budget	deficit.
The	model	suggested	below	allows	us	to	widen	the	principle	of	T.	Sargent’s	and	N.	Wal-
lace’s	 “unpleasant	monetarist	 arithmetic”	 (considered	 in	 Section	 2.4)	 in	 certain	 aspects.	
First	of	all,	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	may	bring	about	either	a	decrease	or	
an	increase	in	the	steady	level	of	seigniorage	depending	on	the	rate	of	inflation	prevalent	in	
the	economy	(on	the	active	branch	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve).1	The	logic	and	results	
of	the	Sargent	and	Wallace	model	are	true	only	for	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	
curve,	that	is,	for	low	inflation	(for	the	section	of	the	demand	curve	for	real	money	balances	
that	is	inelastic	with	respect	to	inflation	expectations).	
Second.	The	direction	of	the	transitional	dynamics	of	seigniorage	may	differ	from	the	
direction	of	change	in	its	steady	level.	An	important	role	is	played	here	by	the	expectations	
of	economic	agents.	We	assume	that	expectations	are	forward-looking,	and	we	additionally	
allow	for	the	possibility	that	information	about	changes	in	macroeconomic	policy	becomes	
available	before	 they	are	actually	 implemented.	As	can	be	 seen	 from	the	analysis	given	 in	
Section	2.3,	in	this	case	the	expected	decrease	(increase)	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	
will	bring	about	an	increase	(decrease)	in	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	even	before	
the	actual	changes	in	monetary	policy.	Here	we	should	remember	that	seigniorage	may	be	
represented	as	the	product	of	the	actual	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	the	volume	of	real	
money	balances,	 the	demand	 for	which	decreases	with	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 expected	 future	
actual	growth	rate	of	base	money.	Therefore,	both	the	current	volume	of	seigniorage	and	the	
present	value	of	future	seigniorage	flow	may	change	even	before	switches	in	macroeconomic	
policies	are	implemented.	This	factor,	beyond	any	doubt,	plays	a	very	important	role	and,	as	
1	 This	fact	was	first	noted	in	connection	with	the	principle	of	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	in	the	
papers	by	Liviatan	(1984)	and	Drazen	(1985).	See	also	Liviatan	(1986,	1988).		The	analysis	in	the	second	and	
third	chapters	also	used	this	very	important	consideration.	
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we	will	show	later,	may	violate	the	principle	of	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”	even	in	a	
low-inflation	economy.2	
Third.	When	formulating	either	fiscal	or	monetary	policy,	one	should	note	that	the	inte-
rest	rate	on	the	public	debt	can	also	be	important;	it	determines,	in	essence,	the	discount	fac-
tor	when	calculating	the	present	value	of	future	budget	surpluses	and	of	seigniorage.	Ceteris 
paribus,	a	high	interest	rate	makes	distant	changes	in	macroeconomic	policies	less	important	
and	forces	the	government	and	central	bank	to	concentrate	more	on	their	short-run	policies.	
By	contrast,	a	low	interest	rate	will	give	greater	weight	to	long-run	policies.	If	it	is	the	real	
value	of	budget	surpluses	and	seigniorage	that	is	considered	by	the	principle	of	sustainable	
fiscal	policy,	then	the	value	of	the	interest	rate	will	significantly	influence	the	choice	of	how	
fiscal	and	monetary	policies	will	interact.3
This	chapter	has	the	following	structure.	In	the	second	section	we	determine	joint	for-
ward-looking	dynamics	for	real	money	balances,	rate	of	inflation,	and	public	debt.	In	Sec-
tions	 5.2—5.10	we	 study	 several	 possible	ways	 in	which	 fiscal	 and	monetary	 policies	may	
interact.	 In	particular,	Sections	5.5,	5.7,	5.9	and	5.10	provide	historical	experience	of	 the	
United	States,	Latin	American	and	Asian	countries	that	serve	as	counterparts	to	theoretical	
scenarios.	We	 show	 that	 under	 certain	 assumptions	monetary	policy	may	be	permanently	
tightened	under	unchanged	fiscal	policies,	thus	avoiding	the	“unpleasant	monetarist	arith-
metic”	of	Sargent	and	Wallace.	The	examples	we	discuss	do	not	come	close	to	exhausting	all	
possible	types	of	macroeconomic	policy;	they	do,	however,	allow	us	to	determine	three	fac-
tors	that	we	consider	to	be	of	major	importance	in	choosing	how	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	
should	interact,	namely:	(i)	future	expectations	of	changes	in	policies,	(ii)	inflationary	regime	
(elasticity	of	the	demand	for	real	money	balances),	and	(iii)	the	interest	rate	on	public	debt.	
In	Sections	5.11—5.13	we	consider	 the	consequences	of	uncertainty	about	 the	 timing	
and	type	of	changes	in	macroeconomic	policies.	In	Section	5.14	we	return	yet	again	to	the	
problem	of	 the	 sustainability	 and	 feasibility	 constraints	 for	macroeconomic	policy.	 In	 the	
final	section,	5.15,	we	generalize	our	results.	
The	nonlinear	character	of	the	inflation	and	of	public	debt	dynamics	does	not	allow	us	
to	investigate	the	economic	system	by	purely	analytical	means.	The	Appendix	at	the	end	of	
2	 The	role	of	expectations	of	future	changes	in	macroeconomic	policy	(the	expectation	of	future	stabi-
lization)	was	considered	extensively.	See,	 for	example,	Calvo	(1988),	Drazen	and	Helpman	(1988),	Bental	
and	Eckstein	(1990),	Miller,	Skidelsky	and	Weller	(1990),	Bertola	and	Drazen	(1993),	Sargent	(1993),	Miller	
and	Zhang	(1997),	Sutherland	(1997),	Rankin	(1998),	Elder	(1999),	Ruge	and	Murcia	(1999).	Our	research	
concerns	problems	that	are	closest	to	those	considered	by	Drazen	and	Helpman	(1990).	
3	 As	a	rule,	special	attention	is	paid	to	the	value	of	the	interest	rate	on	the	public	debt	as	it	determines	
the	associated	costs	of	debt	service.	See	a	general	overview	of	this	problem	by	Missale	(1999).	In	considering	
in	essence	the	same	problem,	we	transfer	the	analysis	to	the	context	of	the	interaction	between	fiscal	and	mo-
netary	policies.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	we	consider	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	under	
the	assumption	that	the	latter	determines	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	However,	in	reality	the	central	bank	
often	pays	most	attention	not	to	the	money	base,	but	rather	to	the	interest	rate.	In	many	countries	after	World	
War	II,	monetary	policies	kept	the	interest	rate	at	a	rather	low	level,	thus	decreasing	the	costs	of	servicing	the	
public	debt.	This	is	an	important	example	of	the	logic	of	the	interaction	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policies;	how-
ever,	in	this	research	we	consider	a	monetary	policy	that	controls	the	money	base,	not	the	interest	rate.	
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the	chapter	contains	some	numerical	values	of	the	parameters	in	the	model	and	the	results	
of	theoretical	experiments	that	confirm	the	most	important	results	that	we	arrived	at	in	the	
chapter.	
	
5.2. Sustainable macroeconomic policy
As	in	the	previous	chapter,	we	will	consider	here	the	problems	of	formulating	a	common	
fiscal	and	monetary	policy	by	using	the	standard	pair	of	equations	that	describe	the	dynamics	
of	the	public	debt	and	of	real	money	balances:
	
 	
&b = d + rb − μm,
&m = μ − π m( )( )m.
⎧
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⎪
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	 (5.1)
However,	unlike	our	previous	analysis,	in	this	chapter	we	will	consider	the	forward-look-
ing	dynamics	of	the	variables:
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In	order	to	simplify	our	analysis,	and	in	order	to	be	able	to	arrive	at	analytical	solutions,	
we	will	base	our	approach	on	the	Cagan	function	for	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	
(2.11).	As	in	the	case	of	the	backward-looking	solution	(4.3),	the	second	equation’s	indepen-
dence	of	the	public	debt	and	of	the	parameters	of	fiscal	policy	allows	us,	by	using	the	results	of	
our	analysis	in	Section	2.3,	to	find	the	forward-looking	solution	(5.2)	for	the	logarithm	of	real	
money	balances.	The	Cagan	function	(2.11)	gives	us	 	 x = lnm = −απ,	and	this	allows	us	to	
automatically	arrive	at	the	equation	for	the	dynamics	of	inflation	(5.3).	Thus,	using	the	defi-
nition	of	seigniorage	 S = μm 	and	the	fact	that	 m = e
x,	we	find	the	volume	of	the	monetization	
of	the	operational	budget	deficit	(5.4).	Finally,	equation	(5.5)	describes	the	dynamics	of	the	
public	debt	in	the	case	of	conducting	sustainable	fiscal	policies.	As	we	discussed	in	Section	2.1,	
equation	 (5.5)	 characterizes	 the	 intertemporal	 budget	 constraint	 of	 the	 government	 given	
the	no-Ponzi	game	condition	(2.7):	
	 
lim
t→∞
b(t )e − rt = 0.	In	the	general	case	fiscal	and	monetary
policies	 in	 the	 future	may	be	unknown	 to	 the	private	 sector.	Thus,	 equations	 (5.2)—(5.5)	
include	an	operator	for	rational	expectations	
 
E
t
•( ),	which	is	the	operator	for	the	conditional	
mathematical	expectancy	of	a	variable,	the	future	value	of	which	is	unknown.	Expectations	
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are	based	on	the	information	set	that	is	available	at	time	t.	In	all	examples	that	we	consider	
below,	the	appearance	of	information	and	changes	in	the	expectations	of	economic	agents	are	
of	principle	importance.	In	order	to	simplify	the	analysis,	we	will	assume	that	the	instruments	
of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	d	and	µ,	are	piecewise-constant	functions	of	time.	Changes	in	
the	levels	of	d	and	µ	may	be	unknown	at	the	initial	point	of	time.	In	this	rather	simple	frame-
work	of	perfect	foresight	the	use	of	rational	expectation	operator	may	seem	redundant,	while	
it	would	be	necessary	if	we	model	the	dynamics	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	govern-
ment	deficits	as	a	stochastic	processes	(for	example,	Ito	processes).	But	we	prefer	 to	keep	
this	general	approach	for	convenience	(see,	for	example,	the	same	notion	in	the	textbook	by	
Turnovsky	(2000,	ch.	3).
5.3. A permanent increase  
in the growth rate of base money
It	 is	clear	 from	equations	(5.2)	and	(5.3)	 that	 the	expected	permanent	 increase	 in	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	results	in	an	increase	in	inflation	and	a	decrease	in	real	money	
balances	now	and	 in	 the	 future.	 Interestingly,	 from	(5.4)	and	 (5.5)	 the	effect	on	 seignior-
age	and	fiscal	sphere	is	ambiguous.	Let	us	consider	the	following	simple	example.	Starting	
with	a	constant	growth	rate	of	base	money,	µ(t)	=	µ0,	at	time	tA	the	central	bank	announces	
that	in	the	future,	starting	from	 tS	>	 tA,	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	will	be	increased	to	
µ(t)	=	µ1	>	µ0.	It	should	be	stressed	that	the	existence	of	the	time	interval	[tA,	tS]	between	this	
announcement	and	the	actual	policy	switch	is	crucial	to	the	principal	results	of	our	investi-
gation.	Using	(5.2)—(5.4),	we	can	describe	the	dynamics	of	the	log	of	real	money	balances,	
inflation,	and	seigniorage:
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Figure	 5.1	 shows	 the	 time	 paths	 of	 these	 variables.	 Prior	 to	 the	 announcement,	 the	
money	market	is	in	a	steady	state.	The	announcement	at	time	t	=	tA	leads	to	discrete	jumps	
in	 the	 log	 of	 real	 money	 balances,	
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< 0,	 and	 in	 inflation,
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> 0.	No	matter	what	side	of	 the	 inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	the
economy	is	on,	the	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	initially	results	in	a	discrete	fall
in	seigniorage:	
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Up	to	time	tS,	when	monetary	policy	switches,	the	log	of	real	money	balances	and	infla-
tion	gradually	adjust	to	their	new	steady	levels.	In	contrast,	at	this	time	seigniorage	undergoes	
another	discrete	jump,	
	 
ΔS (t = t
S
) = (μ
1
− μ
0
)e −αμ1 > 0.	Depending	on	which	side	of	the	infla-
tion	tax	Laffer	curve	the	economy	was	on	and	the	magnitude	of	the	change	in	the	growth	rate	
of	base	money,	the	new	steady	state	value	of	seigniorage	may	be	either	higher	or	lower	than	
it	was	initially.
With	regard	to	the	fiscal	sphere,	what	is	important	is	the	consequences	for	the	present	
value	 (evaluated	at	 time	 tA)	of	 future	 seigniorage	 revenues.	Assume	 for	 simplicity	 that	 the	
public	debt	is	initially	at	the	steady	state	for	some	constant	level	of	primary	budget	deficit.	If	
the	new	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage	for	t > tS	is	lower	than	it	was	initially	(for	t > tA),	then	
the	present	value	of	seigniorage	will	fall.	This	means	that	the	current	(predetermined)	level	
of	public	debt	 is	higher	 than	it	 should	be	assuming	a	sustainable	 fiscal	policy.	The	bottom	
diagram	in	Fig.	5.1	depicts	 the	path	of	 the	sustainable	 level	of	public	debt,	bs,	determined	
by	(5.5).	Its	downward	jump	(the	dotted	line)	is	a	result	of	a	decrease	in	the	present	value	
of	seigniorage4.	A	primary	budget	deficit	that	does	not	change	leads	to	the	explosive	growth	
of	the	actual	level	of	public	debt.	To	avoid	this	scenario	(i.e.,	to	avert	a	confidence	crisis),	
the	government	must	adjust	the	future	path	of	the	budget	deficit	d(t)	so	that	the	reduction	
in	its	present	value	compensates	the	fall	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	revenues.	In	the	
simplest	case	of	a	piecewise-constant	primary	deficit,	the	government	should	decrease	d	at	
time	tA	by	an	amount	equal	to	the	product	of	the	interest	rate	and	the	change	in	steady	state	
level	of	seigniorage.	At	the	same	time,	the	path	of	bS	will	shift	upward	for	t > tA,	bridging	the	
gap	with	 the	 actual	 (predetermined)	 level5.	Remaining	on	 a	 stable	 (sustainable)	 path,	 the	
4	 Here	and	below	we	implicitly	assume	that	the	government	(central	bank)	receives	the	same	information	
about	future	monetary	(fiscal)	policy	changes	and	at	the	same	time	tA	as	the	private	sector.	But	this	is	not,	in	
fact,	a	crucial	assumption.
5	 Figure	5.1	and	others	do	not	illustrate	this	possible	change.
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Fig. 5.1. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage, and the sustainable 
level of public debt for a permanent increase in the growth rate of base money
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public	debt	will	 initially	decrease	and	then	increase	and	reach	its	new	steady	state	 level	at	
time	tS,	which	will	in	fact	be	lower	than	the	initial	steady	state	level.
An	increase	in	the	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage	for	t > tS	does	not	automatically	lead	
to	an	increase	in	its	present	value	at	time	 tA.	Thus,	the	effect	of	this	increase	is	ambiguous	
and	critically	depends	on	the	interest	rate	for	public	debt.	If	the	time	interval	[tA,	tS]	is	long	
enough,	 if	 the	 fall	 in	 real	money	 balances	 is	 large,	 and	 (most	 importantly)	 if	 the	 interest	
rate	is	high,	then	the	present	value	of	future	seigniorage	revenues	may	decrease.	The	conse-
quences	of	this	scenario	are	similar	to	those	described	above	(see	the	solid	line	on	the	time	
diagram	for	bS).	The	government	will	be	forced	to	decrease	the	primary	deficit,	eliminating	
the	jump	in	bS .	Along	the	sustainable	path,	public	debt	will	increase	up	to	its	new	steady	state.	
Table	A5.1.1	 in	 the	Appendix	provides	a	numerical	 specification	of	parameters	 that	 shows	
this	scenario	to	be	quite	possible.
An	increase	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	is	possible,	ceteris paribus,	if	the	interest	
rate	is	relatively	low.	In	this	case	the	accumulated	level	of	debt	becomes	lower	than	bS	(see	
the	chain	line	in	Fig.	5.1,	and	also	the	numerical	example	in	Table	A5.1.1	in	the	Appendix).	
If	 the	government	does	not	react,	public	debt	will	decrease.	However,	 in	this	situation	the	
government	can	increase	the	primary	deficit	(its	present	value	in	general),	which	in	many	cir-
cumstances	may	indeed	be	desirable	for	either	economic	or	political	reasons.	Such	action	will	
keep	the	debt	on	a	stable	path.	The	new	steady	state	level	will	be	higher	than	it	was	initially,	
just	as	in	the	case	considered	above.
The	 last	 possible	 outcome	 is	 that	 of	 a	 permanent	 increase	 in	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 base	
money	that	will	not	change	present	value	of	seigniorage	at	all6.	The	principle	of	sustainable	
fiscal	policy	is	not	violated.	Public	debt	rises	along	the	sustainable	path	up	to	its	new	steady-
state	level	(the	double	dot-chain	line	in	Fig.	5.17).
5.4. A permanent increase in the primary budget deficit
The	most	important	conclusion	we	learn	from	the	example	above	is	that	there	is	no	sim-
ple	or	unambiguous	correspondence	between	changes	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	(and	
inflation)	and	the	direction	in	which	fiscal	policy	must	be	adjusted	in	order	to	keep	the	public	
debt	on	a	sustainable	path.	But	the	reverse	is	also	true.	To	prove	this,	let	us	consider	the	fol-
lowing	simple	scenario.	Assume	that	initially	the	money	market	and	the	public	debt	are	in	
steady	states	for	certain	values	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	of	the	primary	deficit.	
Then,	for	some	reason,	the	government	needs	to	increase	(permanently)	the	primary	budget	
deficit	(by	increasing	spending,	or	by	decreasing	taxes).	To	keep	the	public	debt	on	a	sustain-
able	path,	it	is	necessary	to	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	by	an	amount	equal	to	
6	 We	do	not	illustrate	numerically	this	extreme	case	in	the	Appendix	due	to	the	obvious	complexity	of	the	
necessary	calculations.	However,	this	result	seems	to	be	quite	possible.
7	 All	the	lines	on	the	time	diagram	for	bS	
in	Fig.	5.1	should	not,	in	fact,	converge	to	the	same	steady	state	
level.	We	show	the	same	steady	state	levels	in	order	to	simplify	visual	perception.	The	same	applies	to	the	other	
diagrams	below.	
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the	increase	in	the	present	value	of	budget	deficits.	Assume	for	concreteness	that	the	econo-
my	is	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve8.	A	possible	approach	would	be	to	
increase	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	as	was	described	above.	This	must	be	done	at	time	tS,	
while	an	announcement	to	that	effect	should	be	made	at	time	tA	<	tS.	This	action	results	in	a	
higher	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage,	after	a	period	of	temporary	decrease,	but	at	the	cost	of	
an	increase	in	the	steady	state	inflation	rate	and	of	a	decrease	in	real	money	balances.	
However,	this	is	not	the	only	way	to	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage.	In	some	
circumstances	this	objective	can	also	be	achieved	by	decreasing	the	growth	rate	of	base	mo-
ney9.	The	following	scenario	is	illustrated	in	Fig.	5.2.	Indeed,	if	tA	 is	the	moment	at	which	
there	is	a	switch	in	fiscal	policy,	and	the	central	bank	announces	a	permanent	drop	in	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	after	tS,	then	inflation	will	undergo	a	discrete	fall,	while	real	money	
balances	jump	up.	Up	to	the	time	of	actual	changes	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	infla-
tion	(real	money	balances)	will	gradually	decrease	(increase)	to	its	new	steady	state	level.	This	
results	in	a	temporary	increase	in	seigniorage.	Despite	the	fact	that	it	eventually	falls	to	a	new	
steady	state	at	time	tS,	its	present	value	for	time	tA may	increase.	This	scenario	is	more	likely	
for	high	interest	rates.
In	general,	just	as	in	the	previous	example,	whether	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	will	
increase	or	decrease	depends	on	the	interest	rate	that	is	used	in	discounting	future	values,	on	
the	length	of	the	time	interval	between	the	announcement	of	an	impending	policy	switch	and	
its	actual	implementation,	on	the	magnitude	of	the	change	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	
and	on	the	semi-elasticity	of	the	money	demand	function.	Figure	5.2	depicts	possible	trajec-
tories	for	the	sustainable	level	of	public	debt.	For	certain	parameterizations	of	the	experiment	
(see	the	corresponding	examples	in	Table	A5.1.2	in	the	Appendix),	and	in	particular	for	high	
interest	rates	for	public	debt,	a	permanent	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	leads	to	
a	discrete	upward	jump	in	bS.	In	our	example,	the	size	of	the	jump	is	equal	to	the	ratio	of	the	
change	in	the	primary	deficit	to	the	interest	rate.	We	will	demonstrate	below	that,	depending	
on	the	magnitude	of	the	change	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	on	the	length	of	the	
time	interval	(tS	—	tA),	the	central	bank’s	ability	to	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	is	
bounded	from	above,	if	it	exists	at	all.	Without	changes	in	the	primary	budget	deficit,	if	this	
kind	of	monetary	policy	is	able	to	produce	an	increase	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	by	
time	tA,	then,	after	a	discrete	increase,	bS 	will	gradually	decrease	to	its	new	steady	state	level	
(the	solid	line	in	Fig.	5.2).	As	long	as	the	new	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage	is	lower	than	it	
8	 If	the	economy	is	functioning	with	high	inflation	(i.e.,	it	is	on	the	“wrong	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laf-
fer	curve),	then	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	money	will	unambiguously	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	present	
value	of	seigniorage.	At	the	same	time,	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	money	will	result	in	a	decrease	in	the	
present	value	of	seigniorage.	For	obvious	reasons,	the	direction	of	the	transitory	dynamics	of	seigniorage	and	
the	direction	of	the	change	in	its	steady	state	are	the	same	(upward	or	downward)	along	the	“wrong	side”	of	
inflation	tax	Laffer	curve.
9	 In	order	to	not	be	misunderstood,	we	should	stress	that	there	is	no	tradeoff	between	contractionary	and	
expansionary	monetary	policy	aimed	at	 increasing	 the	present	value	of	 seigniorage.	We	demonstrate	below	
that	depending	on	the	parametric	specification	(most	importantly	on	the	interest	rate)	monetary	policy	could	
produce	a	higher	present	value	of	seigniorage	only	for	one	direction	of	change,	while	the	other	direction	will	
produce	quite	the	opposite	result.
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Fig 5.2. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage, and the sustainable 
level of public debt for a permanent decrease in the growth rate of base money
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was	initially,	the	new	steady	state	level	of	public	debt	must	also	be	lower.	Since	the	increase	
in	the	primary	budget	deficit	should	be	balanced	by	the	increase	in	the	present	value	of	seig-
niorage,	bS	will	not	undergo	a	 jump	at	 time	 tA;	 instead	 it	will	gradually	decrease	along	the	
sustainable	path	to	its	new	steady	state	level.
Ceteris paribus,	in	the	case	of	a	low	interest	rate,	a	decrease	in	the	steady	state	level	of	
seigniorage	in	the	future	plays	an	important	role,	and	thus	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	
may	decrease	or	remain	at	least	the	same	(see	the	dotted	and	chain	lines	in	Fig.	5.2).	Quali-
tatively,	the	ensuing	dynamics	of	bS 	are	the	same	as	in	the	example	given	above	(a	decrease	
to	a	new	constant	level).	However,	along	with	the	increase	in	primary	deficit	one	could	come	
to	a	situation	in	which	the	predetermined	public	debt	at	time	tA 	is	higher	than	it	should	be	in	
accordance	with	(5.5),	i.e.	it	becomes	unsustainable.	
5.5. Credible stabilization programs: Israel, Chile and Mexico
Discussion	in	Sections	5.3	and	5.4	stressed	one	important	point:	as	long	as	the	sustain-
ability	of	public	debt	depends	not	only	on	future	fiscal	policy,	but	on	future	seigniorage	as	
well,	monetary	policy	may	not	be	able	to	stabilize	inflation	without	corresponding	fiscal	ad-
justments.	The	necessity	of	joint	fiscal	and	monetary	measures	to	fight	high	inflation	is	the	
essence	of	 the	so-called	“orthodox	stabilization”.	Here	we	provide	examples	of	 successful	
high	inflation	stabilization	programs	in	Israel,	Chile	and	Mexico.	In	all	these	cases,	the	in-
troduction	of	a	tight	monetary	policy	was	accompanied	by	budget	cuts	that	were	perceived	
as	a	credible	attempt	to	stop	high	inflation	(immediately	at	the	beginning	of	the	program	or	
after	a	short	delay).	We	do	not	consider	these	examples	in	a	chronological	order,	however,	and	
we	start	with	Israel’s	1985—1986	stabilization	program	since	it	was	the	most	successful	of	the	
three.	In	all	cases	we	note	the	presence	of	additional	stabilization	policy	elements	that	were	
mostly	part	of	the	alternative	package,	the	so-called	“heterodox	stabilization”	program.	Our	
analysis	does	not	take	into	account	inflation	inertia	that	is	considered	to	be	a	very	important	
character	of	chronic	high	inflation.	The	elements	of	the	heterodox	stabilization	policy	are	
designed	to	break	inflation	inertia.	While	in	all	cases	the	orthodox	program	was	at	the	core	
of	the	inflation	stabilization	efforts,	the	absence	of	an	adequate	heterodox	program	may	be	
viewed	as	the	main	reason	for	the	low	rate	of	decrease	in	inflation	in	Chile.	
Israel, 1985—1986
Israel’s	experience	 in	 the	mid	1980’s	provides	a	good	example	of	 inflation	and	public	
debt	stabilization	under	a	policy	package	consisting	of	monetary	anchoring	and	fiscal	adjust-
ment,	among	other	efforts.10	Moreover,	as	history	shows,	a	tight	monetary	policy	and	cuts	in	
the	budget	deficit	were	perceived	as	a	credible	long-run	policy	shift,	not	just	as	a	short-run	
attempt	to	lower	inflation.
10	 The	discussion	and	statistical	data	presented	in	this	subsection	is	based	mainly	on	Bruno	(1993).	See	
also	Bruno	and	Meridor	(1991).
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Along	with	Latin	America	countries,	Israel	in	1975—1985	provides	a	canonical	example	
of	an	economy	with	chronic	high	inflation.	During	this	period	inflation	moved	from	the	two-
digit	to	the	three-digit	range	so	yet	never	became	hyperinflation.	The	most	dramatic	episode	
of	inflation	intensification	was	in	1984—1985.	By	the	end	of	1984	the	inflation	rate	was	close	
to	500	percent	on	an	annual	basis	(see	Fig.	5.3).	Inflation	in	Israel	was	characterized	by	very	
strong	inertia	due	to	indexation	institution	and	other	factors,	something	that	has	proved	to	
be	a	common	phenomena	in	high-inflation	countries.	Indeed,	Fig.	5.3	suggests	that	money	
growth	was	simply	accommodating	an	increasing	inflation	rate.	And	this	may	indeed	be	the	
case.11	Nevertheless,	it	is	possible	to	attribute	a	significant	part	of	the	increase	in	money	to	
the	financing	of	the	budget	deficit.	As	Table	5.1	shows,	seigniorage	(creation	of	base	money)	
played	a	rather	significant	part	in	this	process.	Starting	from	the	mid-1970s,	the	government	
ran	very	high	deficits	(two-digit	percent	of	GNP).	Taken	together	with	monetization,	which	
led	to	an	escalation	 in	 inflation,	 the	deficits	 resulted	 in	a	dramatic	growth	of	 internal	and	
external	 public	 debt.	Before	 the	 oil-price	 shock	 and	 the	Yom	Kippur	War	 in	 1973,	 Israel	
was	in	its	“Golden	Age”	of	growth	that	was	11.2	percent	in	1950—1960	and	9.7	percent	in	
1961—1972	 (annually,	on	average).	Under	 these	conditions,	 large	 fiscal	deficits	 (although	
they	were	not	as	 large	as	 later	on)	did	not	 lead	to	an	unsustainable	growth	of	public	debt.	
However,	after	1973	economic	growth	became	much	slower:	3.4	percent	in	1973—1981	and	
1.9	percent	in	1982—1984.	Increasing	budget	deficits	made	public	debt	highly	unsustainable.	
In	the	mid-1980s	the	public	debt	became	higher	than	200	percent	of	GNP	and	reached	its	
historical	maximum	of	240	percent	of	GNP.
Stabilization	of	chronic	high	inflation	is	a	difficult	task.	Israel’s	1985	stabilization	pro-
gram	is	a	rare	example	of	success.	In	1985—1986	inflation	was	brought	down	to	the	two-
digit	range	and	was	stabilized	there	at	the	level	between	15	and	20	percent.	After	that,	in	the	
1990s	inflation	decreased	to	the	single-digit	range.	The	stabilization	process	was	complex	
and	involved	a	host	of	measures	on	the	part	of	both	the	government	and	the	central	bank.	
Among	them,	there	are	two	major	elements:	the	Bank	of	Israel	successfully	squeezed	money	
emission	while	the	government	cut	its	budget	deficits.	Table	5.1	confirms	this	drastic	policy	
shift.	The	other	elements	of	greatest	importance	were:	pegging	the	nominal	exchange	rate,	
price	control	policy	and	various	directions	of	 structural	adjustment	of	 the	economy.	One	
should	also	note	a	very	important	element	—	namely,	the	political	and	social	atmosphere	at	
the	time	that	made	the	public	perceive	the	stabilization	plan	of	the	National	Unity	Govern-
ment	as	credible	(at	least	eventually).
We	can	 illustrate	 the	credibility	 (or	 sustainability)	of	 this	 stabilization	program	by	 the	
logic	explained	in	Section	5.4.	As	was	discussed	earlier,	an	anticipated	permanent	decrease	
in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	can	produce	an	increase	in	the	present	discounted	value	of	
future	seigniorage	in	the	case	of	high	interest	rates	(see	Fig.	5.2).	However,	it	can	also	produce	
a	lower	present	value	of	seigniorage	when	the	interest	rate	is	relatively	low.	Thus,	in	general,	
a	permanent	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	may	not	be	perceived	as	a	credible	
11	 Fischer,	Sahay	and	Vegh	(2002)	found	that	this	is	a	prevailing	pattern	during	inflationary	episodes.
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future	monetary	policy,	 if	only	because	 it	may	result	 in	unsustainable	public	debt	dynam-
ics.	Despite	the	evidence	that	interest	rates	were	very	high	in	the	1980s,	the	mere	fact	that	
the	public	debt	to	GNP	ratio	was	higher	than	200	percent	leaves	little	room	to	suppose	that	
the	Bank	of	Israel’s	unilateral	radical	shift	to	a	tight	monetary	policy	would	be	perceived	as	
credible.	However,	as	long	as	it	was	supported	by	expectations	of	a	future	cut	in	deficits,	the	
monetary	squeeze	should	be	viewed	as	credible.	Even	if	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	did	
not	increase	following	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	a	decrease	in	the	present	
value	of	future	budget	deficits	may	produce	an	increase	in	the	sustainable	level	of	public	debt	
(i.e.,	in	terms	of	Fig.	5.2,	there	is	an	upward	jump	in	bS	at	time	tA,	and	the	new	steady	state	
Source:	Bank	of	Israel.
Fig. 5.3. Inflation and growth rate of money in Israel, 1982—1990
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Table 5.1. Budget	deficit	finance	in	Israel,	1978—1990	(percent	of	GNP)
Period
Budget 
deficit
Base Money 
Creation
Domestic debt 
finance
Foreign debt 
finance
Unaccounted 
finance
1978—1980 17,2 2,0 7,3 6,9
1981—1983 14,1 2,1 7,2 4,9
1984 12,7 2,9 0,2 5,3 4,4
1985 –0,6 5,8 –6,5 –3,9 4,0
1986—1990 1,3 –0,1 0,3 –0,9 2,0
Source:	Bruno,	1993	(extract	from	Table	3.1,	p.	46).
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level	of	bS	after	time	tS	may	be	even	higher	than	the	initial	steady	state,	before	tA).	Thus,	a	tight	
monetary	policy	that	is	aimed	to	fight	high	inflation	is	much	more	likely	to	be	credible	if	it	
is	supported	by	fiscal	adjustment.	After	all,	this	policy	mix	makes	the	current	level	of	public	
debt	sustainable.
Chile, 1974—1975
Chilean	macroeconomic	policy	after	the	military	coup	in	September,	1973	provides	an-
other	example	of	a	rather	successful	stabilization	program.	Along	with	other	Latin	American	
countries,	Chile	in	the	1960s	was	a	typical	high	inflation	country	with	an	average	annual	infla-
tion	rate	well	above	20	percent.	The	economic	situation	became	worse	in	1972	under	the	social-
ist-populist	policy	of	Allende.	Its	government	ran	extremely	high	fiscal	deficits	(see	Fig.	5.4).	At	
the	same	time	inflation	moved	from	the	two-digit	to	the	three-digit	range	(see	Fig.	5.5).	
In	1974	and	1975	the	new	military	government	carried	out	an	orthodox	program	to	stop	
accelerating	inflation.	A	major	tax	reform	was	introduced.	Government	spending	was	drasti-
cally	cut,	and	some	government	assets	were	sold.	Budget	deficits	were	reduced	and	in	some	
time	there	appeared	fiscal	surpluses.12	However,	despite	the	disappearance	of	the	main	source	
of	inflation,	the	rate	of	inflation	decreased	relatively	slowly,	returning	to	the	two-digit	range	
only	in	1977	(it	continued	to	further	decrease,	reaching	the	one-digit	range	in	1981).	Corbo	
and	Solimano	(1991)	attribute	this	failure	to	the	very	high	degree	of	immanent	inflation	iner-
tia,	the	exchange	rate	policy	of	devaluing	the	peso	between	1978	and	198213,	and	effects	from	
backward-looking	wage	 indexation	 schemes.	 Indeed,	 in	 comparison	with	 aggressive	 fiscal	
adjustment,	Chilean	monetary	policy	was	not	very	tight,	but	rather	accommodative.
Actually,	the	problems	of	a	nominal	synchronization	under	inflation	inertia	that	are	es-
sential	in	stabilizing	chronic	high	inflation	are	not	captured	in	our	“flexible-price”	model.	
From	a	historical	perspective	this	lesson	gave	rise	to	the	conclusion	that	orthodox	stabiliza-
tion	is	a	necessarily	but	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	successful	high	inflation	stabilization.	
Additional	elements	of	income	policy	dealing	with	inflation	inertia	that	are	at	the	core	of	a	
heterodox	stabilization	are	also	needed.14	However,	orthodox	elements	of	stabilization,	i.e.	
fiscal	restraint	and	monetary	tightness,	are	still	necessary.	Therefore,	the	model	applied	to	
interpret	Israel’s	stabilization	works	here	as	well.15	Heterodox	elements	determine	mainly	the	
costs	of	the	stabilization	program.
12	 Additional	helpful	factors	were	a	rollover	of	30	percent	of	debt	outstanding	and	relatively	high	prices	
of	exportable	copper.
13	 It	was	called	Tablita — a	kind	of	crawling	peg.	Bruno	(1993)	also	 refers	 to	 this	policy	of	a	pre-an-
nounced	decreasing	crawl	(below	the	previous	month’s	inflation	rate)	as	a	“major	macro-policy	error”	that	
made	the	decrease	in	inflation	even	slower.		
14	 Obviously,	this	lesson	was	taken	into	account	in	Israel’s	stabilization	discussed	above.
15	 In	the	case	of	Chile	one	should	also	take	into	account	extremely	high	real	interest	rates	and	a	serious	
decline	in	output	following	the	fiscal	contraction,	coupled	with	adverse	external	shocks	(the	world-wide	oil	
price	shock	and	the	drop	of	copper	prices	in	1975).	See	Corbo	and	Solimano	(1991)	for	details.
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Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.4. Budget deficit in Chile, 1970—1988
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.5. Inflation and growth rate of money in Chile, 1970—1988
-10,0
-5,0
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Budget deficit(+)/surplus(-) (percent of GDP)
-100,0
0,0
100,0
200,0
300,0
400,0
500,0
600,0
700,0
800,0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
P
er
ce
nt
,
m
on
th
to
m
on
th
of
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
Growth rate of money CPI Inflation
114
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.6. Inflation and growth rate of base money in Mexico, 1982—1994
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.7. Budget deficit and public debt in Mexico, 1982—1994
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Mexico, 1987—1988
The	Mexican	stabilization	program	was	initiated	in	1987.	This	program	was	comprised	
of	a	Pact	for Economic Solidarity	and	a	Pact for Stability and Growth,	and	it	provides	another	
example	of	a	successful	combination	of	orthodox	and	heterodox	stabilization.16
Unlike	other	Latin	American	countries,	Mexico	experienced	high	inflation	over	a	rela-
tively	short	period.	Until	1982,	the	inflation	rate	was	well	below	30	percent	annually17,	while	
annual	GDP	growth	was	well	 above	6	percent.	 In	1982	Mexico	underwent	 a	 serious	debt	
crisis	(repudiating	its	external	debt).	The	exchange	rate	was	devalued	by	466	percent,	CPI	
increased	by	99	percent.	For	several	years	the	economy	became	extremely	unstable.	Initial	
attempts	to	stabilize	the	economy	were	undertaken	in	the	right	direction:	the	budget	deficit	
was	cut	and	a	rather	tight	monetary	policy	was	implemented.	However,	the	size	of	the	adjust-
ment	was	not	 sufficient.	The	 inflation	 rate	 returned	 to	 the	 two-digit	 range,	and	yet	 it	 still	
remained	very	high	(see	Fig.	5.6).	After	the	earthquake	of	1985	in	Mexico	and	the	fall	of	oil	
prices	in	early	1986,	the	balance	of	payment	deteriorated,	and	the	inflation	rate	again	began	
to	accelerate.	Finally,	in	October,	1987	the	stock	market	crashed.
By	the	end	of	1987,	the	Pact	for	Economic	Solidarity	was	announced,	and	it	was	jointly	
signed	by	 the	government	and	by	 representatives	 from	 industrial	and	agricultural	workers,	
and	from	business.	The	Pact	was	written	after	Israel’s	successful	stabilization	in	1985—1986.	
It	 included	both	orthodox	and	heterodox	elements	and	relied	 truly	on	social	“solidarity”,	
as	in	Israel’s	case.	The	main	agreement	was	a	further	increase	in	the	primary	budget	surplus	
(a	decrease	in	the	huge	operational	budget	deficit	stemming	from	high	interest	payments).	
This	was	done	in	1988	and	1989	(see	Fig.	5.7).	Monetary	policy	was	significantly	tightened	
(in	particular,	very	tight	credit	ceilings	were	announced).	The	Chilean	policy	error	was	also	
taken	 into	account:	an	agreement	between	 the	different	 sectors	of	 the	economy	upon	key	
pricing	rules	lead	to	a	rather	rapid	decline	in	inflation	(see	Fig.	5.6).	Public	debt	was	more	
than	halved	over	the	following	five	years.	Thus,	we	can	again	refer	to	the	successful	logic	of	
stabilizing	inflation	via	a	credible	tightening	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	supported	by	mea-
sures	to	break	inflation	inertia.
5.6. A temporary decrease  
in the growth rate of base money
Let	us	consider	now	a	policy	switch	that	is	not	permanent.	Assume,	as	usual,	that	initially	
the	money	market	and	the	fiscal	sphere	are	in	steady	states.	At	time	tA 	the	central	bank	an-
nounces	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	that	will	take	place	at	time	
	 
t
S
1
,	µ1	<	µ0.	
Assume	further	that	it	is	expected	that	after	time	
	 
t
S
2
> t
S
1
	monetary	policy	will	again	become	
16	 The	discussion	here	relies	on	Ortiz	(1991)	and	Bruno	(1993).	See	also	Diaz	and	Tercero	(1988),	and	
Dornbusch	and	Fischer	(1991).
17	 Before	the	1973	oil	shock,	inflation	was	even	in	the	single-digit	range.	Double-digit	inflation	became	
chronic	only	after	1975.
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loose,	so	that	µ1	<	µ0 <	µ2,	where	µ2		is	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	for		 
t ≥ t
S
2
.	In	the	simplest	
case,	the	temporary	nature	of	a	tightening	of	monetary	policy	may	be	announced	at	time	tA	as	
well.	In	general,	one	can	infer	that	the	current	policy	switch	cannot	be	permanent	if	only	be-
cause	this	would	violate	the	sustainability	and	feasibility	constraints.		Equations	(5.9)—(5.11)	
describe	the	dynamics	of	the	economy	for	this	type	of	policy.	The	corresponding	time	paths	
are	illustrated	in	Fig.	5.8.
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The	dynamics	of	the	money	market	depend	on	the	semi-elasticity	of	demand,	the	length	
of	the	time	interval	
	 
(t
S
2
− t
S
1
),	and	the	relative	magnitude	of	change	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money.	If	the	condition
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Fig. 5.8. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage, and the sustainable 
level of public debt for a temporary decrease in the growth rate of base money (µ1	<	µ0	<	µ2)
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holds,	then	real	money	balances	undergo	a	discrete	downward	jump	and	monotonically	de-
crease	to	their	new	steady	state	level,	which	is	reached	at	time	
	 
t
S
2
	(the	solid	line	in	Fig.	5.8).	
At	the	same	time	inflation	rises,	and	seigniorage	decreases.	
However,	 there	 is	another	possible	 scenario.	When	condition	(5.12)	 fails	 to	hold,	 real	
money	balances	undergo	 an	upward	 jump	after	 the	 announcement.	They	 continue	 to	 in-
crease	(gradually)	up	to	time	
	 
t
S
1
,	and	only	then	they	start	to	decrease	(see	the	dotted	line	in	
Fig.	5.8).	Assume	for	concreteness	that	the	economy	is	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	
tax	Laffer	curve.	The	new	steady	state	seigniorage	will	then	be	higher	than	it	was	initially.	It	
is	also	clear	that	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	in	the	second	scenario	is	higher	than	in	the	
first	scenario.	However,	it	depends	on	parameters	of	the	economy	and	policy	switch	in	either	
case	whether	or	not	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	will	rise	or	fall.	The	consequences	for	the	
fiscal	sphere	and	the	methods	for	maintaining	the	sustainability	of	the	public	debt	are	quali-
tatively	the	same	as	in	Section	5.3.
Ceteris paribus,	when	 the	 interest	 rate	 is	 low,	not	only	 the	near	 future	 is	 important	 in	
the	evaluation	of	the	present	value,	but	the	distant	future	as	well.	Thus,	a	long-term	rise	in	
the	steady	state	of	seigniorage	implies	an	increase	in	bS	at	time	tA	for	the	same	fiscal	policy.	
Given	this	situation,	the	government	has	the	option	to	increase	the	primary	budget	deficit,	
eliminating	the	gap	between	the	actual	(predetermined)	and	sustainable	levels	of	debt.	The	
value	of	bS	gradually	increases,	starting	from	time	tA,	to	its	new	steady	state	level	(the	solid	line	
in	Fig.	5.8;	if	we	account	for	the	fiscal	correction	described	above,	this	line	should	be	shifted	
down	to	be	continuous).	
On	the	other	hand,	if	the	interest	rate	is	high	enough,	this	kind	of	monetary	policy	will	
result	in	a	decrease	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	at	time	tA.	To	maintain	sustainability	in	
the	fiscal	sphere,	the	government	should	reduce	the	primary	budget	deficit.	The	public	debt	
will	gradually	decrease	until	time	
	 
t
S
1
,	and	then	rise	to	its	new	steady	state	level	(one	should	
imagine	a	line	parallel	to	the	dotted	line	for	bS	in	Fig.	5.8	to	account	for	a	fiscal	correction	to	
eliminate	discontinuity	and	unsustainability).
And	finally,	there	is	a	theoretical	knife-edge	possibility	that	the	described	changes	in	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	will	not	change	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	at	all.	Thus	there	
is	no	need	(and	no	option)	for	fiscal	adjustment18.	Tables	A5.2.1—2	in	the	Appendix	contain	
the	specifications	of	numerical	experiments	that	support	these	conclusions.
5.7. Reaganomics II: A forward-looking interpretation
In	section	4.7	we	proposed	an	explanation	of	the	decrease	in	inflation	in	1982—1983	in	
the	U.S.	that	took	place	despite	a	substantial	ease	in	monetary	policy;	that	was	essentially	a	
backward-looking	explanation.	Here	we	 suggest	an	alternative	 interpretation	of	 the	event,	
one	that	is	based	on	forward-looking	considerations.	For	convenience,	we	reproduce	the	dy-
namics	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	federal	funds	rate	and	inflation	in	Fig.	5.9.
18	 We	do	not	depict	this	case	in	Fig.	5.8.
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Although	 at	 first,	 in	 1979,	Volcker’s	 attempt	 to	 fight	 inflation	was	 not	 perceived	 as	 a	
credible	policy	shift,	inflation	started	to	decrease	in	1980.	And	with	the	exception	of	a	mo-
dest	 increase	in	the	inflation	rate	in	1983,	disinflation	was	present	until	1986.	Let	us	con-
sider	the	following	theoretical	experiment	that	resembles	the	actual	Federal	Reserve	policy	
in	the	time	interval	from	1982	until	1985.	Assume	that	at	some	date	tA	the	public	began	to
expect	that	monetary	policy	would	be	temporally	eased	in	the	future	time	interval	
	 
t
S
1
,t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦.	It
was	also	expected	that	after	
	 
t
S
2	
monetary	policy	would	be	even	tighter	than	it	was	originally:	
µ2 < µ0 < µ2.	This	experiment’s	setting	is	simply	the	regular	reflection	of	the	case	studied	in	the	
Section	4.4,	in	which	monetary	policy	was	temporarily	tightened	and	then	eased.	It	follows	
that	the	trajectories	of	other	variables	can	be	constructed	and	interpreted	as	the	regular	re-
flection	of	trajectories	in	Fig.	5.8,	and	so	we	do	not	repeat	the	discussion	here.	Assume	further	
that	condition	(5.12)	holds.	Figure	5.10	illustrates	the	dynamics	of	the	system.
Despite	 the	 temporary	 ease	 in	monetary	 policy,	 the	 inflation	 rate	 declines	 as	 long	 as	
the	public	expects	 that	 the	disinflation	policy	will	be	renewed	in	the	future.	This	can	be	a	
probable	explanation	of	actual	beliefs.	Indeed,	as	was	discussed	in	Section	4.7,	the	Federal	
Reserve	was	forced	to	reduce	the	federal	funds	rate	in	the	face	of	a	threat	that	the	Mexican	fi-
nancial	crisis	may	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	American	economy	due	to	very	high	interest	
rates	at	the	time.	Thus,	it	could	have	been	expected	that	the	policy	shift	was	temporary,	and	
after	the	passing	of	some	time	the	Federal	Reserve	would	continue	to	fight	inflation.
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 5.9. Monetary policy and inflation in the U.S., 1979—1988
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Fig. 5.10. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage,  
and the sustainable level of public debt for a temporary increase in the growth rate  
of base money (µ2 < µ0 < µ1 )
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We	can	also	see	that	while	the	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage	becomes	lower	for	
	 
t > t
S
2
,	
it	will	temporarily	become	higher	during	the	interval	
	 
t
A
,t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦.	It	then	follows	that	its	present	
discounted	value	may	increase	at	time	tA,	which	is	most	likely	if	the	interest	rate	on	public	
debt	is	sufficiently	high.	Indeed,	as	we	noted,	the	interest	rates	in	U.S.	economy	were	rela-
tively	high	during	that	period.	
If	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	indeed	increases	at	time	tA,	then,	assuming	no	change	
in	 expected	 future	 budget	 deficits,	 the	 sustainable	 level	 of	 public	 debt	 also	 increases	 at	
time	tA .
19	After	 that	 it	 increases	gradually	 for	 some	 time	and	 then	decreases.	Eventually	 it	
reaches	a	constant	 level	 that	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 initial	 level.	This	 follows	 from	the	 fact	 that	
the	new	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage	becomes	lower	than	it	was	initially.	This	observation	
has	important	implication	for	future	policy:	a	lower	sustainable	level	of	public	debt	imposes	
stronger	restrictions	on	the	government’s	ability	to	support	budget	deficits.	Thus,	disinflation	
that	was	a	result	of	the	policy	experiment	considered	in	this	section	(and	in	actual	history)	
does	not	solve	the	problem	stressed	by	Sargent	(1985,	1986):	tight	monetary	policy	and	fis-
cal	imbalances	are	not	credible	in	the	long	run.	At	least	one	agent	will	“chicken	out”	sooner	
or	later.	If	we	take	monetary	policy	as	exogenous	(dominant),	then	the	public	should	expect	
that	the	government	will	be	able	to	provide	fiscal	surpluses	in	a	sufficient	amount	(and	over	a	
sufficiently	long	period).
5.8. Temporary changes in policy and “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”
As	shown	above,	when	an	economy	is	functioning	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	
Laffer	curve,	a	permanent	reduction	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	can	lead	to	a	fall	in	the	
present	value	of	seigniorage,	and	thus	make	the	public	debt	unsustainable.	In	principle,	the	
government	should	adjust	its	fiscal	policy	and	reduce	the	primary	budget	deficit.	It	is,	how-
ever,	possible	that	the	government	either	does	not	want	to	do	this	because	of	certain	political	
or	economic	considerations,	or	because	of	the	existence	of	a	lower	bound	on	d(t).20	In	this	
case,	a	switch	in	monetary	policy	of	this	sort	cannot	be	permanent.	It	is	also	natural	to	assume	
that	private	agents	will	realize	this	fact	and	take	it	into	consideration.	
Assume	that	both	the	type	and	the	timing	of	policy	changes	are	known	in	advance,	as	
if	they	were	an	announced	commitment.	In	reality,	of	course,	economic	agents	face	uncer-
tainties	about	the	type	and	timing	of	policy	switches.	We	will	return	to	this	point	in	the	next	
section.	Introduction	of	these	simplifying	assumptions	brings	our	analysis	closer	to	the	logic	
of	the	celebrated	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”.	At	time	
	 
t
S
1
	monetary	policy	becomes	
loose,	as	was	known	in	advance	at	time	tA.	However,	if	this	policy	destroys	the	sustainability	
of	public	debt,	it	cannot	be	permanent.	At	a	certain	time	
	 
t
S
2
	the	central	bank	has	to	bring	the	
economy	back	to	a	steady	state.	
19	 Note	that	this	is	the	sustainable,	not	actual,	level	of	public	debt,	and	therefore	we	can	apply	this	result	
to	interpret	the	actual	public	debt	dynamics	during	the	period	being	considered.		
20	 We	discuss	this	problem	later	in	Section	5.14.
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Must	it	always	be	true	that	the	economy	will	eventually	suffer	from	a	higher	steady	state	
rate	of	inflation	(a	higher	growth	rate	of	base	money)?	In	other	words,	should	private	agents	
form	expectations	that	µ0 < µ2	is	the	only	possible	outcome?	The	scenario	that	we	considered	
earlier	(Fig.	5.8)	can	be	viewed	as	a	corroboration	of	the	Sargent-Wallace	result:	monetary	
policy	cannot	be	tightened	permanently;	lower	inflation	now,	if	it	is	possible	at	all,	eventually	
results	in	higher	inflation	in	the	future.	
Surprisingly,	 for	certain	values	of	 the	parameters	 it	 is	quite	possible	 to	keep	 the	pres-
ent	value	of	seigniorage	constant	(or	even	increase	it)	when	µ1 < µ2 < µ0,	i.e.	when	the	final	
monetary	policy	need	not	be	more	expansionary	than	it	was	initially.	In	other	words,	we	will	
show	that	in	a	certain	sense	monetary	policy	can	be	tightened	in	the	long	run	without	violat-
ing	fiscal	sustainability	and,	more	importantly,	without	long-run	inflationary	consequences.	
Figure	5.11	illustrates	the	logic.	From	equations	(5.9)—(5.11)	and	the	criterion	(5.12)	one	can	
unambiguously	conclude	that	for	µ1 < µ2 < µ0	the	log	of	real	money	balances	and	hence	seig-
niorage	increase	on	the	interval	
	 
t
A
, t
S
1
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦,	including	a	discrete	increase	at	tA,	while	inflation
decreases.	Then,	for	the	time	interval	
	 
t
S
1
, t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦,	the	log	of	real	money	balances	starts	to	de-
crease	to	its	new	steady	state,	and	reaches	it	at	time	
	 
t
S
2
	(inflation,	consequently,	increases).	
The	new	steady	state	level	of	real	money	balances	(inflation)	is	higher	(lower),	than	it	was	
initially.	One	can	view	this	as	something	like	“pleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”.	At	the	same	
time,	seigniorage	 jumps	up	at	 tA;	 it	 then	gradually	 increases	until	 	 
t
S
1
,	 jumps	down	and	de-
creases	on	the	interval	
	 
t
S
1
, t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦;	eventually,	after	a	final	discrete	increase	at	time		 
t
S
2
,	it	will	stay
	at	a	new	steady	state	level	that	is	lower	than	it	was	initially	(we	are	using	our	usual	assump-
tion	about	the	economy	being	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	Laffer	curve).	Even	so,	the	present	
value	of	seigniorage	at	time	tA 	may	remain	constant	or	even	increase,	for	the	simple	reason
that	on	the	time	interval	
	 
t
A
, t
S
1
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦	seigniorage	will	be	higher	then	it	was	initially.	This	is	likely
to	be	possible	for	high	interest	rates,	which	make	the	fall	in	seigniorage	in	the	distant	future	
less	important	(for	the	evaluation	of	present	value)	than	its	increase	in	the	short	run.	Conse-
quently,	fiscal	sustainability	is	not	violated,	and	there	is	even	an	option	for	the	government	
to	expand21.
Figure	5.11	illustrates	this	“pleasant	monetarist	scenario”.	The	primary	budget	deficit	
remains	constant.	At	time	tA 	the	value	of	bS	may	discretely	fall	(ceteris paribus for	low	interest	
rates),	rise	(for	high	interest	rates),	or	simply	remain	unchanged	(shown	by	the	solid,	dotted,	
and	chain	lines,	respectively,	in	Fig.	5.11).
If	the	actual	parameters	of	the	economy	are	such	that	it	is	possible	to	find	the	needed	
parameterization	for	this	kind	of	monetary	policy,	the	public	debt	may	be	kept	on	a	sustain-
able	path.	After	a	gradual	decrease	during	the	interval	
	 
t
A
, t
S
1
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦,	it	increases	to	its	new	steady
21	 Of	course,	this	is	true	under	the	assumption	that	private	agents	do	know	precisely	which	kind	of	policy	
will	be	chosen	by	policymakers.
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Fig. 5.11. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage,  
and the sustainable level of public debt for a temporary decrease in the growth rate  
of base money (µ1	<	µ2	<	µ0)
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Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.12. Inflation and growth rate of money in Argentina, 1980—1992
Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	Group.
Fig. 5.13. Debt burden in Argentina, 1980—1992
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state	level,	which	is	lower	than	the	initial	one.	Table	A5.3	in	the	Appendix	presents	concrete	
specifications	of	the	parameters	in	the	model	and	a	numerical	experiment	that	demonstrates	
the	fall	and	rise	of	bS(tA).	Again,	due	to	computational	complexity	we	do	not	illustrate	nu-
merically	the	knife-edge	case	of	an	unchanged	bS(tA)	that	seems,	nevertheless,	possible.
5.9. Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic at work: 
The failure of the Austral Plan in Argentina
In	Section	5.5	we	discussed	examples	of	a	more	or	less	successful	stabilization	of	high	
inflation	and	public	debt	in	two	Latin	American	countries,	namely	Chile	and	Mexico,	and	
in	Israel.	The	stabilization	program	in	Argentina,	the	so-called	Austral	Plan,	started	roughly	
at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 Israel’s	 stabilization	 program.	However,	 Argentina’s	 stabilization	 ef-
fort	(along	with	the	Crusado	Plan	in	Brazil	in	1986)	provides	an	example	of	an	incomplete	
and	unsuccessful	stabilization	program.	What	is	most	interesting	for	us	is	that	this	failure	re-
sembles	the	logic	of	unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic.22
The	 economic	 situation	 in	Argentina	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	1980s	was	 extremely	bad.	
Average	annual	growth	rate	of	GDP	was	about	0.5	percent	between	1975	and	1985	(it	was	
positive	in	the	1970’s	and	it	became	negative	in	the	1980s).	During	this	period,	inflation	was	
almost	always	in	the	three-digit	range	(see	Fig.	5.12).	It	was	brought	down	to	the	two-digit	
range	 in	1980.	Soon	after,	however,	 it	 again	entered	 the	 three-digit	 range	and	accelerated	
further.	In	May	1985,	the	annual	inflation	rate	became	higher	than	1000	percent.	The	fiscal	
position	was	characterized	by	chronic	deficit.	Public	and	publicly	guaranteed	debt	more	than	
tripled	between	1980	and	1985	(see	Fig.	5.13).
The	Austral	Plan	was	announced	 in	 June	1985.	Like	 Israel’s	 stabilization	program,	 it	
combined	orthodox	measures	(a	cut	in	the	budget	deficit	aimed	at	stopping	inflationary	fi-
nance)	and	a	price,	wage	and	exchange	rate	freeze	(aimed	at	breaking	inflation	inertia)	along	
with	an	introduction	of	a	new	currency,	the	austral (pegged	at	USD0.8).	
Table 5.2. Budget	deficit	and	seigniorage	in	Argentina,	1984—1988	(percent	of	GDP)
Primary deficit Interest payments Operational Deficit Seigniorage
1984
I 5,8 5,2 11,0 10,2
II 3,4 5,9 9,3 7,2
III 2,1 4,8 6,9 5,2
IV 3,7 5,6 9,3 5,8
22	 Discussion	in	this	section	is	based	on	Heymann	(1991)	and	Bruno	(1993).	See	also	Canavese	and	Di	
Tella	(1988),	Machinea	and	Fanelli	(1988),	and	Kiguel	and	Liviatan	(1991).
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Primary deficit Interest payments Operational Deficit Seigniorage
1985
I 3,6 6,5 10,1 6,0
II 0,1 6,4 6,5 6,8
III -3,5 6,5 3,0 8,9
IV -4,8 6,8 2 4,1
1986
I –1,1 5,8 4,7 4,1
II –3,5 5,7 2,2 3,3
III –1,3 2,8 1,5 2,4
IV 3,0 5,7 8,7 3,1
1987
I 1,0 4,1 5,1 4,5
II 0,4 6,3 5,7 2,7
III 1,4 6,7 8,1 1,7
IV 1,6 4,3 5,9 5,0
1988
I 0,3 9,0 9,3 3,3
II –0,7 5,8 5,1 4,2
III 2,6 0,9 3,5 5,3
IV 2,1 4,0 6,1 5,0
Source:	Heymann	(1991).
The	Plan	was	initially	successful.	The	government	was	indeed	able	to	substantially	cut	the	
deficit	(see	Table	5.2).	The	annual	inflation	rate	decreased	from	1129	percent	in	July	1985	to	
50	percent	in	July	1986.	However,	success	was	very	short	lived.	The	main	problem	was	that	the	
government	was	not	able	to	succeed	in	cutting	the	budget.	The	initial	increase	in	tax	revenues	
was	mainly	associated	with	the	Olivera-Tanzi	opposite	effect	of	the	price	freeze.	By	the	end	of	
1986	the	budget	deficit	was	again	very	high.	Inflation	started	to	accelerate	once	more.	Things	
went	out	of	control	under	open	hyperinflation	that	was	stabilized	only	in	1991.23
For	the	purposes	of	our	analysis,	we	are	not	interested	in	the	particular	reasons	why	the	
government	was	not	able	to	sustain	a	sufficient	budget	cut	over	a	long	period	of	time.24	Tak-
23	 Brazil,	which	was	in	roughly	the	same	economic	situation	in	the	1980s,	introduced	the	Crusado	Plan	
in	1986.	Initially,	Brazil	was	able	to	reduce	inflation	mainly	via	a	price	freeze,	but	as	in	Argentina’s	case	this	
eventually	led	to	even	higher	inflation.	Researches	come	to	the	conclusion	that	the	Austral	Plan	in	Argentina	
was	at	least	well	designed	initially,	while	there	was	no	attempt	to	adjust	the	fiscal	position	or	conduct	tight	mo-
netary	policy	during	Brazil’s	stabilization.	See,	for	example,	Cardoso	(1991),	Dornbusch	and	Fischer	(1991),	
and	Kiguel	and	Leviatan	(1991).	It	is	for	this	reason	that	we	pay	little	attention	to	the	Brazilian	experience	of	
the	1980’s.	
24	 See	a	discussion	on	this	subject	and	a	comparison	with	Israel’s	stabilization	in	Bruno	(1993).
Continuation of Table 5.2
127
ing	this	fact	as	it	is,	we	can	interpret	the	Austral	Plan	as	an	example	of	unpleasant	monetar-
ist	arithmetic	at	work.	Indeed,	what	was	done	(although	it	was	not	planned	so	badly)	was	an	
effort	 to	 fight	 inflation	by	 tight	monetary	policy	without	 implementing	 the	corresponding	
fiscal	correction.	As	we	discussed	in	Section	5.6,	a	permanent	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	
money,	if	not	supported	by	fiscal	adjustment,	may	not	be	credible	in	general.	This	was	true	in	
the	case	of	the	Austral	Plan.	In	a	situation	of	extremely	high	public	debt,	when	the	govern-
ment	became	unable	to	continue	its	initially	tight	fiscal	policy	in	the	future,	monetary	policy	
was	pushed	to	finance	the	increasing	budget	deficit.	After	a	period	of	successful	decrease,	the	
inflation	rate	started	to	increase	again.	This	scenario	roughly	resembles	the	time	path	of	infla-
tion	depicted	by	the	dotted	line	in	Fig.	5.8.	Moreover,	seigniorage	revenue,	which	first	rose	at	
the	beginning	of	the	stabilization	program,	then	decreased,	and	finally	became	higher	again	
(see	Table	5.2),	also	corresponds	to	the	time	path	in	Fig.	5.8.
5.10. The Asian crisis of 1997:  
Tight monetary policy and prospective deficits
Usually,	economists	treat	the	Asian	crisis	of	1997	as	a	currency	crisis.25	However,	there	
are	certain	fiscal	and	monetary	features	of	this	crisis	that	make	it	a	good	historical	example	
for	our	analysis.	Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	(2001)	suggest	a	theoretical	model	and	
empirical	evidence	in	support	of	the	view	that	a	currency	crisis	may	take	place	even	when	
monetary	policy	is	reasonably	tight	and	the	fiscal	sphere	is	currently	balanced,	so	that	there	is	
no	concern	about	insufficient	reserves	for	maintaining	a	fixed	exchange	rate	regime	or	about	
poor	current	fiscal	fundamentals.	The	key	idea	is	that	a	large	publicly	guaranteed	debt	ac-
cumulated	by	the	private	sector	creates	expectations	of	large	prospective	fiscal	deficits.	This	
in	turn	creates	fears	of	the	monetization	of	future	deficits,	and	thus	higher	inflation	now	and	
in	the	future.	We	can	strengthen	this	point	by	means	of	the	theoretical	examples	considered	
above.
Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	 (2001)	consider	 the	 situation	 in	 the	period	before	
the	Asian	crisis	 in	 five	countries:	 Indonesia,	South	Korea,	Malaysia,	 the	Philippines,	 and	
Thailand.	In	all	these	countries,	the	fiscal	balance	was	positive	in	1995—1996	(as	shown	in	
Fig.	5.14).	However,	as	we	have	stressed	throughout	the	chapter,	the	current	fiscal	stance	is	
not	essential	in	determining	the	sustainability	of	the	fiscal	sphere.	Indeed,	what	is	important	
is	the	future	backing	of	government	liabilities,	that	is,	the	government’s	ability	to	provide	suf-
ficient	budget	surpluses	and/or	seigniorage	in	the	future	to	meet	its	current	obligations.	And	
this	was	one	of	the	main	problems	in	all	of	the	five	chosen	countries.	Difficulties	arose	in	the	
private	banking	sector.	Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	(2001)	provide	evidence	that	the	
public	was	expecting	a	failure	in	the	banking	sector,	and,	due	to	implicit	bailout	guaranties,	
the	consequent	rise	of	large	government	deficits.	
25	 See	a	general	discussion	on	the	Asian	1997	crisis	in	Furman	and	Stiglitz	(1998),	Kaminski	and	Schmuk-
ler	(1999),	Radelet	and	Sachs	(1998),	and	Corsetti,	Pesenti	and	Roubini	(1998a,	b),	among	others.
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 Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 5.14. Budget surplus (deficit) in selected countries, 1995—2005
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 5.15. Domestic and foreign debt in selected countries, 1995—2005
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In	fact,	for	the	purposes	of	our	study	it	is	not	of	much	importance	what	the	real	source	of	
expectations	was	that	the	government	would	be	stricken	by	huge	fiscal	deficits	in	the	future.	
We	take	expected	future	deficits	as	an	assumption,	but	we	can	indeed	see	a	tremendous	turn-
over	in	the	fiscal	stance	after	the	crisis	in	Fig.	5.14	and	5.15.
The	question	is:	Do	prospective	deficits	necessarily	provoke	inflation	and	was	it	true	for	
the	Asian	countries?	The	simple	arithmetic	provided	in	Section	5.3	shows	that	an	expected	
increase	in	future	deficits	can lead	to	higher	inflation.	Indeed,	at	the	time	when	public	change	
expectations	about	the	future	fiscal	balance	(expected	future	surpluses	are	replaced	by	expec-
ted	future	deficits),	the	current	level	of	public	debt	may	become	unsustainable	or	unbacked	by	
the	government	itself.	Treating	this	shift	in	fiscal	policy	as	exogenous,	since	the	government	
has	to	meet	its	guaranties	on	bad	private	loans,	one	should	expect	an	endogenous	increase	in	
the	present	discounted	value	of	future	seigniorage	as	an	additional	source	of	finance.26	This	
in	turn	can	be	achieved	by	means	of	loose	monetary	policy.	Figure	5.1	provides	the	simplest	
example	of	an	increase	in	the	present	discounted	value	of	seigniorage	supported	by	a	perma-
nent	increase	in	(the	constant)	growth	rate	of	base	money.	But	as	we	stressed	in	Section	5.3	
this	is	the	policy	option	that	holds	only	in	the	case	of	a	relatively	low	interest	rate.	When	the	
interest	rate	on	public	debt	is	relatively	high,	a	permanent	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money	can	produce	a	decrease	in	the	present	discounted	value	of	seigniorage.	This	makes	the	
current	public	debt	even	more	unsustainable,	and	thus	this	is	not	a	policy	option	here.	Sec-
tion	5.4	and	Fig.	5.2	provide	the	logic	of	how	a	permanent	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money	can	produce	an	increase	in	the	present	discounted	value	of	seigniorage	in	the	case	of	
a	relatively	high	interest	rate.	Sections	5.6	and	5.8	develop	the	similar	argumentation	in	the	
case	of	temporary	changes	in	macroeconomic	policy.
Addressing	this	logic	for	the	case	of	the	Asian	crisis	of	1997	is	not	an	easy	task.	There	are	
two	separate	problems.	The	first	is	determining	what	“relatively	low”	and	“relatively	high”	
interest	rates	actually	are.	In	our	model,	different	policy	options	appear	not	only	because	of	
different	magnitudes	of	the	real	interest	rate,	but	also	because	of	different	semi-elasticities	of	
money	demand	and	the	time	intervals	(or	their	combinations,	to	be	precise).	Moreover,	in	
the	case	of	a	temporary	change	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	we	derived	a	specific	condi-
tion,	(5.12),	that	determines	the	possible	outcomes.	After	all,	in	the	real	world,	interest	rates	
are	not	constant	through	time	and	states	of	nature,	as	in	our	simple	model,	and	public	debt	
consists	of	different	financial	instruments	with	different	yields.	On	one	hand,	our	logic	hardly	
answers	the	question	of	whether	prospective	deficits	provoked	inflation	in	Asia	in	1997.	How-
ever,	we	can	at	least	stress	that	there	could	be	different	policy	options	(stated	above)	for	dif-
ferent	economies.27	On	the	other	hand,	having	observed	monetary	expansion	and	an	increase	
in	inflation	after	the	crisis	(see	Fig.	5.16	and	5.17),	we	can	use	the	first	scenario	(in	which	an	
increase	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	may	be	provided	by	a	permanent	increase	in	the	
26	 Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	(2001)	argue	that	it	was	hardly	expected	that	government	will	be	
able	to	adjust	its	balance.
27	 This	contradicts	the	unambiguous	statement	of	Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	(2001).
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Source: International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 5.16. Growth rate of money in selected countries, 1995—2005
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	
Fig. 5.17. CPI growth rate in selected countries, 1995—2005
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growth	rate	of	base	money)	to	understand	the	logic	of	the	crisis	in	terms	of	a	problem	of	fiscal	
sustainability.28	
The	second	problem	is	that	the	whole	discussion	on	the	importance	of	fiscal	sustain-
ability	 relies	on	 the	 specific	 assumptions	 that	we	 stressed	 in	Chapter	2:	 the	 interest	 rate	
should	 be	 higher	 than	 the	GDP	 growth	 rate	 (the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 public	 debt	 to	GDP	
ratio	should	be	stable	on	a	backward-looking	basis).29	Addressing	this	question	for	the	se-
lected	five	countries	before	and	after	the	crisis	is	again	a	difficult	task,	since	GDP	growth	
varies	substantially	from	year	to	year	just	like	interest	rates	do.30	Moreover,	the	crisis	led	to	
a	dramatic	slump	for	at	least	one	year	in	all	five	countries.	Table	5.3	shows	the	annual	GDP	
growth	rates	and	the	real	rates	of	interest.	The	latter	is	taken	as	the	lending	rate	minus	the	
inflation	rate.	Although	this	is	not	a	precise	measure	for	the	discount	rate	in	the	calcula-
tion	of	the	present	value	of	future	budget	surpluses	and	seigniorage,	it	is	sufficient	for	the	
purposes	of	illustration.	Positions	marked	by	bold	italic	type	depict	periods	in	which	the	
interest	rate	was	higher	than	the	GDP	growth	rate.	We	can	see	that	these	periods	prevail	in	
all	countries	except	for	Malaysia.	In	the	first	approximation,	this	fact	can	be	interpreted	as	
that,	indeed,	fiscal	sustainability	matters	for	this	case	study.	However,	it	goes	without	saying	
that	more	rigorous	research	is	needed	here.
The	last	point	in	this	discussion	is	that,	again,	the	narrow	framework	of	our	research	li-
mits	us.	Although	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	interaction	issues	may	be	important	for	explain-
ing	the	crisis,	its	true	nature	is	much	more	complicated.	Specifically,	further	analysis	should	
take	into	account	not	only	monetary	policy,	but	also	the	exchange	rate	policy	of	the	central	
bank	before	and	after	the	crisis.
Table 5.3. GDP	growth	and	real	interest	rates	in	selected	countries,	1995—2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
In
do
ne
si
a GDP	growth1 8,4 7, 4,7 –13,1 0,8 4,9 3,8 4,4 4,7 5,1 5,6
Real	interest	
rate2
8,3 9,5 8,2 –24,6 11,8 –1,7 1,6 12,2 12,0 7,4 0,3
T
ha
ila
nd GDP	growth
1 9,5 5,9 –1,4 –10,5 4,4 4,8 2,2 5,3 7,0 6,2 4,5
Real	interest	
rate2
7,3 9,0 9,2 4,7 13, ,4 5,1 ,0 4,2 2,1 1,2
K
or
ea
GDP	growth1 9,2 7,0 4,7 –,9 9,5 8,5 3,8 7,0 3,1 4,7 4,0
Real	interest	
rate2
1,5 3,5 ,9 8,9 9,5 7,8 4,0 3,8 3,4 3,3 5,9
28	 This	means	that	we	“believe”	that	interest	rates	were	“relatively	low”.
29	 Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	(2001)	do	not	discuss	this	problem.
30	 This	resembles	the	polemic	between	Darby	(1984)	and	Miller	and	Sargent	(1984)	that	was	discussed	
in	Chapter	2.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M
al
ay
si
a GDP	growth1 9,8 10,0 7,3 -7,4 ,1 8,9 0,3 4,4 5,4 7,1 5,3
Real	interest	
rate2
4,9 6,0 6,9 3,4 8,5 2,7 10,3 2,7 2,7 -0,2 1,4
P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s GDP	growth1 4,7 5,8 5,2 -0, 3,4 6,0 1,8 4,4 4,5 6,0 5,1
Real	interest	
rate2
, ,7 9,5 5,7 3,5 4,3 5,7 4,4 5, 3,8 3,9
Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	Group.
1	Annual,	percent.
2	Annual,	percent.	Defined	as	lending	interest	rate	adjusted	for	inflation.
5.11. Uncertainty about the magnitude and the direction of change  
in the growth rate of base money
Up	to	now	we	have	accepted	the	assumption	of	perfect	foresight:	there	was	no	uncer-
tainty	about	what	kind	of	change	in	macroeconomic	policy	would	occur	and	when.	Here	and	
in	the	following	section	we	consider	two	simple	examples.	In	the	first	one	there	is	uncertainty	
about	the	magnitude	as	well	as	about	the	direction	of	the	change	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money.	In	the	second	example	we	consider	the	situation	in	which	private	agents	do	not	know	
for	certain	the	type	of	impending	policy	switch.	Specifically,	they	do	not	know	whether	there	
will	be	changes	in	fiscal	or	in	monetary	policy.	However,	in	both	examples	we	continue	to	as-
sume	that	the	timing	of	the	changes	in	the	policies	is	perfectly	known.	
Suppose	 that	 at	 time	 tA	 private	 agents	 are	 informed	 that	 the	 central	 bank	 intends	 to	
change	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	at	time	tS.	However,	up	to	time	tS	there	is	no	informa-
tion	about	whether	it	will	be	reduced	or	increased	with	respect	to	the	initial	value	of	µ0.	For	
this	situation,	equations	(5.6)—(5.8)	can	be	written	as
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Continuation of Table 5.3
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where	
	 
E
t
A
μ
1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦	is	the	expected	new	growth	rate	of	base	money	at	time	tA.
Figure	5.18	depicts	the	dynamics	of	the	economy	for	various	cases.	Let	us	assume	for	con-
creteness	that	the	central	bank	actually	increases	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	The	opposite	
situation	can	be	easily	considered	as	well.	The	first	possibility	is	that	the	expected	growth	rate	
of	base	money	will	be	higher	than	that	which	was	actually	chosen.	The	path	of	the	log	of	real	
money	balances	(the	chain	line	in	Fig.	5.18)	is	located	lower	than	it	would	be	under	certainty	
(the	solid	line	in	Fig.	5.18).	No	matter	what	the	new	steady	state	is,	the	economy	suffers	from	
excess	inflation	during	transition.	The	actual	present	value	of	seigniorage	is	lower	than	under	
certainty.	Quite	naturally,	a	situation	in	which	private	agents	overestimate	the	future	growth	rate	
of	base	money	is	a	disadvantage	both	for	the	central	bank	and	for	the	government.	
In	the	second	case,	
	 
μ
0
< E
t
A
μ
1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < μ1 ,	and	the	log	of	real	money	balances	(inflation)	is
decreasing	(increasing).	However,	its	path	(the	long-chain	line	in	Fig.	5.18)	is	above	(below)	
the	 solid	 line	 that	 characterizes	 the	 certainty	 case.	This	 scenario	 is	 favorable	both	 for	 the	
central	bank	and	for	the	government,	as	long	as	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	is	higher	and	
inflation	lower	than	they	could	be,	at	least	during	transition.	The	government	acquires	the	
option	to	increase	spending	or	to	cut	taxes.
In	the	third	and	final	case,	
	 
μ
0
< E
t
A
μ
1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < μ1,	the	log	of	real	money	balances	and	seig-
niorage	 increase	 and	 inflation	 falls	 during	 the	 transition	 period	
	 
t
A
,t
S
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦	 (see	 the	 double-
dashed	line	in	Fig.	5.18).	
All	of	the	cases	considered	above	demonstrate	the	interest	of	both	the	central	bank	and	
the	government	in	having	private	agents	underestimate	the	future	growth	rate	of	base	money,	
and	especially	for	them	to	expect	its	decrease	rather	than	its	increase31.	As	an	extreme	case,	
the	best	way	to	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage,	given	that	the	economy	is	on	the	
“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve,	is	to	form	expectations	among	private	agents	for	
a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	and	then	to	actually	increase	it32.
The	bottom	diagram	in	Fig.	5.18	shows	sustainable	public	debt	dynamics.	We	see	from	
the	previous	analysis	that,	under	conditions	of	certainty,	a	permanent	increase	in	the	growth	
rate	of	base	money	results	 in	a	discrete	 fall	 in	bS 	at	 time	 tA	 (the	solid	 line	 in	Fig.	5.18),	 if	
31	 However,	 in	 this	specification	one	must	be	careful	about	extra	 jumps	 in	 inflation.	Most	economists	
believe	that	such	shocks	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	economy	for	many	reasons.	See,	e.g.,	Beckerman	(1992),	
Heymann,	Leijonhufvud	(1995).
32	 In	general	this	can	lead	to	the	dynamic	inconsistency	problem	(Kydland,	Prescott,	1977),	but	here	we	
are	not	concerned	about	this	for	the	simple	reason	that	we	do	not	introduce	any	kind	of	policy	trade-off	that	
could	give	rise	to	this	problem.
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Fig. 5.18. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage,  
and the sustainable level of public debt for the case of a permanent increase in growth rate  
of base money of uncertain magnitude
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only	the	interest	rate	is	high	enough.	The	government	must	cut	the	primary	budget	deficit	
in	order	to	keep	the	debt	on	a	sustainable	path.	If,	under	conditions	of	uncertainty,	private	
agents	overestimate	the	rise	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	then	the	announcement	of	a	
downward	 jump	in	bS	 should	be	even	 larger	(the	chain	 line	 in	Fig.	5.18).	The	government	
must	 implement	 a	 greater	 cut	 in	 the	primary	deficit.	 In	 the	 case	when	
	 
μ
0
< E
t
A
μ
1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < μ1,	
bS 	will	undergo	a	smaller	downward	jump,	or	it	can	remain	the	same,	or	even	jump	up	(the	
long-chain	line	in	Fig.	5.18).	Finally,	if	the	central	bank	is	able	to	form	expectations	of	a	de-
crease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	should	rise.	bS 	jumps	
upward	at	time	tA	(the	double-dashed	line	in	Fig.	5.18),	allowing	the	government	to	increase	
the	primary	budget	deficit	while	keeping	the	accumulated	debt	sustainable33.
5.12. Uncertainty about the type of change in macroeconomic policy
Due	to	the	fact	that	the	second	equation	of	system	(5.1)	does	not	include	any	parameter	
or	variable	pertaining	to	the	fiscal	sphere,	any	certain	or	uncertain	changes	in	fiscal	policy	can	
affect	the	money	market	only	via	the	unavoidable	interaction	with	monetary	policy.	Thus,	for	
the	dynamics	of	inflation,	the	only	relevant	uncertainty	is	that	which	pertains	to	monetary	
policy.	To	illustrate	this,	assume	that	initially	the	economy	was	in	a	steady	state,	and	at	some	
point	the	government	increases	the	primary	budget	deficit.	This	action,	of	course,	moves	the	
public	debt	off	its	sustainable	path.	To	prevent	this,	either	the	government	must	cut	the	bud-
get	deficit	at	some	point	in	the	future,	or	the	central	bank	must	somehow	increase	the	present	
value	of	seigniorage.	Actually,	in	fact,	a	policy	mix	is	also	possible.34	
Assume	further	that	private	agents	do	not	precisely	know	the	type	of	policy	that	must	be	
implemented	at	time	tS	(as	usual,	assume	that	(quantitative)	information	concerning	deregu-
lation	in	the	fiscal	sphere	was	revealed	earlier,	at	time	tA).	Assume	the	economy	is	functioning	
on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve.	We	know	from	the	analysis	in	Sections	
5.3—5.4	 that,	acting	alone,	 the	central	bank	can	 increase	 the	present	value	of	 seigniorage	
either	by	permanently	increasing	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	in	the	case	of	low	interest	
rate,	or	by	permanently	decreasing	it	if	the	interest	rate	is	sufficiently	high.	In	general,	the	
central	bank	can	do	this	either	by	increasing	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	from	µ0	up	to		 
μ
H
1
or	
	 
μ
H
2
	(
	 
μ
0
< μ
H
1
≤ μ
H
2
),	or	by	decreasing	it	down	to	
	 
μ
L
1
	or	
	 
μ
L
2
	(
	 
μ
L
2
≤ μ
L
1
< μ
0 ).	
Figures	5.19	and	5.20	depict	the	discrete	change	in	the	sustainable	level	of	debt,	∆bS(tA),	
as	a	function	of	the	future	growth	rate	of	base	money	µ1.	
For	 all	 realistic	parametric	 specifications,	 the	 function	∆bS(tA)	has	 a	 single	maximum	
with	a	positive	value.	Besides	the	initial	growth	rate	of	base	money,	∆bS(tA)	equals	zero	at	only	
one	other	point	(µmax	in	Fig.	5.19	and	µmin	in	Fig.	5.20,	respectively).	If	the	interest	rate	is	rela-
33	 Here	we	have	considered	only	the	case	when	the	economy	is	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	
Laffer	curve.	One	can	easily	consider	the	other	case	as	well.	
34	 Kawai	and	Maccini	 (1990,	1995)	 study	 the	effects	of	anticipated	 switches	 in	 the	method	of	budget	
deficit‘s	finance.	Their	model	demonstrates	no	straightforward	connection	between	inflation	and	budget	defi-
cits.	This	result	conforms	our	general	finding	in	Chapters	4	and	5.
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Fig. 5.19. Discrete change in the sustainable level of public debt  
as a function of the future growth rate of base money given a low interest rate
Fig. 5.20. Discrete change in the sustainable level of public debt  
as a function of the future growth rate of base money given a high interest rate
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tively	low,	the	maximum	of	∆bS(tA)	is	located	to	the	right	of	µ0	(see	Fig.	5.19).	Thus,	the	only	
way	the	central	bank	can	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	is	by	increasing	the	growth	
rate	of	base	money.	Furthermore,	if	the	desired	increase	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	
does	not	exceed	the	maximum	of	∆bS(tA),	there	are	two	values	of	the	new	growth	rate	of	base	
money,	
	 
μ
H
1
	and	
	 
μ
H
2
,	which	the	central	bank	can	implement.	
On	the	other	hand,	if	the	interest	rate	is	sufficiently	high,	the	only	way	the	central	bank	
can	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	is	by	reducing	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	
This	is	because	the	maximum	of	µbS(tA)	lies	to	the	left	of	µ0	(see	Fig.	5.20).	Again,	in	general	
there	are	two	values	of	µ1,	denoted		 
μ
L
1
	and	
	 
μ
L
2
,	that	achieve	the	desired	result35.
If,	in	fact,	only	monetary	policy	will	be	changed	to	keep	the	public	debt	sustainable,	if	this	
is	known	to	economic	agents,	and	if	the	central	bank	does	not	intend	to	increase	the	present	
value	of	seigniorage	any	more	than	needed,	then	expectations	concerning	the	future	growth
rate	of	base	money	can	only	be	either	
	 
E
t
A
μ
1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = μLi ,	or		 
E
t
A
μ
1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = μH i,	i	=	1,2,	depending	on
the	possibilities	of	the	central	bank	(i.e.,	depending	on	interest	rate).	On	one	hand,	private	
agents	should	not	expect	that	the	central	bank	would	choose	µ1,	which	does	not	correspond	
to	the	required	change	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage.	On	the	other	hand,	after	private	
agents	have	formed	their	expectations	(i.e.	have	chosen	one	of	the	two	possible	values	of	µ1),	
monetary	policy	will	simply	be	forced	to	follow	them.	If	expectations	are	different,	the	actual	
change	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	will	be	lower	or	higher	than	required.	
As	long	as	we	do	not	have	any	formal	equilibrium	selection	device,	the	equilibrium	is	in-
determinate.	As	an	informal	device,	we	can	assume	that	central	bank	will	always	prefer	lower	
inflation	if	possible,	i.e.	it	will	always	choose	a	lower	growth	rate	of	base	money36.	However,	
in	the	current	setup	monetary	policy	must	follow	formed	expectations,	while	private	agents	
may	or	may	not	take	the	central	bank’s	preferences	into	consideration.	Thus,	in	fact,	there	
may	be	a	kind	of	“sunspot	equilibrium”37.	
In	the	case	of	a	policy	mix	aimed	to	keep	the	public	debt	sustainable,	i.e.	when	both	the	
central	bank	and	the	government	intend	to	adjust	their	policies,	private	agents	quite	possibly	
do	not	know	for	certain	what	changes	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	or	primary	budget	
deficit	to	expect.	Thus	they	do	not	know	the	two	possible	values	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money.	If	we	assume	that	changes	in	monetary	policy	should	not	be	at	least	less	than	the	pre-
sent	value	of	seigniorage,	then	we	can	determine	the	possible	range	of	inflationary	expecta-
tions	—	it	is	simply	the	interval	[µmin,	µ0]	or	[µ0,	µmax],	depending	on	the	interest	rate,	where	
the	function	∆bS(tA)	is	positive.
35	 The	 shape	 of	 the	 curves	 depicted	 in	 Fig.	 5.19—5.20	 was	 derived	 by	 numerical	 calculations	 using	
MathCad	2000	Pro.	The	parameterization	of	the	calculations	is	the	same	as	in	the	examples	considered	in	
Sections	5.3—5.4.	
36	 Since	the	choice	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	also	determines	the	new	steady	state	level	of	public	
debt,	which	is	important	in	the	general	context	of	the	coordination	of	macroeconomic	policy,	one	may	sug-
gest	an	alternative	(and	just	as	informal)	criterion	for	the	choice	of	equilibrium:	the	central	bank	may	have	the	
intention	to	position	the	fiscal	sphere	in	a	particular	way.
37	 See	excellent	reviews	of	this	problem	in	Azariadis	(1993)	and	Farmer	(1999),	among	others.
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5.13. Uncertainty about the timing of change  
in macroeconomic policy
In	this	section	we	consider	the	hypothetical	situation	in	which	there	is	no	uncertainty	
about	the	type	of	policy	switch,	but	there	is	uncertainty	about	its	timing.	As	before,	we	con-
sider	the	generic	case,	when	there	is	uncertainty	regarding	future	monetary	policy.	
Assume	that	initially	the	money	market	is	in	equilibrium	for	some	growth	rate	of	base	
money	µ0,	and	economy	is	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve.	At	time	 tA	
private	agents	receive	information	that	at	some	unknown	moment	in	the	future	the	growth	
rate	of	base	money	will	be	increased	to	µ1.	As	an	illustrative	example	we	propose	the	simplest	
scenario:	the	switch	in	monetary	policy	must	be	done	either	at	time	
	 
t
S
1
,	or	at	a	later	date	
	 
t
S
2
,
but	then	for	certain.	Let	p	∈[0,1]	be	the	subjective	probability	that	monetary	policy	will	be	
changed	at	the	earlier	date	
	 
t
S
1
.	At	this	moment	the	agents	learn	when	switches	in	monetary
policy	will	be	implemented.	If	the	earlier	date	is	chosen,	then	this	change	will	endure.	If	not,	
then	it	will	switch	at	the	later	time	
	 
t
S
2
	with	unit	probability38.	Equations	(5.16)—(5.18)	de-
scribe	the	dynamics	of	the	money	market.
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38	 This	illustrative	example	is	rather	standard.	See,	e.g.,	Bertola	and	Drazen	(1993),	Miller	and	Zhang	
(1997).
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	 (5.18)
Figure	5.21	 illustrates	 the	dynamics.	As	 long	as	 there	 is	no	uncertainty	after	 time	
	 
t
S
1
,	
the	dynamics	of	inflation,	the	log	of	real	money	balances,	and	seigniorage	during	the	time	
interval	
	 
t
S
1
,t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦	are	determined	only	by	the	actual	value	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	If
the	growth	rate	of	base	money	increases	at	time	
	 
t
S
1
,	then	the	money	market	jumps	to	a	steady	
state	and	all	variables	will	become	constant	(the	long-dotted	lines	in	Fig.	5.21).	If	monetary	
policy	switches	only	at	the	later	date	
	 
t
S
2
,	then	again,	no	matter	what	the	preceding	dynamics	
were,	inflation	and	the	log	of	real	money	balances	should	be	on	paths	that	lead	to	new	steady	
states	(the	solid	lines	in	Fig.	5.21).	Seigniorage	will	also	follow	some	path,	yet	after	a	gradual	
decrease	on	the	interval	
	 
t
S
1
,t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦	it	will	undergo	an	upward	jumps	at	time		 
t
S
2
.
During	 the	 interval	
	 
t
A
,t
S
1
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 variables	 are	 driven	 by	 expectations.	 If
there	is	no	subjective	confidence	that	monetary	policy	will	switch	at	the	later	date	
	 
t
S
2
,	 i.e.	
when	p	=	0,	inflation	(the	log	of	real	money	balances	and	seigniorage)	jumps	upward	(down-
ward)	 slightly	 and	 then	 gradually	 increases	 (decrease).	The	 corresponding	 trajectories	 are	
depicted	by	solid	lines	in	Fig.	5.21.	If,	in	fact,	changes	in	policy	take	place	only	at	time	
	 
t
S
2
,
then	 during	 the	 interval	
	 
t
A
,t
S
2
( )	 the	 dynamics	 of	 all	 variables	will	 be	 smoothened.	How-
ever,	 if	 the	growth	 rate	of	base	money	 increases	at	 the	earlier	 time	
	 
t
S
1
,	 then	 inflation	and	
seigniorage	 jump	up,	while	the	 log	of	real	money	balances	 jumps	down	to	 its	steady	state.
In	the	other	extreme,	when	private	agents	are	certain	that	monetary	policy	will	switch	
soon	at	time	
	 
t
S
1
,	i.e.	p	=	1,	inflation	(the	log	of	real	money	balances)	has	a	significant	discrete	
increase	(fall),	and	then	a	gradual	increase	(decrease);	see	the	double-chain	lines	in	Fig.	5.21.	
However,	if	expectations	were	wrong	and	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	increases	at	the	later	
date	
	 
t
S
2
,	all	 the	variables	will	undergo	one	more	 jump	in	 the	opposite	direction,	and	then	
gradually	adjust.
The	intermediate	case,	0	<	p	<	1,	is	depicted	in	Fig.	5.21	by	dotted	trajectories.	We	do	
not	illustrate	the	possible	dynamics	of	sustainable	public	debt	bS(t).	As	in	the	examples	given	
above	we	may	conclude	that,	ceteris paribus,	there	is	a	possibility	of	an	increase	in	the	present	
value	of	seigniorage	at	tA	if	the	interest	rate	is	low	enough.	At	the	same	time	the	timing	of	the	
policy	switch	is	 important.	If	we	do	not	take	into	consideration	the	formation	of	expecta-
tions,	then	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	at	the	earlier	moment	
	 
t
S
1
	obviously	
allows	the	central	bank	to	gain	the	maximal	possible	increase	(or	at	least	the	minimal	possible	
140
Fig. 5.21. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, and seigniorage  
for a permanent increase in the growth rate of base money at an uncertain time
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Fig. 5.22. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, and seigniorage  
for a permanent decrease in the growth rate of base money at an uncertain time
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fall)	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage.	This	conclusion	is	important	with	regard	to	the	sus-
tainability	of	the	fiscal	sphere.	We	should,	however,	account	for	the	process	by	which	expec-
tations	are	formed.	Private	agents	can	also	exploit	the	same	conclusion	—	they	will	estimate	
the	probability	p	quite	close	to	unity.	In	turn,	this	will	result	in	a	decrease	in	the	seigniorage
during	the	interval	
	 
t
S
1
,t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦,	and	thus	in	a	decrease	in	its	present	value.
Figure	5.22	depicts	analogous	situations	 for	 the	case	 in	which	the	growth	rate	of	base	
money	is	expected	to	fall	at	some	unknown	date.	The	qualitative	description	of	the	transitory	
dynamics	and	the	notation	are	the	same	as	in	the	example	above.	Here	the	central	bank	has	
greater	chances	to	increases	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	if	the	interest	rate	is	relatively	
high.	Ceteris paribus,	the	increase	in	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	will	be	maximal	(or	at	
least	its	fall	will	be	minimal),	if	the	central	bank	does	not	change	its	policy	until	time	
	 
t
S
2
.	Again,	
economic	agents	should	take	this	fact	into	consideration.	As	a	consequence,	p	will	tend	to
zero.	During	the	interval	
	 
t
S
1
,t
S
2
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦	the	temporary	increase	in	seigniorage	will	not	be	as	large	as
possible,	and	this	will	have	a	negative	effect	upon	its	present	value.
	
5.14. Sustainability and feasibility of macroeconomic policy
Keeping	the	public	debt	on	a	sustainable	path	given	any	changes	in	the	parameters	of	fis-
cal	and	monetary	policy	was	an	important	requirement	in	the	above	analysis	of	various	ways	
that	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	may	interact.	In	fact,	as	was	shown	in	the	previous	chapter,	
having	the	public	debt	on	an	unstable	path	on	a	temporary	basis	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	
confidence	crisis.	However,	it	is	quite	possible	that	actions	by	the	government,	either	unilateral	
or	supported	by	the	central	bank,	will	not	be	able	to	return	the	public	debt	to	a	sustainable	path;	
this	is	in	essence	the	same	as	saying	that	the	government	will	not	be	able	to	ever	completely	
meet	its	obligations,	while	debt	is	increasing	exponentially	in	the	first	approximation.	Having	
the	public	debt	on	a	path	of	unsustainable	growth	should	not	worry	rational	investors,	if	only	
the	government	is	able	to	adjust	its	expenditures	and	income	so	that	their	present	values	corres-
pond	to	the	current	volume	of	debt.39	If,	however,	the	government	loses	this	ability,	then	inves-
tors	should	understand	that	the	only	way	for	the	government	to	stop	what	is	in	essence	a	Ponzi	
scheme	is	a	complete	or	partial	refusal	to	pay	its	debts.	In	an	economy	with	rational	agents,	this	
criteria	determines	when	the	government	will	face	a	confidence	crisis.40
In	the	previous	chapter,	in	considering	analogous	problems	in	the	context	of	the	back-
ward-looking	dynamics	of	the	system,	it	was	shown	that	there	exists	a	certain	critical	value	
39	 Here	the	principle	of	sustainability	of	fiscal	policy	(5.5)	does	not	at	all	demand	that	the	government	
must	sooner	or	later	pay	off	its	debts.	In	reality,	this	should	not	be	its	goal	in	any	case.	
40	 It	would	be	a	mistake,	nonetheless,	to	forget	that	being	on	a	sustainable	path	does	not	guarantee	that	
the	volume	of	public	debt	will	not	increase	indefinitely.	The	no-Ponzi-game	condition	(2.7)	simply	excludes	
the	possibility	of	a	growth	rate	that	is	“too	high”.	Formally,	this	may	bring	about	a	different	problem,	when	
the	ability	of	the	economy	to	absorb	the	public	debt	is	exhausted.	However,	this	critical	volume	of	debt,	except	
for	simply	pathological	situations,	can	hardly	be	less	than	the	limiting	volume	determined	by	the	principle	of	
sustainability	of	fiscal	policy.
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of	the	public	debt,	after	which	the	government	and	central	bank	will	not	be	able	to	avoid	a	
confidence	crisis.	The	same	logic	may	be	applied	for	forward-looking	dynamics	as	well.	The	
primary	deficit	(surplus)	is	bounded	from	below	(from	above),	and,	as	it	was	shown	above,	
the	possibility	of	 increasing	 the	present	value	of	 future	volumes	of	 seigniorage	 is	bounded	
from	above	as	well.	In	the	steady	state,	the	maximum	volume	of	seigniorage	coincides	with	
the	maximum	on	the	 inflation	 tax	curve.	However,	as	 shown	above,	given	any	 initial	 state	
with	certain	(favorable)	values	of	the	parameters,	even	on	the	peak	of	the	inflation	tax	curve,	
the	real	value	of	seigniorage	may	be	increased	by	increasing	or	decreasing	(depending	on	the	
parameters	of	the	model)	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	What	is	of	principle	importance	here	
are	the	expectations	of	economic	agents	and	the	transition	dynamics	of	the	system,	given	that	
there	will	be	a	certain	interval	of	time	between	the	announcement	and	the	implementation	of	
changes	in	monetary	policy.	We	have	shown	for	the	simplest	cases	that	a	permanent	or	tem-
porary	change	in	µ	may	the	present	value	of	future	volumes	of	seigniorage	only	by	a	limited	
amount.41	In	the	general	case,	an	increase	in	the	value	of	seigniorage	above	that	determined	
by	the	maximum	of	 the	 inflation	tax	curve,	 is	possible	only	at	 the	expense	of	a	 temporary	
positive	value	of	pure	seigniorage,	
 	 &m > 0 ,	in	other	words	at	the	expense	of	a	decrease	in	infla-
tion	expectations.	However,	the	increase	in	real	money	balances	cannot	be	infinitely	large.
5.15. Conclusion: the role of expectations and of economic regimes 
in the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies
Now	we	will	attempt	 to	give	a	general	description	of	 the	various	scenarios	considered	
above,	and	to	give	what	we	consider	to	be	the	most	important	explanations	for	the	theoretical	
results	we	have	arrived	at.	
The	principle	of	 conducting	 sustainable	 financial	policies,	which	 is	 central	 to	 the	 re-
search	given	in	this	chapter,	requires	that	the	volume	of	public	debt	at	each	moment	in	time	
corresponds	to	the	present	value	of	the	pure	income	of	the	government	(the	present	value	of	
seigniorage	flow	minus	the	present	value	of	the	primary	budget	deficit	flow).	In	this	respect,	
one	of	the	most	important	goals	of	monetary	policy	is	managing	the	volume	of	seigniorage	
(of	its	present	value)	so	that	the	public	debt	does	not	depart	from	a	sustainable	path.	In	the	
context	of	 the	rational	behavior	of	economic	agents	and	forward-looking	dynamics	of	 the	
variables	of	the	money	market,	three	factors	are	of	principle	importance:	information	con-
cerning	impending	changes	in	monetary	policy,	the	level	of	inflation	in	the	economy,	and	the	
interest	rate	for	on	the	public	debt.	
Seigniorage	is	comprised	of	two	components:	the	inflation	tax	and	the	increase	in	real	
money	 balances	 (pure	 seigniorage).	Throughout	 our	 analysis,	we	have	 used	 the	 following	
interesting	property	of	an	economic	system:	if	the	economy	is	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	infla-
41	 Formally,	we	may	describe	and	attempt	to	solve	the	problem	of	maximizing	the	value	of	seigniorage,	
where	the	control	variables	will	be	not	only	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	but	also	the	time	interval	between	
the	announcement	and	the	implementation	of	a	new	policy.	However,	closed	form	solution	may	only	be	found	
for	some	simple	specifications	of	monetary	policy.	
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tion	tax	curve	and	there	exists	a	time	interval	between	the	announcement	and	the	implemen-
tation	of	changes	 in	macroeconomic	policy,	 then	 the	direction	of	 the	 transition	dynamics	
of	seigniorage	is	different	from	what	it	would	be	in	the	steady	state.	This	fact	may	be	widely	
used	by	the	central	bank	in	controlling	the	present	value	of	seigniorage,	and	the	possibilities	
of	monetary	policies	in	this	respect	are	greatly	enhanced	if	the	central	bank	is	able	to	form	
expectations	 among	 economic	 agents	 by	 informing	 them	ahead	of	 time	 about	 impending	
changes	in	its	policies	or,	on	the	other	hand,	by	hiding	information	about	its	future	actions.	
We	wish	to	underline	here	that	we	are	not	considering	such	momentous	problems	such	as	
the	credibility	or	the	dynamic	inconsistency	of	policies	that	are	now	being	considered	in	the	
context	of	the	new	political	economy42.	Their	integration	into	the	analysis	that	is	given	above	
seems	 to	 be	 a	 promising	 avenue	 for	 further	 investigation.	The	 role	 of	 expectations	 in	 our	
analysis	is	determined	primarily	by	the	importance	of	the	transitional	dynamics	that	precede	
actual	changes	in	macroeconomic	policies.	In	this	respect,	the	range	of	problems	considered	
here	is	qualitatively	like	those	discussed	in	papers	by	Bental	and	Eckstein	(1990),	Drazen	and	
Helpman	(1988,	1990),	Bertola	and	Drazen	(1993),	Miller	and	Zhang	(1997).
If	the	economy	is	on	the	“wrong	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve,	then	the	direc-
tion	of	change	of	seigniorage	during	transition	will	be	the	same	as	if	it	were	in	a	steady	state.	
However,	in	this	case	the	character	of	monetary	policy	will	be	different:	monetary	expansion	
will	bring	about	a	decrease	in	the	steady	volume	of	seigniorage	and	of	its	present	value,	and	
a	tightening	of	policy	will	bring	about	its	increase.	These	results	underline	once	again	an	im-
portant	fact:	the	principles	of	formulating	monetary	policy	(and	its	coordination	with	fiscal	
policies)	under	high	inflation	are	cardinally	different	from	those	for	an	economy	with	low	
inflation.	
The	role	of	expectations	and	of	transition	dynamics	of	the	money	market	in	the	context	
of	controlling	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	determines	the	importance	of	the	interest	rate.	
On	one	hand,	 this	 is	not	a	new	result,	as	 the	 interest	 rate	on	public	debt	determines	how	
fast	the	latter	will	increase.	On	the	other	hand,	the	real	interest	rate	is	a	discount	rate	used	
in	evaluation	of	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	and	thus	determines	the	relative	weight	of	
various	current	values	of	the	seigniorage	in	both	the	short	and	the	long	run.	We	have	shown	
that,	ceteris paribus	and	taking	into	account	the	difference	in	the	direction	of	the	transition	
dynamics	of	seigniorage	and	the	changes	in	the	steady	state	on	the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	
tax	Laffer	curve,	the	central	bank	may	be	able	to	achieve	an	increase	in	the	present	value	of	
seigniorage	by	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	if	the	interest	rate	is	sufficiently	
low.	This	will	allow	the	government	to	increase	the	primary	budget	deficit.	On	the	other	hand,	
if	the	interest	rate	is	high	enough,	the	short-term	dynamics	of	seigniorage	are	of	most	impor-
tance	and	a	monetary	policy	that	is	meant	to	increase	the	present	value	of	seigniorage	must	
resort	to	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	Given	this,	the	principle	of	Sargent	
and	Wallace’s	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”,	which	states	that	for	an	exogenous	fiscal	
42	 See,	for	example,	an	overview	of	these	problems	in	the	latest	works	by	Drazen	(2000)	and	Persson	and	
Tabellini	(2000).
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policy,	monetary	policy	cannot	be	tight	in	the	long	run,	is	not	universal.	If	the	interest	rate	
is	a	relatively	high,	then	a	temporary	increase	in	the	volume	of	seigniorage	that	is	caused	by	
a	temporary	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	may	be	of	principle	importance	in	
keeping	the	fiscal	sphere	on	a	sustainable	path	and	does	not	require	a	final	increase	in	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	(in	order	to	increase	the	steady	volume	of	seigniorage)	to	a	level	
that	is	higher	than	the	initial	one.	In	other	words,	for	an	exogenous	(dominating)	fiscal	policy,	
a	tight	policy	on	the	part	of	the	central	bank	may	be	long-term.	
Just	as	one	can	discuss	high	or	low	inflation	in	an	economy,	by	analogy	we	may	discuss	
different	fiscal	regimes	in	an	economy	with	high	or	low	interest	rates	on	the	public	debt.	This	
can	be	done	since	this	interest	rate	is	of	principle	importance	both	for	fiscal	and	monetary	
policies.	Furthermore,	just	as	it	is	done	for	different	levels	of	inflation,	the	principles	of	for-
mulating	the	policies	of	the	central	bank	or	the	principles	of	interaction	between	fiscal	and	
monetary	policies	are	determined	to	a	great	extent	by	the	fiscal	regime.
Appendix. Numerical examples
Here	we	give	numerical	examples	for	the	parameterization	of	our	model	that	confirm	the	
main	results43.	The	choice	of	values	for	the	parameters	was	made	mostly	for	demonstrative	
purposes,	but	they	are	not	by	any	means	unrealistic.	Absolute	values,	such	as	real	money	ba-
lances,	deficit,	public	debt,	and	seigniorage	are	not	important	as	along	as	we	do	not	present	
models	in	which	the	main	variables	are	given	as	fractions	of	GDP.	In	all	examples	given	below	
the	GDP	determines	only	the	scale	for	other	absolute	values.	Assuming	that	the	semi-elastic-
ity	of	money	demand	is	α	=	10,	we	have	put	the	maximum	of	inflation	tax	at	an	inflation	rate	
equal	to	10%.	In	other	words,	for	low-inflation	conditions	(the	“right	side”	of	the	inflation	
tax	Laffer	curve)	the	inflation	rate	must	be	below	10%,	while	for	high-inflation	conditions	
(the	“wrong	side”	of	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve)	the	inflation	rate	must	be	greater	than	
10%44.	In	fact,	this	value	of	the	semi-elasticity	of	demand	with	respect	to	inflationary	expec-
tations	(or	the	nominal	interest	rate	in	general)	may	seem	too	high	for	developed	low-infla-
tion	economies.	Again,	the	results	are	robust	to	changes	in	this	parameter,	if	we	also	shift	the	
scale	for	other	relative	values,	such	as	the	growth	rate	of	money	and	inflation.	In	order	to	
characterize	fiscal	regimes	with	low	and	high	interest	rates,	we	choose	correspondingly	1%	
and	10%.	The	length	of	all	time	intervals	is	10	years.
The	tables	below	contain	values	of	all	variables	at	the	initial	time	(t	=	0),	at	the	moment	
when	changes	 in	macroeconomic	policies	 are	 announced	 (t	=	 tA),	 and	at	 the	 times	when	
actual	policy	switches	are	implemented	(t	=	tS	or		 
t = t
S
1
, t = t
S
2
).	Since	seigniorage	typically	
undergoes	an	additional	 jump	at	 the	time	of	policy	switch,	we	also	consider	 its	values	 just	
before	that	time	(t	=	tS –	or		 
t = t
S
1
− , t = tS
2
−).
43	 All	calculations	were	implemented	in	MathCad	2000	Pro.
44	 It	is	hard	to	say	whether	this	is	a	realistic	definition	of	low	and	high	inflation	regimes.	In	fact,	the	im-
portant	distinctions	between	the	two	regimes	are	mostly	qualitative,	rather	than	quantitative.	For	a	discussion	
see	Dornbusch,	Sturzenegger	and	Wolf	(1990).	
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Table A5.1.1*		
Permanent	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money
α	=	10,	d	=	0.01,	tA	=	1,	tS	=	11,	µ0	=	0.05,	µ1	=	0.07
π x S
bS
r	=	0.01 r	=	0.1
t	=	0 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203
t	=	tA 0.057 –0.574 0.028 2.4 0.199
	 
t = t
S
1
− 0.025
t	=	tS 0.07 –0.7 0.035 2.476 0.248
*See	Section	5.3.
Table A5.1.2*	
Permanent	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money
α	=	10,	d	=	0.01,	tA	=	1,	tS	=	11,	µ0	=	0.07,	µ1	=	0.05
π x S
bS
r	=	0.01 r	=	0.1
t	=	0 0.07 –0.7 0.035 2.476 0.248
t	=	tA 0.063 –0.625 0.037 2.119 0.259
	 
t = t
S
1
− 0.042
t	=	tS 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203
*	See	subsection	5.4.
Table A5.2.1*	
Temporary	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money
α	=	10,	d	=	0.01,	tA	=	1,	tS	=	11,		 
t
S
1
	=	11,	
	 
t
S
2
	=	21,
µ0	=	0.05,		µ1	=	0.04,		µ2	=	0.09
π x S
bS
r	=	0.01 r	=	0.1
t	=	0 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203
t	=	tA 0.053 –0.531 0.029 2.439 0.179
	 
t = t
S
1
− 0.028
	 
t = t
S
1
0.058 –0.584 0.022 2.498 0.162
	 
t = t
S
2
− 0.016
	 
t = t
S
2
0.09 –0.9 0.037 2.659 0.266
*	See	Section	5.6.
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Table A5.2.2*	
Temporary	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money
α	=	10,	d	=	0.01,	tA	=	1,	tS	=	11,		 
t
S
1
	=	11,	
	 
t
S
2
	=	21,
µ0	=	0.05,		µ1	=	0.03,		µ2	=	0.07
π x S
bS
r	=	0.01 r	=	0.1
t	=	0 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203
t	=	tA 0.048 –0.481 0.031 2.294 0.186
	 
t = t
S
1
− 0.032
	 
t = t
S
1
0.045 –0.447 0.019 2.31 0.139
	 
t = t
S
2
− 0.015
	 
t = t
S
2
0.07 –0.7 0.035 2.476 0.248
*	See	Section	5.6.
Table A5.3*	
Temporary	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money
α	=	10,	d	=	0.01,	tA	=	1,	tS	=	11,		 
t
S
1
	=	11,	
	 
t
S
2
	=	21,
µ0	=	0.09,		µ1	=	0.07,		µ2	=	0.08
π x S
bS
r	=	0.01 r	=	0.1
t	=	0 0.09 –0.09 0.037 2.659 0.266
t	=	tA 0.084 –0.84 0.039 2.61 0.279
	 
t = t
S
1
− 0.043
	 
t = t
S
1
0.074 –0.737 0.034 2.563 0.24
	 
t = t
S
2
− 0.031
	 
t = t
S
2
0.08 –0.8 0.036 2.595 0.259
*	See	Section	5.8.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Beginning	with	the	classic	work	by	Sargent	and	Wallace	in	1981,	one	of	the	fundamental	
problems	in	the	analysis	of	macroeconomic	policy	is	that	of	the	interaction	between	the	go-
vernment	and	the	central	bank	in	conducting	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	In	our	research,	
we	have	continued	this	line	of	inquiry.	Like	the	founders	of	the	fiscal	theory	of	inflation,	we	
did	not	wish	to	describe	a	concrete	economic	situation.	On	the	contrary,	we	attempted	to	elu-
cidate	the	most	general	problems	which	may	in	principle	arise	in	describing	the	logic	of	the	
interaction	between	fiscal	and	monetary	policies.	Various	results	that	we	arrive	at	may	be	used	
to	analyze	various	economic	situations.	Some	of	our	results	pertain	more	to	the	problems	of	
macroeconomic	policy	 in	developed	countries.	Other	 results	can	be	applied	 to	economies	
with	undeveloped	financial	markets.	
We	have	shown	above	the	important	consequences	that	are	inherent	in	the	effect	of	infla-
tion	on	the	budget	deficit	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	interaction.	
In	studying	the	dynamics	of	inflation	and	the	public	debt,	we	were	able	to	identify	important	
constraints	that	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	face.	On	one	hand,	the	government	and	the	cen-
tral	bank	are	interconnected	by	a	consolidated	budget	constraint	for	the	public	sector:	the	
central	bank	creates	seigniorage	by	conducting	operations	on	the	open	market	and	thus	cre-
ates	one	of	the	sources	of	financing	the	budget	deficit.	On	the	other	hand,	the	rate	of	inflation	
and	the	volume	of	accumulated	public	debt	for	obvious	reasons	must	also	be	of	concern	both	
for	the	government	and	for	the	central	bank,	though	perhaps	to	different	extents.	Thus,	our	
investigation	is	able	to	determine	which	constraints	for	the	government	are	created	by	vari-
ous	monetary	policies	and,	vice	versa,	which	constraints	for	the	central	bank	are	created	by	
various	fiscal	policies.	
Returning	to	the	questions	posed	in	Chapter	1,	we	are	now	ready	to	provide	answers	to	
them.	These	questions	do	not	cover	all	the	results	of	our	investigation.	However,	to	a	certain	
extent,	they	are	representative.
Is inflation a completely monetary phenomenon?	No,	 far	 from	 it.	 In	many	 cases	 (in	
particular,	 in	countries	with	undeveloped	 financial	markets)	 seigniorage	may	be	an	
important	source	for	the	financing	of	the	budget	deficit.	In	this	case	inflation	will	have	
fiscal	causes.
Is there a simple cause-and-effect relationship between inflation and the budget deficit?	
No,	and	because	of	many	possible	reasons.	First	of	all,	this	interconnection	operates	
both	ways.	On	one	hand,	if	the	budget	deficit	is	partially	financed	by	seigniorage,	then	
the	level	of	the	deficit	dictates	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	thus	influence	the	
rate	of	inflation.	On	the	other	hand,	inflation	has	an	impact	on	the	real	income	and	
the	real	expenditures	of	the	budget.	There	are	many	possible	mechanisms	by	which	
inflation	may	influence	the	real	budget	deficit,	so	that	the	resulting	effect	of	inflation	
•
•
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depends	on	 the	economic	 institution.	Second	of	all,	depending	on	 the	elasticity	of	
demand	for	real	money	balances	with	respect	to	inflation	expectations,	equilibriums	
with	both	low	and	high	inflation	may	be	stable	for	a	given	level	of	the	budget	deficit.	
Thirdly,	 the	 reaction	of	 the	money	market	 to	 changes	 in	monetary	 policy	 brought	
about	by	changes	in	fiscal	policy	depends	on	the	character	of	the	inflationary	process.	
In	particular,	this	reaction	depends	on	whether	the	dynamics	of	inflation	are	inertial,	
or	rather	the	level	of	inflation	and	the	demand	for	real	money	balances	are	determined	
by	 the	 rational	 forward-looking	behavior	of	 economic	agents.	Fourthly,	 a	 situation	
is	possible	in	which	the	government	will	be	forced	to	change	the	level	of	the	budget	
deficit	in	response	to	changes	in	monetary	policy	rather	than	vice	versa.	Depending	
on	many	factors	(such	as	the	expectations	of	economic	agents	or	the	interest	rate	for	
the	servicing	of	the	public	debt),	the	government	may	be	forced	to	sometimes	decrease	
and	 sometimes	 increase	 the	budget	deficit	 in	 response	 to	a	 tightening	of	monetary	
policy.	
Can chronic inflation be overcome only by a tight monetary policy that is formally in-
dependent of fiscal requirements?	There	 is	no	 straight	 answer	 to	 this	question.	Both	
theory	and	practice	show	that	tight	monetary	policy	by	itself	is	not	enough	to	stabilize	
inflation.	One	policy	implication	of	our	research	is	that	tight	monetary	policy	must	be	
supported	by	certain	fiscal	policy	that	will	allow	the	government	to	decrease	its	need	
for	seigniorage	both	now	and	in	the	future.	
What importance do expectations of future stabilization policy have?	Rational	forward-
looking	expectations	of	economic	agents	concerning	possible	changes	in	macroeco-
nomic	policy	play	a	central	role;	this	has	been	confirmed	both	in	theory	and	in	prac-
tice.	What	is	important	is	that	the	reaction	of	the	money	market	to	new	information	
about	impending	changes	in	monetary	policy	may	come	before	these	changes	are	ac-
tually	implemented.	We	specifically	underline	why	this	fact	could	and	must	be	taken	
into	account	when	 formulating	macroeconomic	policies.	Given	 that	 the	volume	of	
seigniorage	depends	on	the	actual	growth	rate	of	base	money	as	well	as	on	inflation	
expectations	(which	determine	the	demand	for	real	money	balances),	changes	in	in-
flation	expectations	play	an	important	role,	as	not	only	actual	switches	in	monetary	
policy,	but	 information	about	forthcoming	changes	also	 influence	seigniorage;	this,	
in	 its	 turn,	 influences	 the	 state	of	 the	 fiscal	 sphere	and	 the	dynamics	of	 the	public	
debt.	A	typical	situation	here	is	one	in	which	the	direction	of	change	of	seigniorage	
in	transition	is	different	from	the	direction	of	change	of	its	steady	state.	This,	in	its	
turn,	implies	that	the	change	in	the	real	value	of	seigniorage	is	not	always	the	same,	
and	depends	on	factors	such	as	the	interest	rate	and	the	time	interval	between	the	an-
nouncement	of	a	change	in	policy	and	its	actual	implementation.	This	is	important,	
as	in	accordance	with	the	sustainability	principle	of	fiscal	policy	it	is	the	seigniorage	
(along	with	the	real	value	of	future	budget	surpluses)	that	acts	as	a	backing	for	the	ac-
cumulated	public	debt.	
•
•
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Can monetary policy be permanently or only temporarily tightened given exogenous fiscal 
policy?	The	classic	investigation	by	T.	Sargent	and	N.	Wallace,	“unpleasant	monetarist	
arithmetic”,	gives	the	following	answer	to	this	question:	monetary	policy	can	not	be	
tightened	permanently	given	an	exogenous	fiscal	policy	of	the	government.	A	decrease	
in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	will	inevitably	bring	about	a	higher	rate	of	inflation	
not	only	in	the	future,	but	possibly	at	the	current	time	as	well.	One	of	the	important	
results	of	our	research	lies	in	the	fact	that	we	have	found	a	possible	scenario	for	“plea-
sant	monetarist	arithmetic”:	by	influencing	expectations	concerning	the	real	value	of	
seigniorage,	under	certain	conditions	the	central	bank	may	achieve	a	decrease	in	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	and	in	inflation	in	the	long	run,	and	without	violating	the	
principle	of	sustainability	of	the	public	debt.	
Should an increase in the government budget deficit be accompanied by an increase or 
a decrease in the growth rate of base money?	What	short-term	and	long-term	conse-
quences	will	this	have	for	inflation?	We	show	that	there	is	no	unique	answer	to	these	
questions.	As	we	noted	above,	many	factors	play	a	central	role	here,	such	as	the	elas-
ticity	of	demand	for	real	money	balances	with	respect	to	inflation	expectations,	the	
character	of	the	dynamics	of	inflation	and	of	inflation	expectations,	and	the	interest	
rate	on	public	debt,	among	others.	
What situations are there in which neither fiscal nor monetary policies are able to avoid 
a financial crisis, and how can they be avoided?	In	formulating	macroeconomic	policy,	
it	is	important	to	take	into	account	the	feasibility	constraints.	In	a	critical	situation,	
when	the	economy	is	close	to	a	debt	crisis,	the	government	may	not	be	able	to	sup-
ply	the	needed	surplus	in	the	state	budget,	simply	because	the	volume	of	tax	revenues	
is	 bounded	 from	 above	 and	 the	 volume	of	 state	 expenditures	 is	 bounded	 from	be-
low.	Here,	as	discussed	above,	monetary	policy	by	 itself	may	be	unable	 to	cure	 the	
economic	situation.	Taking	this	important	aspect	into	account,	fiscal	and	monetary	
policies	must	be	coordinated	so	that	the	economy	does	not	approach	this	dangerous	
frontier,	after	which	an	aversion	of	a	financial	crisis	becomes	impossible.
•
•
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
De	overheid	en	de	Centrale	Bank	zijn	allebei	gebonden	aan	de	beperkingen	die	de	be-
groting	van	de	geconsolideerde	staatssector	oplegt:	het	operationele	tekort	wordt	door	nieuwe	
kredieten	en	seignorage	gefinancierd.	Aan	de	ene	kant,	heeft	de	Centrale	Bank	die	controle	
over	de	geldemissie	heeft,	een	laag	en	stabiel	inflatieniveau	tot	doel.	Aan	de	andere	kant	moet	
de	Centrale	Bank	ook	voor	de	stabiliteit	van	het	financiële	systeem	zorgen,	en	onder	anderen	
moet	zij	oog	hebben	voor	het	onderhoud	van	de	staatsschulden.	Dat	betekent	dat	hoewel	de	
Centrale	Bank	formeel	afhankelijk	is	van	de	regering,	de	Bank	problemen	op	het	gebied	van	
financiën	in	acht	moet	nemen	en	een	merkbaar	deel	van	het	budgettentekort	door	seignorage	
moet	dekken.	Met	andere	woorden,	de	politieke	lijn	van	de	regering	en	die	van	de	Centrale	
Bank	beïnvloeden	elkaar.	
De	basis	van	ons	onderzoek	is	de	fiscaal-economische	theorie	van	inflatie	die	aan	het	
begin	van	de	 jaren	1980	als	deel	 van	de	nieuwe	klassieke	economie	 tot	 stand	 is	 gekomen.	
Dankzij	deze	fiscale	theorie	is	het	mogelijk	geweest	monetaire	politiek	breder	en	dieper	te	
begrijpen	dan	de	oorspronkelijke	monetaire	benadering,	en	te	begrijpen	dat	het	fiscale	beleid	
een	belangrijke	rol	speelt	in	het	vaststellen	van	het	inflatiecijfer.	
Wij	verzorgen	de	argumentatie	ter	analyse	van	de	fiscale	en	monetaire	politiek	en	bieden	
hoofdlijnen	van	de	 fiscale	en	monetair-	krediettheorieën	 in	Hoofdstuk	2	aan.	De	budget-
beperking	waarmee	de	regering	rekening	moet	houden,	stelt	de	ontwikkeling	van	de	staatss-
chulden	vast.	Het	principe	van	rationele	fiscale	politiek	vraagt	dat	op	ieder	moment	het	totale	
volume	van	de	staatsschulden	ondersteund	is	door	de	reële	waarde	van	toekomstige	begrot-
ingsoverschotten	en	seignorage.	Op	zichzelf	kunnen	de	ontwikkeling	van	inflatie	en	seignor-
age	worden	beschreven	in	het	kader	van	de	algemeen	geaccepteerde	monetaire	benadering.	
Met	behulp	van	deze	begrippen	geven	we	een	overzicht	van	de	moderne	benaderingen	die	ge-
bruikt	worden	bij	de	analyse	van	de	samenwerking	tussen	fiscaal	en	monetair	beleid,	namelijk	
de	fiscale	theorie	van	inflatie	en	de	monetaire	benadering	van	prijsbepaling.	
Daarna	is	Hoofdstuk	3	gewijd	aan	de	analyse	van	de	invloed	van	inflatie	op	het	primaire	
begrotingstekort.	We	stellen	voor	de	verandering	van	het	basismodel	voor	de	dynamiek	van	
inflatie	 en	 staatsschulden	om	het	 reële	 effecten	 van	 inflatie	 te	 bepalen.	Dit	 nieuwe	dyna-
mische	systeem	heeft	interessante	niet-lineaire	eigenschappen	die	voor	de	auteur	bekend	tot	
nu	toe	in	de	economische	literatuur	niet	in	acht	werden	genomen.	Met	inachtneming	van	het	
financieren	van	het	begrotingstekort	door	seignorage,	geven	we	een	vergelijkende	analyse	van	
situaties	waarin	 inflatie	geen	 invloed	uitoefent	op	het	primaire	begrotingstekort	en	waarin	
het	effect	positief	of	negatief	is.	We	nemen	bifurcaties	in	het	systeem	onder	de	loep	die	de	
ontwikkeling	van	staatsschulden	en	het	ware	monetaire	evenwicht	beschrijven.	We	bieden	aan	
een	beschrijving	van	zulke	vormen	van	fiscaal	en	monetair	beleid	die	tot	een	financiële	ineen-
storting	kunnen	 leiden	 in	de	vorm	van	hyperinflatie	en	ernstige	problemen	bij	het	dekken	
van	staatsschulden.	Een	nieuwe	economische	interpretatie	van	de	hysterese-bifurcatie	in	de	
152
niet-lineaire	ontwikkeling	van	inflatie	en	staatsschulden	kan	als	een	verklaring	dienen	van	de	
financiële	crisis	van	1998	in	Rusland.	
In	Hoofdstuk	4	schenken	we	aandacht	aan	verschillende	scenario’s	voor	de	samenwerk-
ing	tussen	fiscaal	en	monetair	beleid,	waarbij	de	meest	eenvoudige	vorm	van	de	stabilisering	
van	inflatie	op	een	vast	niveau	voorgenomen	is.	Het	onderzoek	is	uitgevoerd	met	het	gebruik	
van	het	hetzelfde	systeem	van	de	inflatieontwikkeling	en	staatsschulden.	We	analyseren	uitvo-
erbare	vormen	van	fiscaal	en	monetair	beleid.	Er	zijn	situaties	gedefinieerd	waarbij	ongecoör-
dineerd	beleid	onmogelijk	zou	zijn.	We	nemen	in	acht	de	grenzen	van	de	realiseerbaarheid	
van	fiscaal	beleid	en	bepalen	situaties	waarbij	zowel	fiscaal	als	monetair	en	kredietbeleid	niet	
in	staat	zouden	zijn	om	hyperinflatie	en	crisis	bij	afbetaling	van	staatsschulden	af	te	wenden.	
In	de	loop	van	dit	onderzoek	is	een	aantal	nieuwe	resultaten	ontvangen	die	de	fiscale	theo-
rie	van	inflatie	uitbreidt.	Met	name	een	goed	bekende	principe	van	“unpleasant	monetarist	
arithmetic”	werd	uitgebreid	door	het	vaststellen	van	de	consequenties	van	“unpleasant	mon-
etarist	arithmetic”	voor	fiscaal	beleid.	Bovendien	laten	de	resultaten	ons	een	systematisering	
van	de	mogelijke	oplossingen	uitvoeren	voor	de	samenwerking	tussen	de	regering	en	de	Cen-
trale	Bank.	Er	waren	ook	doelstellingen	van	fiscaal	en	monetair	beleid	vastgesteld	die	zonder	
coördinatie	onrealiseerbaar	zouden	zijn	geweest.	Dankzij	de	analyse	van	de	beperkingen	van	
houdbaarheid	en	haalbaarheid	van	macro-economische	politiek	in	het	kader	van	het	model	
voor	de	ontwikkeling	van	inflatie	en	staatsschulden	hebben	we	mogelijkheden	gevonden	een	
gebied	op	het	fase-diagram	te	bepalen	waarop	zelfs	de	gecoördineerde	macro-economische	
politiek	niet	in	staat	zou	zijn	om	de	crisis	bij	afbetaling	van	staatsschulden	en	hyperinflatie	af	
te	wenden.	
In	Hoofdstuk	5	bieden	we	aan	een	breed	overzicht	van	de	wisselwerking	tussen	de	reger-
ing	en	de	Centrale	Bank.	Hun	gezamenlijk	beleid	moet	niet	in	conflict	zijn	met	het	principe	
van	stabiliteit	wat	het	onderhoud	van	de	staatsschulden	betreft.	Deze	benadering	verklaart	
niet	alleen	de	huidige	situatie	op	het	gebied	van	financiën	en	op	de	monetaire	markt,	maar	
ook	de	richtlijnen	van	het	toekomstige	beleid	als	zodanig.	Beschouwend	de	rationele	verwa-
chtingen	van	de	privésector	als	toelaatbaar,	laten	we	de	uitbreiding	van	mogelijkheden	van	
fiscale	en	monetaire	politiek	zien	als	hun	ontwerpers	in	staat	zouden	zijn	een	actieve	invloed	
uit	 te	oefenen	op	de	verwachtingen	van	de	maatschappij.	Bij	de	toelating	van	een	mogeli-
jkheid	veranderingen	in	de	macro-economische	politiek	eerder	te	melden	dan	de	uitvoering	
daarvan	plaats	zou	vinden	hebben	we	nieuwe	belangrijke	resultaten	geboekt	op	het	gebied	van	
de	fiscale	theorie	van	inflatie.	Ten	eerste,	zijn	we	in	staat	om	een	oplossing	te	vinden	van	het	
probleem	van	“unpleasant	monetarist	arithmetic”.	Met	name	demonstreren	we	dat	het	onder	
bepaalde	omstandigheden	monetair	 beleid	 en	kredietbeleid	permanent	 verscherpt	 kunnen	
worden	bij	(exogeen)	fiscaal	beleid.	Ten	tweede	laat	ons	onderzoek	zien	dat	voor	de	samen-
werking	tussen	fiscaal,	monetair	en	kredietbeleid	het	huidige	volume	van	seignorage	minder	
van	belang	is	dan	de	bekwaamheid	van	de	Centrale	Bank	invloed	uit	te	oefenen	op	de	nu	te	
verwachten	grootheid	van	toekomstige	seignorage.	Ten	derde	zijn	we	in	staat	om	drie	factoren	
te	definiëren	die	van	belang	zijn	geweest	bij	de	uitvoering	van	fiscale,	monetaire	en	kredietpo-
litiek.	Deze	factoren	zijn:	(i)	de	verwachtingen	van	economische	agenten	ten	opzichte	van	de	
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aanstaande	veranderingen	in	monetair	beleid,	(ii)	het	inflatieniveau	in	de	economie	(regime	
van	inflatie),	en	(iii)	de	rentevoet	die	bepaald	is	voor	het	onderhoud	van	staatsschulden.	Deze	
laatste	 factor	 is	bepalend	niet	alleen	voor	de	dynamiek	 in	de	 fiscale	sfeer,	maar	ook	bij	de	
vorming	van	monetair	beleid	en	kredietbeleid.
In	de	thesen	is	een	aantal	historische	episoden	behandeld	die	ontleend	waren	uit	de	mac-
ro-economische	politiek	van	heel	verschillende	 landen	zoals	Argentinië,	Chili,	 Indonesië,	
Israel,	Korea,	Maleisië,	Mexico,	de	Filippijnen,	Rusland,	Thailand	en	de	Verenigde	Staten.	
Daarbij	stelden	we	ons	tot	doel	op	basis	van	deze	voorbeelden	verschillende	manieren	van	
samenwerking	 tussen	 fiscale,	monetaire	 en	 kredietpolitiek	 te	 presenteren	 en	de	mogelijke	
problemen	te	illustreren	die	tijdens	deze	samenwerking	zouden	kunnen	ontstaan.	
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